Ocean acidification and climate change: synergies and challenges of addressing both under the UNFCCC

Ocean acidification and climate change are linked by their common driver: CO₂. Climate change is the consequence of a range of GHG emissions, but ocean acidification on a global scale is caused solely by increased concentrations of atmospheric CO₂. Reducing CO₂ emissions is therefore the most effective way to mitigate ocean acidification. Acting to prevent further ocean acidification by reducing CO₂ emissions will also provide simultaneous benefits by alleviating future climate change. Although it is possible that reducing CO₂ emissions to a level low enough to address ocean acidification will simultaneously address climate change, the reverse is unfortunately not necessarily true. Despite the ocean's integral role in the climate system and the potentially wide-ranging impacts on marine life and humans, the problem of ocean acidification is largely absent from most policy discussions pertaining to CO₂ emissions. The linkages between ocean acidification, climate change and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are identified and possible scenarios for developing common solutions to reduce and adapt to ocean acidification and climate change are offered. Areas where the UNFCCC is currently lacking capacity to effectively tackle rising ocean acidity are also highlighted.     

Detecting potential changes in the meridional overturning circulation at 26˚N in the Atlantic

We analyze the ability of an oceanic monitoring array to detect potential changes in the North Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (MOC). The observing array is ‘deployed’ into a numerical model (ECHAM5/MPI-OM), and simulates the measurements of density and wind stress at 26^°N in the Atlantic. The simulated array mimics the continuous monitoring system deployed in the framework of the UK Rapid Climate Change program. We analyze a set of three realizations of a climate change scenario (IPCC A1B), in which – within the considered time-horizon of 200 years – the MOC weakens, but does not collapse. For the detection analysis, we assume that the natural variability of the MOC is known from an independent source, the control run. Our detection approach accounts for the effects of observation errors, infrequent observations, autocorrelated internal variability, and uncertainty in the initial conditions. Continuous observation with the simulated array for approximately 60 years yields a statistically significant (p < 0.05) detection with 95 percent reliability assuming a random observation error of 1 Sv (1 Sv = 10⁶ m³ s^?1). Observing continuously with an observation error of 3 Sv yields a detection time of about 90 years (with 95 percent reliability). Repeated hydrographic transects every 5 years/ 20 years result in a detection time of about 90 years/120 years, with 95 percent reliability and an assumed observation error of 3 Sv. An observation error of 3 Sv (one standard deviation) is a plausible estimate of the observation error associated with the RAPID UK 26^°N array.     

A new strategy for global climate protection

This essay proposes an innovative institutional strategy for global climate protection, quite distinct from but ultimately complementary to the UNFCCC climate treaty negotiations. Our “building block” strategy relies on a variety of smaller-scale transnational cooperative arrangements, involving not only states, but also subnational jurisdictions, firms, and civil society organizations, to undertake activities whose primary goal is not climate mitigation but which will achieve greenhouse gas reductions as a byproduct. This strategy avoids the problems inherent in developing an enforceable, comprehensive treaty regime by mobilizing other incentives—including economic self-interest, energy security, cleaner air, and furtherance of international development— to motivate a range of actors to cooperate on actions that will also produce climate benefits. The strategy uses three specific models of regime formation (club, linkage, and dominant actor models) which emerge from economics, international relations, and organizational behavior, to develop a variety of transnational regimes that are generally self-enforcing and sustainable, avoiding the free rider and compliance problems endemic in collective action to provide public goods. These regimes will contribute to global climate action not only by achieving emissions reductions in the short term, but also by creating global webs of cooperation and trust, and by linking the building block regimes to the UNFCCC system through greenhouse gas monitoring and reporting systems. We argue that the building blocks regimes would thereby help secure eventual agreement on a comprehensive climate treaty.     

The global carbon market-mechanism landscape: pre and post 2020 perspectives

With market-mechanisms likely to achieve emission reductions at lower cost than alternative approaches, there is a presumption that they will be embraced by those who are serious about achieving ambitious reductions. Two broad messages exist; there is already considerable activity and some ambition in many parts of the world – a fragmented but embryonic ‘global’ trading landscape is emerging – and there are efforts at UN level to provide a unifying framework for these bottom-up developments. The topography of interest and response varies considerably across groups of countries, and there have been delays in making progress on a unifying framework. This article analyses the current carbon market landscape in terms of market dynamics and market-mechanism developments whilst undertaking an examination of how climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is shaping the future carbon market landscape. This work shows that the combination of existing, emerging, and potential carbon market-mechanisms can be regarded as an emerging pre-2020 fragmented ‘global’ carbon market landscape based on differing bottom-up market based approaches. One outcome of a 2015 Climate Agreement could be a post-2020 global carbon market which would include new domestic and international market initiatives such as the Framework for Various Approaches and New Market Mechanism, together with reformed Kyoto mechanisms.

