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1.
Most countries implementing an emissions trading system (ETS), such as EU member states, California in the US, or South Korea, are generally targeting large sized companies, which consume energy above a specific threshold. However, previous studies using computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have analyzed climate policies without considering company size. This may have led to inaccurate results because the impacts of climate policy would differ depending on the coverage of regulated companies. Accordingly, this study examines the environmental and economic impacts of greenhouse gas emission reduction policies, assuming policy results vary by firm size, as covered by the Korean emission trading system. To this end, a CGE model with a separate social accounting matrix based on company size is used to compare three scenarios that reflect different types of carbon pricing methods. The results show that greenhouse gases will be reduced to a lower extent and utility will decrease more if mitigation policies are only imposed to large companies.

Key policy insights

  • Carbon pricing policies should consider the different impacts on companies of different sizes and industry sectors.

  • Without considering the different sizes of companies covered by an ETS, the expected carbon price and its economic impact will be underestimated.

  • Small and medium-sized companies will face more negative impacts than large companies in some industry sectors under an ETS, even if the mitigation burden is only faced by large companies.

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2.
Oskar Lecuyer 《Climate Policy》2019,19(8):1002-1018
We study the interactions between a CO2 emissions trading system (ETS) and renewable energy subsidies under uncertainty over electricity demand and energy costs. We develop an analytical model and a numerical model applied to the European Union electricity market in which renewable energy subsidies are justified only by CO2 abatement. We confirm that in this context, when uncertainty is small, renewable energy subsidies are not welfare-improving, but we show that when uncertainty is large enough, these subsidies increase expected welfare because they provide CO2 abatement even in the case of over-allocation, i.e. when the cap is higher than the emissions which would have occurred without the ETS. The source of uncertainty is important when comparing the various types of renewable energy subsidies. Under uncertainty over electricity demand, renewable energy costs or gas prices, a feed-in tariff brings higher expected welfare than a feed-in premium because it provides a higher subsidy when it is actually needed i.e. when the electricity price is low. Under uncertainty over coal prices, the opposite result holds true.

Key policy insights

  • Due to the possibility of over-allocation in an ETS, subsidies to renewable energies can increase expected welfare, even when climate change mitigation is the only benefit from renewables taken into account.

  • In most cases studied, a feed-in tariff brings a higher expected welfare than a feed-in premium.

  • The European Commission guidelines on State aid for energy, which incentivize member States to replace feed-in tariffs by feed-in premiums, should be reconsidered based on these results.

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3.
This paper examines power relations, coalitions and conflicts that drive and hinder institutional change in South African climate policy. The analysis finds that the most contested climate policies are those that create distributional conflicts where powerful, non-poor actors will potentially experience real losses to their fossil fuel-based operations. This finding opposes the assumption of competing objectives between emissions and poverty reduction. Yet, actors use discourse that relates to potentially competing objectives between emissions reductions, jobs, poverty reduction and economic welfare.

The analysis relates to the broader questions on how to address public policy problems that affect the two objectives of mitigating climate change and simultaneously boosting socio-economic development. South Africa is a middle-income country that represents the challenge of accommodating simultaneous efforts for emissions and poverty reduction.

Institutional change has been constrained especially in the process towards establishing climate budgets and a carbon tax. The opposing coalitions have succeeded in delaying the implementation of these processes, as a result of unequal power relations. Institutional change in South African climate policy can be predominantly characterized as layering with elements of policy innovation. New policies build on existing regulations in all three cases of climate policy examined: the climate change response white paper, the carbon tax and the renewable energy programme. Unbalanced power relations between coalitions of support in government and civil society and opposition mainly from the affected industry result in very fragile institutional change.

Key policy insights

  • The South African government has managed to drive institutional change in climate policy significantly over the past 7 years.

  • Powerful coalitions of coal-related industries and their lobbies have constrained institutional change and managed to delay the implementation of carbon pricing measures.

  • A successfully managed renewable energy programme has started to transform a coal- and nuclear-powered electricity sector towards integrating sustainable energy technologies. The programme is vulnerable to intergovernmental opposition and requires management at the highest political levels.

  • Potential conflict with poverty reduction measures is not a major concern that actively hinders institutional change towards climate objectives. Predominantly non-poor actors frequently use poverty-related discourse to elevate their interests to issues of public concern.

