What is the ecosystem approach for fisheries management?

The ecosystem approach for fisheries management is a widely accepted concept and various international instruments require its application. However, there are various interpretations of the ecosystem approach and its application almost always brings about confrontations and resistance among managers, proponents, and stakeholders. This paper categorizes the ecosystem approach into four distinguishable types: bycatch mitigation, multi-species management, protection of vulnerable ecosystems, and integrated approach. Furthermore, the lack of identification and understanding of specific management goals is hampering the application of the ecosystem approach. Unless the stakeholders understand and accept the goals, the ecosystem approach will not succeed.     

From user-groups to stakeholders? The public interest in fisheries management

Fisheries management has long been characterised by strong user-group involvement, created to enhance the legitimacy and proficiency of decisions. Due to perennial problems of overfishing and resource depletion, the privileged position of users are increasingly being challenged, and there have been calls for more inclusive and democratic institutions. Fish, it is argued, is a public resource and should be managed through institutional arrangements that take the public interest into account. Taking the demands for more inclusive and transparent management institutions as our starting point, the article addresses some of the issues emanating from a stakeholder approach to fisheries management. Against the backdrop of stakeholder theory, as it has been developed in the literature on business management, we attempt to identify—and classify—those with a legitimate stake in the fisheries. We also address some of the problems and complexities of stakeholder management, and conclude with a discussion of some of the central issues and challenges pertaining to the creation of more inclusive and transparent institutions in fisheries management.     

Do boat licences have a role in fisheries managed through individual quotas? Experience in Australian fisheries

Some economists have questioned the need for retaining boat licences in fisheries managed through rights-based systems on the assumption that licences act as an impediment to autonomous adjustment. In this paper, the role of boat licences in fisheries managed through rights-based instruments is explored through examining their use in several fisheries in Australian and elsewhere. The study concludes that any impediment to autonomous adjustment that is produced by boat licences is likely to be small relative to other factors. Further, boat licences play an important role in offsetting imperfections in the rights-based management systems that exist in most countries.     

Community-based management of near-shore fisheries in Vanuatu: What works?

In the Pacific, coastal communities have compensated for chronically low capacity of governments to manage fisheries by implementing local regulations in their marine tenure areas. In order to investigate the performance of community-based fisheries management (CBFM) in Vanuatu, trajectories and factors of change in CBFM systems since the 1990s were analysed. Focal group interviews were conducted in seven villages on Efaté island in 2011 and supplemented by a review of supporting literature. Results reveal the increasing and excessive reliance of CBFM systems on external agencies that promoted overly complex management plans. Examination of trends in CBFM systems shows that community and national fishing rules that were highly acceptable by local societies were more likely to be enforced in the long run. In particular, the establishment of marine reserves was the most widespread and best enforced community rule for the purposes of conservation, ecotourism, and/or fisheries. Overall, the results challenge the current effectiveness of CBFM in achieving sustainability of reef fisheries in Vanuatu, and highlight the over-reliance on small marine reserves as a management tool. Community initiatives must be strengthened by new specific national regulations governing subsistence and commercial reef fisheries as part of a multi-scale co-management approach.     

Coastal risk management: How to motivate individual economic decisions to lower flood risk?

Coastal flood risk is defined as a product of probability of event and its effect, measured in terms of damage. The paper is focused on coastal management strategies aimed to decrease risk by decreasing potential damage. We review socio-economic literature to show that total flood damage depends on individual location choices in the housing market and on individual flood risk awareness. Low flood risk awareness leads to inefficient spatial developments and increased flood risk. We show that personal experience, risk communication, financial instruments like insurance from flooding and technical instruments like building on high elevations, are factors that increase individual risk awareness. Evidence that these factors indeed affect housing prices and land use patterns is provided. We discuss proactive instruments that can be used in coastal zone management in the Netherlands to increase individual risk awareness. We argue that policy-makers may create incentives giving individuals a possibility to make location choices that lead to less total flood risk in the coastal zone area.     

Social–ecological feedback links for ecosystem management: a case study of fisheries in the Central Baltic Sea archipelago

In this paper, we address the implications of changing social-ecological feedback links for a sustainable management of coastal regions applying an ecosystem management perspective. This case study focuses on user patterns of fish resources in the Central Baltic Sea archipelago consisting of three sub-regions: Stockholm archipelago, Sweden, the Åland islands and the archipelago of SW Finland. The transition from a region, mainly relying on a mixture of local natural resources towards a region more dominated by the recreational demands of nearby large urban areas, has altered user patterns of fish resources. This transition has partly followed different pathways in the three sub-regions depending on how socio-economic driving forces have been manifested in management actions. Nevertheless, functioning ecosystems are still the basis for the delivery of ecosystem services and a living archipelago system. The significance of capturing and (re)building feedback links into management regarding knowledge on ecosystem services for a sustainable ecosystem management is discussed.     