Policy relevance

With the 2015 Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) expected to see Parties commit to ambitious mitigation commitments, post-2020 could see significant Party (& industry) investment in market-mechanisms and associated emissions units in an effort to achieve some of the abatement cost minimization offered by market approaches. This article is written for those who have an interest in understanding what is happening – and what is not happening – as regards the emergence of market-related approaches to GHG mitigation globally in the run up to the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC which meets in Paris in December 2015, and what could be the shape of things to come post-2020.     

The changing geopolitics of climate change finance

Funding for climate change efforts in developing countries is firmly established in the Articles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Since the early days of the climate change negotiations, finance has been a key focus of attention and, often, a principal source of tension between developed and developing countries. Understandably, these tensions have led to numerous efforts to reform the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC. The history of reforms of the Global Environment Facility – for some time the only operating entity of the financial mechanism – and the recent establishment of the Green Climate Fund are good examples of such efforts. It is asked here whether these efforts have been sufficient to keep pace with a rapidly changing, more complex and radically different world from that of 1992 when the UNFCCC was signed by most countries in Rio de Janeiro. On the 21st anniversary of the signing of the UNFCCC, the effects that global transformations have had on climate change finance are here explored, and some of the new challenges, as well as emerging opportunities, resulting from the new landscape of climate finance that has emerged as a result are described.

Policy relevance

The climate change negotiations are entering a critical period. The issue of finance is one of the key pillars on which the success of a new deal on a binding agreement depends. A better understanding of the increasing complexity of the climate finance landscape is essential. The world of climate finance and the geopolitics in which it operates have been significantly transformed since the signing of the UNFCCC. A better understanding of this transformation would help policy makers and negotiators find more effective and realistic ways to help unleash the immense amount of financial resources that could potentially be made available for the great challenge that many countries face to address climate change. The need for up-front and significantly scaled-up investments requires effective mechanisms that can leverage and encourage investments into areas where they are most needed to face the challenge of climate change. The role of the Green Climate Fund will be critical in this regard.     

The dynamics of learning about a climate threshold

Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions may trigger threshold responses of the climate system. One relevant example of such a potential threshold response is a shutdown of the North Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (MOC). Numerous studies have analyzed the problem of early MOC change detection (i.e., detection before the forcing has committed the system to a threshold response). Here we analyze the early MOC prediction problem. To this end, we virtually deploy an MOC observation system into a simple model that mimics potential future MOC responses and analyze the timing of confident detection and prediction. Our analysis suggests that a confident prediction of a potential threshold response can require century time scales, considerably longer that the time required for confident detection. The signal enabling early prediction of an approaching MOC threshold in our model study is associated with the rate at which the MOC intensity decreases for a given forcing. A faster MOC weakening implies a higher MOC sensitivity to forcing. An MOC sensitivity exceeding a critical level results in a threshold response. Determining whether an observed MOC trend in our model differs in a statistically significant way from an unforced scenario (the detection problem) imposes lower requirements on an observation system than the determination whether the MOC will shut down in the future (the prediction problem). As a result, the virtual observation systems designed in our model for early detection of MOC changes might well fail at the task of early and confident prediction. Transferring this conclusion to the real world requires a considerably refined MOC model, as well as a more complete consideration of relevant observational constraints.     

What are robust strategies in the face of uncertain climate threshold responses?