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4.
Brianna Craft 《Climate Policy》2018,18(9):1203-1209
The Paris Agreement establishes a global goal on adaptation which will be assessed through the global stocktake, the first attempt by the international climate change regime to measure collective progress on adaptation. This policy analysis identifies four main challenges to designing a meaningful assessment. These are: designing a system that can aggregate results; managing the dual mandate of reviewing collective progress and informing the enhancement of national level actions; methodological challenges in adaptation; and political challenges around measurement. We propose a mixed-methods approach to addressing these challenges, combining short-term needs for reporting with longer-term aims of enhancing national adaptation actions.

Key policy insights

  • Broad domains of adaptation activity could be identified within each of the objectives of the adaptation goal and progress could be measured and aggregated through simple scorecards.

  • The goal should have both process and outcome indicators as well as some narrative linking activities to outcomes over time.

  • Reporting could be a compilation of national data using qualitative and quantitative sources, aligning with the global stocktake’s aim of enhancing national actions over time and reducing immediate reporting burdens.

  • There would be a complementary role at least in the short term for an expert assessment of priority areas.

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5.
The successful implementation of the Paris Agreement requires substantial energy policy change on the national level. In national energy policy-making, climate change mitigation goals have to be balanced with arguments on other national energy policy goals, namely limiting cost and increasing energy security. Thus far, very little is known about the relative importance of these goals and how they are related to political partisanship. In order to address this gap, we focus on parliamentary discourse around low-carbon energy futures in Germany over the past three decades and analyze the relative importance of, and partisanship around, energy policy goals. We find that the political discourse revolves around four, rather than three, goals as conventionally assumed; improving the competitiveness of the national energy technology industry is not only an additional energy policy goal, it is also highly important in the political discourse. In general, the relative importance of these goals is rather stable over time and partisanship around them is limited. Yet, a sub-analysis of the discourse on renewable energy technologies reveals a high level of partisanship, albeit decreasing over time. Particularly, the energy industry goal’s importance increases while its partisanship vanishes. We discuss how these findings can inform future energy policy research and provide a potential inroad for more ambitious national energy policies.

Key policy insights

  • In addition to the three classic goals of energy policy (limiting cost, securing access and reducing the environmental burden) we identify a fourth policy goal: strengthening the national energy technology industry

  • Conformity between the three classical energy and the industrial policy goals is a key driver explaining policy change

  • For renewable energy technologies, partisanship around this fourth goal is lower than around other goals and decreases over time as innovation allows these technologies to increasingly correspond to policy-makers’ high-level goals

  • Extant research underestimates the importance of industry policy goals, but overestimates environmental co-benefits of low-carbon energy options

  • Paradigmatic policy change in Germany did not depend on top-down shifts in high-level policy goals but was driven by lower-level technology-specific goals

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6.
Environmental policies may have important consequences for firms’ competitiveness or profitability. For the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) the empirical literature documents that significant emissions reductions have resulted from it. Surprisingly, however, the literature shows that there have been hardly any concurrent negative effects on firms’ competitiveness during the first two phases of the scheme (2005–2012). We show that the main explanations for the absence of negative impacts on competitiveness are a large over-allocation of emissions allowances leading to a price drop and the ability of firms to pass costs onto consumers in some sectors. Cost pass-through combined with free allocation, in turn, partly generated windfall profits. In addition, the relatively low importance of energy costs indicated by their average share in the budgets of most manufacturing industries may have limited the impact of the EU ETS. Finally, small but significant stimulating effects on innovation have been found so far. Several factors suggest that over-allocation is likely to remain substantial in the upcoming periods of the scheme. Therefore, we expect to see no negative competitiveness effects from the EU ETS in Phases III and IV (2013–2030).

Key policy insights

  • Empirical literature on the EU ETS shows that there have been hardly any effects on firms’ competitiveness or profitability.

  • One main explanation is a large over-allocation of emissions allowances leading to a price drop. This reduced incentives for innovation.

  • Moreover, firms were able to pass costs on to consumers in some sectors which partly generated windfall profits.

  • Innovation effects have so far been small but positive.

  • We expect to see no negative competitiveness effects on regulated firms in the near future suggesting that no further reliefs for regulated firms are required.

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7.
Reducing GHG emissions and mitigating climate change would require significant investments in renewable energy technologies. Foreign direct investments (FDI) in renewable energy (RE) have increased over the last years, contributing to the diffusion of RE globally. In the field of climate policy, there are multiple policy instruments aimed at attracting investments in renewable energy. This article aims to map the FDI flows globally including source and destination countries. Furthermore, the article investigates which policy instruments attract more FDI in RE sectors such as solar, wind and biomass, based on an econometric analysis of 137 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD countries. The results show that Feed in Tariffs (FIT) followed by Fiscal Measures (FM), such as tax incentives and Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), are the most significant policy instrument that attract FDI in the RE sector globally. Regarding carbon pricing instruments, based on our analysis, carbon tax proved to be correlated with high attraction of FDI in OECD countries, whereas Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) proved to be correlated with high attraction of FDI mainly in non-OECD countries.