Is Europe ready for a results-based approach to fisheries management? The voice of stakeholders

The reformed Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), adopted by the European Union in 2013, aims to achieve sustainable exploitation of marine resources. Beyond the mainstream of stakeholders׳ engagement, the literature increasingly calls for shared accountability in fisheries management. In such scenarios, identifying stakeholders׳ insights becomes critical for a successful design of innovative management approaches. This paper analyses how the stakeholders perceive a results-based management system for four fisheries in different European sea-basins as well as at a pan-European level. The results indicate a need for adaptive and participatory management approaches, building on regional adaptations within transparent and plural frameworks for fisheries. To succeed, the system should explicitly address its associated public and private costs; neither participation nor accountability comes for free.     

The added value of participatory modelling in fisheries management – what has been learnt?

How can uncertain fisheries science be linked with good governance processes, thereby increasing fisheries management legitimacy and effectiveness? Reducing the uncertainties around scientific models has long been perceived as the cure of the fisheries management problem. There is however increasing recognition that uncertainty in the numbers will remain. A lack of transparency with respect to these uncertainties can damage the credibility of science. The EU Commission's proposal for a reformed Common Fisheries Policy calls for more self-management for the fishing industry by increasing fishers' involvement in the planning and execution of policies and boosting the role of fishers' organisations. One way of higher transparency and improved participation is to include stakeholders in the modelling process itself. The JAKFISH project (Judgment And Knowledge in Fisheries Involving StakeHolders) invited fisheries stakeholders to participate in the process of framing the management problem, and to give input and evaluate the scientific models that are used to provide fisheries management advice. JAKFISH investigated various tools to assess and communicate uncertainty around fish stock assessments and fisheries management. Here, a synthesis is presented of the participatory work carried out in four European fishery case studies (Western Baltic herring, North Sea Nephrops, Central Baltic Herring and Mediterranean swordfish), focussing on the uncertainty tools used, the stakeholders' responses to these, and the lessons learnt. It is concluded that participatory modelling has the potential to facilitate and structure discussions between scientists and stakeholders about uncertainties and the quality of the knowledge base. It can also contribute to collective learning, increase legitimacy, and advance scientific understanding. However, when approaching real-life situations, modelling should not be seen as the priority objective. Rather, the crucial step in a science–stakeholder collaboration is the joint problem framing in an open, transparent way.     

Will regionalisation improve fisheries management in the EU? An analysis of the Swedish eel management plan reflects difficulties

In response to the shortcomings of the EU's Common Fisheries Policy, the European Commission has suggested regionalising fisheries management. Examples already exist of the more decentralised management of certain fisheries. Since 2007, the Commission has requested national eel management plans (EMPs) from all EU eel-fishing nations, giving national management bodies considerable freedom to develop their own EMPs. To examine the prerequisites for decentralisation, the Swedish EMP was chosen as a case. The European eel is critically endangered due to overfishing and environmental degradation. Analysis of the Swedish EMP reveals serious flaws: the conflict between the objectives of species and fishery preservation has not been clarified nor is the prioritisation clear. The plan has not been critically reviewed and alternative options are not considered. Though the basic data are uncertain, this uncertainty is viewed as support for not adopting any safety margin. Management is therefore directed towards mitigating the negative effects of fishing and other human activities rather than realising the conservation objective. The efficiency of the various protection measures is also disputable; for example, translocation is problematic, as translocated (i.e., stocked) eels display impaired navigational abilities. Another problematic aspect of this conservation strategy is the slow implementation of the EMP. In conclusion, this study emphasises the necessity of legal and social science as well as natural science research to evaluate the efficiency and implementation of fishery management.     

Who should set the total allowable catch? Social preferences and legitimacy in fisheries management institutions

This article presents a decision-making model based on situations that are typically encountered in fisheries management when setting the total allowable quota. The model allows assessing the differences in outcomes when different management institutions make the decision under uncertain conditions. Social preferences are considered to measure the social expected costs raised by different institutions. Moreover, stakeholder participation and the notion of “legitimacy cost” are taken into account, the latter being defined as the cost of actions that stakeholders may take when they do not agree with decisions made by the management authority. Within this context, economic policy choices are discussed in terms of what type of institutions will generate a higher expected welfare depending on social preferences and legitimacy costs in specific contexts. Finally, this article also discusses what aspects should be considered when designing stakeholder and scientific boards in the TAC setting process.     