We use an integrated assessment model of climate change to analyze how alternative decision-making criteria affect preferred investments into greenhouse gas mitigation, the distribution of outcomes, the robustness of the strategies, and the economic value of information. We define robustness as trading a small decrease in a strategy’s expected performance for a significant increase in a strategy’s performance in the worst cases. Specifically, we modify the Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (DICE-07) to include a simple representation of a climate threshold response, parametric uncertainty, structural uncertainty, learning, and different decision-making criteria. Economic analyses of climate change strategies typically adopt the expected utility maximization (EUM) framework. We compare EUM with two decision criteria adopted from the finance literature, namely Limited Degree of Confidence (LDC) and Safety First (SF). Both criteria increase the relative weight of the performance under the worst-case scenarios compared to EUM. We show that the LDC and SF criteria provide a computationally feasible foundation for identifying greenhouse gas mitigation strategies that may prove more robust than those identified by the EUM criterion. More robust strategies show higher near-term investments in emissions abatement. Reducing uncertainty has a higher economic value of information for the LDC and SF decision criteria than for EUM.     

Dangerous anthropogenic interference, dangerous climatic change, and harmful climatic change: non-trivial distinctions with significant policy implications

Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) calls for stabilization of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at levels that prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference (DAI) in the climate system. However, some of the recent policy literature has focused on dangerous climatic change (DCC) rather than on DAI. DAI is a set of increases in GHGs concentrations that has a non-negligible possibility of provoking changes in climate that in turn have a non-negligible possibility of causing unacceptable harm, including harm to one or more of ecosystems, food production systems, and sustainable socio-economic systems, whereas DCC is a change of climate that has actually occurred or is assumed to occur and that has a non-negligible possibility of causing unacceptable harm. If the goal of climate policy is to prevent DAI, then the determination of allowable GHG concentrations requires three inputs: the probability distribution function (pdf) for climate sensitivity, the pdf for the temperature change at which significant harm occurs, and the allowed probability (“risk”) of incurring harm previously deemed to be unacceptable. If the goal of climate policy is to prevent DCC, then one must know what the correct climate sensitivity is (along with the harm pdf and risk tolerance) in order to determine allowable GHG concentrations. DAI from elevated atmospheric CO₂ also arises through its impact on ocean chemistry as the ocean absorbs CO₂. The primary chemical impact is a reduction in the degree of supersaturation of ocean water with respect to calcium carbonate, the structural building material for coral and for calcareous phytoplankton at the base of the marine food chain. Here, the probability of significant harm (in particular, impacts violating the subsidiary conditions in Article 2 of the UNFCCC) is computed as a function of the ratio of total GHG radiative forcing to the radiative forcing for a CO₂ doubling, using two alternative pdfs for climate sensitivity and three alternative pdfs for the harm temperature threshold. The allowable radiative forcing ratio depends on the probability of significant harm that is tolerated, and can be translated into allowable CO₂ concentrations given some assumption concerning the future change in total non-CO₂ GHG radiative forcing. If future non-CO₂ GHG forcing is reduced to half of the present non-CO₂ GHG forcing, then the allowable CO₂ concentration is 290–430 ppmv for a 10% risk tolerance (depending on the chosen pdfs) and 300–500 ppmv for a 25% risk tolerance (assuming a pre-industrial CO₂ concentration of 280 ppmv). For future non-CO₂ GHG forcing frozen at the present value, and for a 10% risk threshold, the allowable CO₂ concentration is 257–384 ppmv. The implications of these results are that (1) emissions of GHGs need to be reduced as quickly as possible, not in order to comply with the UNFCCC, but in order to minimize the extent and duration of non-compliance; (2) we do not have the luxury of trading off reductions in emissions of non-CO₂ GHGs against smaller reductions in CO₂ emissions, and (3) preparations should begin soon for the creation of negative CO₂ emissions through the sequestration of biomass carbon.     

Spatial impact of projected changes in rainfall and temperature on wheat yields in Australia

Climate projections over the next two to four decades indicate that most of Australia’s wheat-belt is likely to become warmer and drier. Here we used a shire scale, dynamic stress-index model that accounts for the impacts of rainfall and temperature on wheat yield, and a range of climate change projections from global circulation models to spatially estimate yield changes assuming no adaptation and no CO₂ fertilisation effects. We modelled five scenarios, a baseline climate (climatology, 1901–2007), and two emission scenarios (“low” and “high” CO₂) for two time horizons, namely 2020 and 2050. The potential benefits from CO₂ fertilisation were analysed separately using a point level functional simulation model. Irrespective of the emissions scenario, the 2020 projection showed negligible changes in the modelled yield relative to baseline climate, both using the shire or functional point scale models. For the 2050-high emissions scenario, changes in modelled yield relative to the baseline ranged from ?5 % to +6 % across most of Western Australia, parts of Victoria and southern New South Wales, and from ?5 to ?30 % in northern NSW, Queensland and the drier environments of Victoria, South Australia and in-land Western Australia. Taking into account CO₂ fertilisation effects across a North–south transect through eastern Australia cancelled most of the yield reductions associated with increased temperatures and reduced rainfall by 2020, and attenuated the expected yield reductions by 2050.     