Key policy insights

  • Feed in Tariffs is the most significant policy instrument that attracts FDI in the Renewable Energy sector globally.

  • Fiscal Measures (FM), such as tax incentives, show a significant and positive impact on renewable energy projects by foreign investors, and particularly on solar energy.

  • Carbon pricing instruments, such as carbon taxation and emissions trading, proved to attract FDI in OECD and non-OECD countries respectively.

  • Public investments, such as government funds for renewable energy projects, proved not as attractive to foreign private investors, perhaps because public funds are not perceived as stable in the long run.

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8.
While carbon pricing is widely seen as a crucial element of climate policy and has been implemented in many countries, it also has met with strong resistance. We provide a comprehensive overview of public perceptions of the fairness of carbon pricing and how these affect policy acceptability. To this end, we review evidence from empirical studies on how individuals judge personal, distributional and procedural aspects of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade. In addition, we examine preferences for particular redistributive and other uses of revenues generated by carbon pricing and their role in instrument acceptability. Our results indicate a high concern over distributional effects, particularly in relation to policy impacts on poor people, in turn reducing policy acceptability. In addition, people show little trust in the capacities of governments to put the revenues of carbon pricing to good use. Somewhat surprisingly, most studies do not indicate clear public preferences for using revenues to ensure fairer policy outcomes, notably by reducing its regressive effects. Instead, many people prefer using revenues for ‘environmental projects’ of various kinds. We end by providing recommendations for improving public acceptability of carbon pricing. One suggestion to increase policy acceptability is combining the redistribution of revenue to vulnerable groups with the funding for environmental projects, such as on renewable energy.

Key policy insights

  • If people perceive carbon pricing instruments as fair, this increases policy acceptability and support.

  • People’s satisfaction with information provided by the government about the policy instrument increases acceptability.

  • While people express high concern over uneven distribution of the policy burden, they often prefer using carbon pricing revenues for environmental projects instead of compensation for inequitable outcomes.

  • Recent studies find that people’s preferences shift to using revenues for making policy fairer if they better understand the functioning of carbon pricing, notably that relatively high prices of CO2-intensive goods and services reduce their consumption.

  • Combining the redistribution of revenue to support both vulnerable groups and environmental projects, such as on renewable energy, seems to most increase policy acceptability.

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9.
Zhe Deng  Dongya Li  Tao Pang 《Climate Policy》2018,18(8):992-1011
China is in the process of establishing a national emissions trading system (ETS). Evaluating the implementation effectiveness of the seven pilot ETSs in China is critical for designing this national system. This study administered a questionnaire survey to assess the behaviour of enterprises covered by the seven ETS pilots from the perspective of: the strictness of compliance measures; rules for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV); the mitigation pressure felt by enterprises; and actual mitigation and trading activities. The results show that the pilot MRV and compliance rules have not yet been fully implemented. The main factors involved are the lack of compulsory force of the regulations and the lack of policy awareness within the affected enterprises. Most enterprises have a shortage of free allowances and thus believe that the ETSs have increased their production costs. Most enterprises have already established mitigation targets. Some of the covered enterprises are aware of their own internal emission reduction costs and most of these have used this as an important reference in trading. Many enterprises have accounted for carbon prices in their long-term investment. The proportion of enterprises that have participated in trading is fairly high; however, reluctance to sell is quite pervasive in the market, and enterprises are mostly motivated to trade simply in order to achieve compliance. Few enterprises are willing to manage their allowances in a market-oriented manner. Different free allowance allocation methods directly affect the pathways enterprises take to control emissions.

Key policy insights

  • In the national ETS, the compulsory force of ETS provisions should be strengthened.

  • A reasonable level of free allowance shortage should be ensured to promote emission reduction by enterprises.

  • Sufficient information should be provided to guide enterprises in their allowance management to activate the market.

  • To promote the implementation of mitigation technologies by enterprises, actual output-based allocation methods should be used.

  • The government should use market adjustment mechanisms, such as a price floor and ceiling, to ensure that carbon prices are reasonable and stable, so as to guide long-term low carbon investment.