User participation and institutional change in fisheries management: a viable alternative to the failures of ‘top-down’ driven control?

This article investigates the role and value of user participation in fisheries management. New empirical data on changes in the institutional structure of fisheries management systems is presented by examining the management structure of two Danish fisheries. The analysis focuses on how user participation functions are institutionalized as co-management between administrators and user groups. General lessons for successful user participation in management are deduced. The paper concludes that co-management is able to overcome some of the fundamental problems related to modern fisheries management and that co-management can work as an active and effective management tool rather than as an impediment to efficient management.     

Seasonal variability in the Macroinvertebrate Community Index: Are seasonal correction factors required?

Freshwater macroinvertebrate data collected from streams in Taranaki, New Zealand (1981–2006) were used to examine seasonality of biological indices including taxon richness, %EPT (Ephemeroptera, Plecoptera, and Trichoptera) richness, and the hard‐ and soft‐bottomed (‐sb) stream versions of the Macroinvertebrate Community Index (MCI). All indices tested showed modest but statistically significant seasonal variation in hard‐bottomed streams. Seasonal means for the MCI were within ±3.0% of the annual mean. The Semi‐Quantitative MCI (SQMCI) (±4.3%), %EPT richness (±7.4%) and taxon richness (±7.7%) showed greater seasonal variability than the MCI. MCI, SQMCI, and %EPT richness were significantly higher in spring and winter compared with autumn and summer. Taxon richness was lower in winter than in other seasons. In soft‐bottomed streams, SQMCI‐sb showed least seasonality (within ±3.6% of the annual mean, nonsignificant), followed by MCI‐sb and taxon richness (±4.7%), and %EPT richness (±11.2%). Spring and winter MCI‐sb and SQMCI‐sb values tended to be significantly higher than those calculated from summer or autumn samples, although most values were within 5% of the annual site means. Examination of seasonal variation in species traits and their relationships to observed seasonal patterns of biotic indices did not support the suggestion that seasonal variations in life histories of aquatic macroinvertebrates affect index values. Rather, seasons with higher biotic index values were associated with a greater frequency of flow disturbance, which is consistent with the view that the character of New Zealand's stream macroinvertebrate communities with their poorly‐synchronised life histories, has been shaped by the unpredictable physical environment. We recommend the MCI and MCI‐sb for State of Environment reporting in New Zealand for cost‐effectiveness and because data requirements and seasonal variation were less than for quantitative alternative indices. We suggest that seasonal variability is unlikely to confound interpretation, and does not need to be considered.     

From low- to high-value fisheries: Is it possible to quantify the trade-off between management cost,risk and catch?

Fishery managers are faced with the challenge of maintaining sustainable fisheries at the lowest possible cost while conforming to international and national obligations. Given that fisheries range from low to high value, there is a real need to understand how to trade ecological and economic risks, and the various costs associated with their management, against the benefits from catch. Key to this is an understanding of (a) the costs corresponding to a given level of acceptable risk, or conversely, (b) the change in risk given a change in cost investment. This paper first defines biological, economic and ecosystem risk at a whole-of-fishery level, and then develops a simple model to quantify the trade-offs between risk, cost and catch. Using as case studies Australia's federally managed fisheries that range from data-rich to data-poor, risk was quantified for target species in terms of both their limit and target reference points (defined as “biological risk” and “economic risk”, respectively), and for ecosystems in terms of overall ecological impact (defined as “ecosystem risk”). A statistical linear model was used to quantify the risk–cost–catch frontier for each of the three forms of risk. The most parsimonious models were statistically significant for each. However, the management and research costs were mostly positively correlated with risk, indicating that these tended to be reactive to risk, as opposed to risk decreasing in response to increased costs. The only model where this was not the case was for the ecosystem risk, which is probably because these risks have only recently been assessed and the management response to these risks across all the fisheries has so far been limited. For target species risks, it was not possible to develop a model for proactive use. However, the method itself has merit and, if the costs were defined to a greater level of resolution, and/or a time-dynamic modelling approach considered, these issues could potentially be addressed.     

Adaptive management of declining fisheries: When is it worth trying to rebuild stocks through fishery regulation?