How to increase technology transfers to developing countries: a synthesis of the evidence

The existing United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has failed to deliver the rate of low-carbon technology transfer (TT) required to curb GHG emissions in developing countries. This failure has exposed the limitations of universalism and renewed interest in bilateral approaches to TT. Gaps are identified in the UNFCCC approach to climate change TT: missing links between international institutions and the national enabling environments that encourage private investment; a non-differentiated approach for (developing) country and technology characteristics; and a lack of clear measurements of the volume and effectiveness of TTs. Evidence from econometric literature and business experience on climate change TT is reviewed, so as to address the identified pitfalls of the UNFCCC process. Strengths and weaknesses of different methodological approaches are highlighted. International policy recommendations are offered aimed at improving the level of emission reductions achieved through TT.     

Uncertainties in global warming science and near-term emission policies

Abstract

It is argued here that stringent, early emission reductions are necessary in order to minimize ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate system’ (DAI), the stated Objective of Article 2 of the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). Given probability distribution functions (pdfs) for climate sensitivity and the temperature threshold for harm consistent with currently available evidence, and accepting a 10% risk of unacceptable damage as the threshold for ‘danger’, it is not possible to avoid DAI. Having adopted a precautionary approach in setting emission trajectories, the possibility arises that future resolution of uncertainties concerning climate sensitivity and the harm threshold may show the climate sensitivity to be low (1–2 K) and the harm threshold high (2 K rather than 1 K). Using a simple coupled climate-carbon cycle model, it is shown that if the climate sensitivity were to be definitively determined to be 2 K in 2020, then the emission reductions achieved by that time and planned for the next two decades are still fully needed. Only if climate sensitivity is very low (1 K) and the harm threshold is high (2 K) would the emissions achieved by 2020 not have been fully necessary. However, this would still lead to changes in ocean chemistry that are likely to be highly detrimental to marine life. Thus, when the full spectrum of impacts is considered, there is no plausible set of assumptions under which stringent near-term emission reductions are rendered unnecessary.     

Comparison of uncertainty sources for climate change impacts: flood frequency in England

This paper investigates the uncertainty in the impact of climate change on flood frequency in England, through the use of continuous simulation of river flows. Six different sources of uncertainty are discussed: future greenhouse gas emissions; Global Climate Model (GCM) structure; downscaling from GCMs (including Regional Climate Model structure); hydrological model structure; hydrological model parameters and the internal variability of the climate system (sampled by applying different GCM initial conditions). These sources of uncertainty are demonstrated (separately) for two example catchments in England, by propagation through to flood frequency impact. The results suggest that uncertainty from GCM structure is by far the largest source of uncertainty. However, this is due to the extremely large increases in winter rainfall predicted by one of the five GCMs used. Other sources of uncertainty become more significant if the results from this GCM are omitted, although uncertainty from sources relating to modelling of the future climate is generally still larger than that relating to emissions or hydrological modelling. It is also shown that understanding current and future natural variability is critical in assessing the importance of climate change impacts on hydrology.     

Carbon Sequestration and the Restoration of Land Health

Carbon sequestration, the conversion of greenhouse gas CO₂ toorganic matter, offers a powerful tool with which to combat climate change. The enlargement of carbon sinks stored in soil and biota is an essential tool in buying time while mankind seeks means to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and to reduce the elevated levels of atmospheric CO₂. Carbon sequestration within the context of the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) also has great potential as an incentive for combating land degradation and desertification and restoring fertility to degraded land.Decisions regarding carbon sinks during finalization of the operational details of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 fit well the needs of countries facing land degradation and desertification. However, incentives for such mitigation through the Clean Development Mechanism of the protocol are limited to forestry issues. Iceland provides a good example of the multiple role of carbon sequestration in meeting national commitments to UNFCCC, conserving and restoring biological diversity, combating soil erosion, revegetation of eroded land and reforestation. Linking carbon sequestration with such goals has resulted in increased funds for soil conservation and restoration of degraded land in Iceland.     