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10.
This paper provides a detailed analysis of the Tokyo Metropolitan Emissions Trading Scheme (Tokyo ETS), Japan’s first emissions trading scheme with mandatory cap initiated by the government of Tokyo. Unlike trading schemes in other countries, the Tokyo ETS covers indirect emissions from the commercial sector. It is well known that a variety of market barriers impede full realization of energy efficiency opportunities, especially in the commercial sector. Experiences with the Tokyo ETS should therefore provide important lessons for the design of climate change mitigation policies, especially when targeting the commercial sector. The emissions from covered entities have been drastically reduced from those at the scheme’s outset, with an average 14% reduction as of the end of the first commitment period of five years (2010–2014) compared with 2009 levels. This paper shows that the Tokyo ETS alone did not cause these reductions; there were other drivers. Among them, the energy savings triggered by the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 were crucial. The contribution of credit trading, in contrast, was limited since most of the covered entities reduced emissions by themselves. Through an investigation of official reports, an assessment of the emissions data from the covered entities compared to those of uncovered entities and in-depth interviews with firms covered by the scheme, this paper confirms that the main drivers of emissions reductions by covered entities were separate from the ETS. In fact, the advisory aspect of the scheme seems to be much more important in encouraging energy-saving actions.

Key policy insights

  • Most of the observed emission reductions were not caused by the Tokyo ETS alone.

  • An advisory instrument was crucial to the effectiveness of the Tokyo ETS.

  • The experience of the Tokyo ETS suggests that making full use of the advantages of emissions trading is difficult in the case of the commercial sector.

  • Price signals have not provided a stimulus to climate change mitigation actions, which implies that establishing a cap to yield effective carbon prices poses a challenge.

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11.
Energy and climate policies may have significant economy-wide impacts, which are regularly assessed based on quantitative energy-environment-economy models. These tend to vary in their conclusions on the scale and direction of the likely macroeconomic impacts of a low-carbon transition. This paper traces the characteristic discrepancies in models’ outcomes to their origins in different macro-economic theories, most importantly their treatment of technological innovation and finance. We comprehensively analyse the relevant branches of macro-innovation theory and group them into two classes: ‘Equilibrium’ and ‘Non-equilibrium’. While both approaches are rigorous and self-consistent, they frequently yield opposite conclusions for the economic impacts of low-carbon policies. We show that model outcomes are mainly determined by their representations of monetary and finance dimensions, and their interactions with investment, innovation and technological change. Improving these in all modelling approaches is crucial for strengthening the evidence base for policy making and gaining a more consistent picture of the macroeconomic impacts of achieving emissions reductions objectives. The paper contributes towards the ongoing effort of enhancing the transparency and understanding of sophisticated model mechanisms applied to energy and climate policy analysis. It helps tackle the overall ‘black box’ critique, much-cited in policy circles and elsewhere.

Key policy insights

  • Quantitative models commissioned by policy-makers to assess the macroeconomic impacts of climate policy generate contradictory outcomes and interpretations.

  • The source of the differences in model outcomes originates primarily from assumptions on the workings of the financial sector and the nature of money, and of how these interact with processes of low-carbon energy innovation and technological change.

  • Representations of innovation and technological change are incomplete in energy-economy-environment models, leading to limitations in the assessment of the impacts of climate-related policies.

  • All modelling studies should state clearly their underpinning theoretical school and their treatment of finance and innovation.

  • A strong recommendation is given for modellers of energy-economy systems to improve their representations of money and finance.

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12.
Carbon pricing, including carbon taxes and emissions trading, has been adopted by different kinds of polities worldwide. Yet, beyond the increasing adoption over time, little is known about what polities – countries as well as sub- and supranational entities – adopt carbon pricing and why. This paper explores patterns of adoption (both implemented policies and those scheduled to be) through cluster analysis, with the purpose of investigating factors that could explain polities’ decisions to adopt carbon pricing. The study contributes empirically by studying carbon taxes and emissions trading together and by ordering the polities adopting carbon pricing into clusters. It also contributes theoretically, by exploring constellations of variables that drive the adoption of carbon pricing within individual clusters. We investigated 66 adopted policies of carbon pricing, which were divided into five clusters: early adopters, North-American subnational entities, Chinese pilot provinces, second-wave developed polities, and second-wave developing polities. The analysis indicates that the reasons for adopting carbon pricing have shifted over time. While international factors (climate commitments or influences from polities within the same region) are increasingly salient, domestic factors (including crises and income levels) were more important for the early adopters.

Key policy insights

  • Carbon pricing has become a global mainstream policy instrument.