Declining catches are typically taken to be a warning sign of overfishing. But in fact, many such declines have been driven by recruitment changes unrelated to stock size, as evidenced by the failure of stocks to recover after reduction in fishing or recovery despite the failure to reduce fishing. Given a declining pattern, supposedly precautionary decisions to reduce fishing should be treated as experimental management options with a high probability of not resulting in the desired recovery to more productive stock sizes. Simple decision tables can be used to compare such experimental options to “wait and see” options that do not involve fishing reductions. A case example with a grouper fishery in Kuwait demonstrates that experimental effort reduction may not be the best policy from a decision analysis perspective, at least when there are substantial reasons to expect recruitment changes unrelated to stock size. In this case, virtual population analysis and stock reduction analysis models indicate either unusually weak recruitment compensation (steepness h < 0.4) or progressive decline in recruitment carrying capacity, possibly caused by decreases in estuarine rearing habitat associated with declining flows of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.     

Frozen fish block: how commited are North Atlantic States to accountability,conservation and management of fisheries?

The North Atlantic Ocean has numerous global, regional, and sub-regional instruments for fisheries management. Research for this paper has examined North Atlantic State levels of compliance with these instruments. The study reveals there to be moderate levels of overall compliance, and a latitudinal gradient of compliance with Northern States scoring higher than those in the south. Of particular significance for other global regions, and the future development of international fisheries law, are the findings that: few regional fishery bodies have a systematic program in place to monitor and assess compliance; and despite overall moderate levels of compliance with the conservation and management regimes, most fishery stocks are either overexploited or at risk or collapse.     

Is the catch quota management (CQM) mechanism attractive to fishers? A preliminary analysis of the Danish 2011 CQM trial project

There is a demand for a management mechanism that can reduce the discarding problems of EU fisheries. Catch quota management (CQM) seems to be a promising candidate for such a mechanism. Drawing on a principal–agent model, the objective of this study is to develop and test a method for investigating if the CQM mechanism is efficient in providing fishers with incentives for participating in CQM and complying with the rules. The study uses the 2011 Danish CQM trial project as its empirical basis. The results indicate that CQM fishers have a higher average gross income compared to fishers harvesting according to the conventional rules. Hence, there is an incentive for fishers to participate in the trial. However, with the possibility to cheat, CQM fishers may achieve even higher gross income. It is not obvious that the CQM mechanism׳s payoff structure (incentives) is attractive enough to ensure that the fishers comply with the rules. The empirical data illustrate that without discarding the CQM fishers achieve a lower average price for their catches. Therefore, to make the CQM mechanism sufficiently attractive to fishers, the participating fishers must be compensated.     

Striking the right balance? Applying the jurisprudence of international tribunals to coastal state innovations in international fisheries governance

While the coastal State has ‘sovereign rights’ with respect to the exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of the living resources of the exclusive economic zone, including the right to take the necessary enforcement measures, these rights are not as all-encompassing as they first appear. In practice, the geographic and substantive limitations on the coastal State's jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone provide significant challenges to effective fisheries governance and enforcement. This paper considers the approaches that have been adopted – or could be adopted – by coastal States seeking to improve the reach and effectiveness of their jurisdiction over the living resources of the exclusive economic zone, by reference to the current state of jurisprudence from international courts and tribunals.     

Beyond sustainability: is government obliged to increase economic benefit from fisheries in the face of industry resistance?

Substantial economic opportunities have been identified in many Australian fisheries but may remain unimplemented due to the perception that the role of government is to ensure harvests are biologically sustainable, while economic decisions should be left to the commercial industry. This paper explores the role of government in driving changes that increase revenue and profit from fisheries (termed economic benefit). Australian fisheries resources are managed by eight different jurisdictions. While each have separate legislation, there is invariably a responsibility to manage on behalf of, and to the benefit of the public, who are the owners of the resource. This paper uses case studies to explore how government can struggle to determine the public interest, separate this from private interests and then implement management changes to ensure the public utility is maximised. Common problems were: (i) overarching economic objectives, which define who should benefit, were often ambiguous and open to interpretation; (ii) the public interest was usually abstract and often under-represented in decision-making processes, (in contrast to industry, who have direct representation); (iii) special interest groups were often able to lobby against changes; and (iv) government was often reluctant to seize opportunities to increase economic benefit when there was significant industry opposition to management changes. In drawing attention to these challenges and how they have been overcome historically, it is argued that government has both a role and requirement under their legislative objectives to take the lead in implementing measures that increase the economic benefit from Australian fisheries.