Overlooked ocean strategies to address climate change

The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC’s) Paris Agreement—which aims to limit climate change and increase global resilience to its effects—was a breakthrough in climate diplomacy, committing its Parties to develop and update national climate plans. Yet the Parties to the Agreement have largely overlooked the effect of climate change on ocean-based communities, economies, and ecosystems—as well as the role that the ocean can play in mitigating and adapting to climate change. Because the ocean is an integral part of the climate system, stronger inclusion of ocean issues is critical to achieving the Agreement’s goals. Here we discuss four ocean-climate linkages that suggest specific responses by Parties to the Agreement connected to 1) accelerating climate ambition, including via sustainable ocean-based mitigation strategies; 2) focusing on CO₂ emissions to address ocean acidification; 3) better understanding ocean-based mitigation; and 4) pursuing ocean-based adaptation. These linkages offer a more complete perspective on the reasons strong climate action is necessary and inform a systematic approach for addressing ocean issues under the Agreement to strengthen climate mitigation and adaptation.     

Scenarios for a 2 °C world: a trade-linked input–output model with high sector detail

In this study a scenario model is used to examine if foreseen technological developments are capable of reducing CO₂ emissions in 2050 to a level consistent with United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreements, which aim at maximizing the temperature rise to 2 °C compared to pre-industrial levels. The model is based on a detailed global environmentally extended supply–use table (EE SUT) for the year 2000, called EXIOBASE. This global EE SUT allows calculating how the final demand in each region drives activities in production sectors, and hence related CO₂ emissions, in each region. Using this SUT framework, three scenarios have been constructed for the year 2050. The first is a business-as-usual scenario (BAU), which takes into account population, economic growth, and efficiency improvements. The second is a techno-scenario (TS), adding feasible and probable climate mitigation technologies to the BAU scenario. The third is the towards-2-degrees scenario (2DS), with a demand shift or growth reduction scenario added to the TS to create a 2 °C scenario. The emission results of the three scenarios are roughly in line with outcomes of typical scenarios from integrated assessment models. Our approach indicates that the 2 °C target seems difficult to reach with advanced CO₂ emission reduction technologies alone.

Policy relevance

The overall outlook in this scenario study is not optimistic. We show that CO₂ emissions from steel and cement production and air and sea transport will become dominant in 2050. They are difficult to reduce further. Using biofuels in air and sea transport will probably be problematic due to the fact that agricultural production largely will be needed to feed a rising global population and biofuel use for electricity production grows substantially in 2050. It seems that a more pervasive pressure towards emission reduction is required, also influencing the basic fabric of society in terms of types and volumes of energy use, materials use, and transport. Reducing envisaged growth levels, hence reducing global gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, might be one final contribution needed for moving to the 2 °C target, but is not on political agendas now.     

Governing people on the move in a warming world: Framing climate change migration and the UNFCCC Task Force on Displacement

Different ways of framing the nexus between climate change and migration have been advanced in academic, advocacy and policy circles. Some understand it as a state-security issue, some take a protection (or human security) approach and yet others portray migration as an adaptation or climate risk management strategy. Yet we have little insight into how these different understandings of the ‘problem’ of climate change-related migration are beginning to shape the emergence of global governance in the climate regime. Through a focus on the UNFCCC Task Force on Displacement we argue that these different framings of climate change migration shape how actors understand the appropriate role of the TFD, including the substantive scope of its mandate; its operational priorities; the nature of its outputs and where it should be situated in the institutional architecture. We show that understanding the different framings of the nexus between climate change and migration – and how these framings are contested within the UNFCCC – can help to account for institutional development in this area of climate governance.     