  • Economic and fiscal crises provide windows of opportunity for promoting carbon pricing.

  • The international climate regime can support the adoption of carbon pricing through mitigation commitments and international financial and technical assistance.

  • Learning between polities from the same region is a useful tool for promoting carbon pricing.

  • Carbon intensive economies tend to prefer emissions trading over carbon taxes.

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13.
Climate engineering has received increasing attention, but its discussion has remained on the sidelines of mainstream climate policy. The policy relevance of this previously exotic option is poised to rise because of the gap between the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement and slow global mitigation efforts. It is therefore crucial to understand the risks and benefits of the proposed schemes, and the social implications of policy choices. Assessment of the risks and benefits of solar geoengineering strongly depends on scenarios, but previous scenarios have not reflected the full range of social choices. In light of concerns over risks, a newer set of scenarios is desirable, which represents both uncertainties and social choices more fully. Borrowing and extending lessons from recent literature on the new community climate scenario process, we envision a possible scenario-building process that combines interdisciplinary scholarship with the involvement of stakeholders and citizens. The resultant scenarios would better characterize uncertainties of, and policy choices for, solar geoengineering, and foster critical appraisal of its risks and benefits. Such societal choices might include not only total ban and large-scale deployment, but also limited deployment, which has received less attention in the scenario literature. The interaction between scenario and governance research would be able to highlight the central issues at stake, including ethical, social, and political dimensions.

Key policy insights

  • A more comprehensive assessment of solar geoengineering is necessary to evaluate its risks and benefits, necessitating new scenario research

  • It is crucial to reflect the full span of policy choices and uncertainties with interdisciplinary collaboration in such scenarios

  • Such societal choices might include not only total ban and large-scale deployment, but also limited deployment, which has received less attention in the scenario literature

  • Participatory scenario research would enable incorporating the concerns and opinions of stakeholders and citizens in scenario creation

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14.
Emission reductions improve the chances that dangerous anthropogenic climate change will be averted, but could also cause some firms financial distress. Corporate failures, especially if they are unnecessary, add to the social cost of abatement. Social value can be permanently destroyed by the dissolution of organizational capital, deadweight losses paid to liquidators, and unemployment. This article proposes using measures of corporate solvency as an objective tool for policy makers to calibrate the optimal stringency of climate change policies, so that they can deliver the least loss of corporate solvency for a given level of emission reductions. They could also be used to determine the generosity of any compensation to address losses to corporate solvency. We demonstrate this approach using a case study of the UK’s Carbon Price Support (a carbon tax).

Key policy insights

  • Solvency metrics could be used to empirically calibrate the optimal stringency of climate policies.

  • An idealized solvency trajectory for firms affected by climate change policy would cause corporate solvency to initially decline – approaching but not exceeding ‘distressed’ levels – and then gradually improve to a new ‘steady state’ once the low-carbon transition had been achieved.

  • In terms of the UK’s Carbon Price Support, corporate solvency of energy-intensive industries was found to be stable subsequent to its introduction. Therefore, the available evidence does not support its later weakening.

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15.
Since the UK introduced a Climate Change Act (CCA) in 2008, similar legislation has followed in a number of states, with each having a slightly different take. What unites these examples is that they all represent framework legislation that aims to facilitate climate change mitigation by creating continuous policy processes whereby mechanisms for the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are developed and implemented. This article is concerned with the extent to which they are living policy processes or rather symbolic gestures. We analyse seven European CCAs with regard to GHG emission reduction targets, planning/implementation mechanisms, and feedback/evaluations prescribed by the laws. These three features correspond with three aspects of climate policy integration (CPI): interpretations of CPI as a norm; CPI as a process of governing; CPI as a policy outcome. We show that CCAs address all three aspects of CPI and constitute living policy processes, although to varying extents. However, CCAs are also policy processes in that they are part of a political system, affected by political forces external to the legislation, positively and negatively.

Key policy insights

  • CCAs can provide a normative basis for policymaking on climate change at the national level, especially through quantitative emission reduction targets.

  • Whilst CCAs can bring some stability and predictability to policymaking on climate change (mainly because legislation is more difficult to amend or remove than policy strategies), they are still vulnerable to political developments.

  • Most CCAs lack either short/medium-term (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden) or long-term (Austria) targets. Given EU Member States’ aim to decarbonise in the next three decades and the Paris Agreement's global goal of pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C, states need to find ways to guide this process. One approach could be the inclusion of short-term, medium-term and long-term targets in their CCAs.