The sensitivity of the meridional overturning circulation to modelling uncertainty in a perturbed physics ensemble without flux adjustment

Ocean dynamics play a key role in the climate system, by redistributing heat and freshwater. The uncertainty of how these processes are represented in climate models, and how this uncertainty affects future climate projections can be investigated using perturbed physics ensembles of global circulation models (GCMs). Techniques such as flux adjustments should be avoided since they can impact the sensitivity of the ensemble to the imposed forcing. In this study a method for developing an coupled ensemble with a GCM that does not use flux adjustment is presented. The ensemble is constrained by using information from a prior ensemble with a mixed layer ocean coupled to an atmosphere GCM, to reduce drifts in the coupled ensemble. Constraints on parameter perturbations are derived by using observational constraints on surface temperature, and top of the atmosphere radiative fluxes. As an example of such an ensemble developed with this methodology, uncertainty in response of the meridional overturning circulation (MOC) to increased CO₂ concentrations is investigated. The ensemble mean MOC strength is 17.1?Sv and decreases by 2.1?Sv when greenhouse gas concentrations are doubled. No rapid changes or shutdown of the MOC are seen in any of the ensemble members. There is a strong negative relationship between global mean temperature and MOC strength across the ensemble which is not seen in a multimodel ensemble. A positive relationship between climate sensitivity and the decrease of MOC strength is also seen.     

Modelling the impact of climate extremes: an overview of the MICE project

This paper provides an overview of the aims, objectives, research activities undertaken, and a selection of results generated in the European Commission-funded project entitled “Modelling the Impact of Climate Extremes” (MICE) – a pan-European end-to-end assessment, from climate model to impact model, of the potential impacts of climate change on a range of economic sectors important to the region. MICE focussed on changes in temperature, precipitation and wind extremes. The research programme had three main themes – the evaluation of climate model performance, an assessment of the potential future changes in the occurrence of extremes, and an examination of the impacts of changes in extremes on six activity sectors using a blend of quantitative modelling and expert judgement techniques. MICE culminated in a large stakeholder-orientated workshop, the aim of which was not only to disseminate project results but also to develop new stakeholder networks, whose expertise can be drawn on in future projects such as ENSEMBLES. MICE is part of a cluster of three projects, all related to European climate change and its impacts. The other projects in the cluster are PRUDENCE (Prediction of Regional Scenarios and Uncertainties for Defining European Climate Change Risks and Effects) and STARDEX (Statistical and Regional Dynamical Downscaling of Extremes for European Regions).     

Uncertainty of forest carbon stock changes – implications to the total uncertainty of GHG inventory of Finland

Uncertainty analysis facilitates identification of the most important categories affecting greenhouse gas (GHG) inventory uncertainty and helps in prioritisation of the efforts needed for development of the inventory. This paper presents an uncertainty analysis of GHG emissions of all Kyoto sectors and gases for Finland consolidated with estimates of emissions/removals from LULUCF categories. In Finland, net GHG emissions in 2003 were around 69 Tg (±15 Tg) CO₂ equivalents. The uncertainties in forest carbon sink estimates in 2003 were larger than in most other emission categories, but of the same order of magnitude as in carbon stock change estimates in other land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) categories, and in N₂O emissions from agricultural soils. Uncertainties in sink estimates of 1990 were lower, due to better availability of data. Results of this study indicate that inclusion of the forest carbon sink to GHG inventories reported to the UNFCCC increases uncertainties in net emissions notably. However, the decrease in precision is accompanied by an increase in the accuracy of the overall net GHG emissions due to improved completeness of the inventory. The results of this study can be utilised when planning future GHG mitigation protocols and emission trading schemes and when analysing environmental benefits of climate conventions.     

Analysis of change in relative uncertainty in GHG emissions from stationary sources for the EU 15

Total uncertainty in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions changes over time due to “learning” and structural changes in GHG emissions. Understanding the uncertainty in GHG emissions over time is very important to better communicate uncertainty and to improve the setting of emission targets in the future. This is a diagnostic study divided into two parts. The first part analyses the historical change in the total uncertainty of CO₂ emissions from stationary sources that the member states estimate annually in their national inventory reports. The second part presents examples of changes in total uncertainty due to structural changes in GHG emissions considering the GAINS (Greenhouse Gas and Air Pollution Interactions and Synergies) emissions scenarios that are consistent with the EU’s “20-20-20” targets. The estimates of total uncertainty for the year 2020 are made under assumptions that relative uncertainties of GHG emissions by sector do not change in time, and with possible future uncertainty reductions for non-CO₂ emissions, which are characterized by high relative uncertainty. This diagnostic exercise shows that a driving factor of change in total uncertainty is increased knowledge of inventory processes in the past and prospective future. However, for individual countries and longer periods, structural changes in emissions could significantly influence the total uncertainty in relative terms.