  • Since sanctioning mechanisms are lacking across all the CCAs analysed here, it is not clear what will happen if legally binding targets are not met. Just as it is difficult to imagine speed limits and speed cameras without accompanying penalties, it is hard to imagine how CCAs without sanctions can deliver decarbonization.

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16.
Carbon leakage is central to the discussion on how to mitigate climate change. The current carbon leakage literature focuses largely on industrial production, and less attention has been given to carbon leakage from the electricity sector (the largest source of carbon emissions in China). Moreover, very few studies have examined in detail electricity regulation in the Chinese national emissions trading system (which leads, for example, to double counting) or addressed its implications for potential linkage between the EU and Chinese emissions trading systems (ETSs). This article seeks to fill this gap by analysing the problem of ‘carbon leakage’ from the electricity sector under the China ETS. Specifically, a Law & Economics approach is applied to scrutinize legal documents on electricity/carbon regulation and examine the economic incentive structures of stakeholders in the inter-/intra-regional electricity markets. Two forms of ‘electricity carbon leakage’ are identified and further supported by legal evidence and practical cases. Moreover, the article assesses the environmental and economic implications for the EU of potential linkage between the world’s two largest ETSs. In response, policy suggestions are proposed to address electricity carbon leakage, differentiating leakage according to its sources.

Key policy insights

  • Electricity carbon leakage in China remains a serious issue that has yet to receive sufficient attention.

  • Such leakage arises from the current electricity/carbon regulatory framework in China and jeopardizes mitigation efforts.

  • With the US retreat on climate efforts, evidence suggests that EU officials are looking to China and expect an expanded carbon market to reinforce EU global climate leadership.

  • Given that the Chinese ETS will be twice the size of the EU ETS, a small amount of carbon leakage in China could have significant repercussions. Electricity carbon leakage should thus be considered in any future EU–China linking negotiations.

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17.
This study reports survey results of American and Chinese citizens administered to determine the effect of reciprocity and the absence of reciprocity on public support of international climate treaties. American and Chinese college students and adults were surveyed about their support for signing an international climate treaty including commitments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, conditional on the other country signing the same treaty or not. This study finds knowledge of other-country non-support on average decreases cooperative behaviour among all age groups in both the US and China. Knowledge of China’s support for the treaty is found on average to increase support among American adults, while having no noticeable effect on average support among American college students. Chinese citizens are found to not respond positively to reciprocity. Although not statistically significant at conventional significance levels, knowledge of the US’s support is found on average to decrease support among Chinese college students and adults.

Key policy insights

  • To increase support for international climate treaties, knowledge that another major emitter will sign the treaty does not unanimously increase domestic support.

  • Knowing the other country will not sign the treaty decreases domestic support for signing an international climate treaty for both Americans and Chinese, relative to not being told about the other country’s decision to sign the treaty.

  • Knowing China will sign an international climate treaty on average increases American adult support for signing the same treaty, while American college student support is unaffected.

  • Although not statistically significant at conventional significance levels, knowing the US will sign an international climate treaty on average decreases Chinese support for signing the same treaty.

  • Policy-makers pursuing increased international support of climate treaties by first getting support from countries with substantial historical emissions might deter international support if little attention to fairness concerns is given.

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18.
Global climate change governance has changed substantially in the last decade, with a shift in focus from negotiating globally agreed greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets to nationally determined contributions, as enshrined in the 2015 Paris Agreement. This paper analyses trends in adoption of national climate legislation and strategies, GHG targets, and renewable and energy efficiency targets in almost all UNFCCC Parties, focusing on the period from 2007 to 2017. The uniqueness and added value of this paper reside in its broad sweep of countries, the more than decade-long coverage and the use of objective metrics rather than normative judgements. Key results show that national climate legislation and strategies witnessed a strong increase in the first half of the assessed decade, likely due to the political lead up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009, but have somewhat stagnated in recent years, currently covering 70% of global GHG emissions (almost 50% of countries). In comparison, the coverage of GHG targets increased considerably in the run up to adoption of the Paris Agreement and 89% of global GHG emissions are currently covered by such targets. Renewable energy targets saw a steady spread, with 79% of the global GHG emissions covered in 2017 compared to 45% in 2007, with a steep increase in developing countries.

Key policy insights

  • The number of countries that have national legislation and strategies in place increased strongly up to 2012, but the increase has levelled off in recent years, now covering 70% of global emissions by 2017 (48% of countries and 76% of global population).

  • Economy-wide GHG reduction targets witnessed a strong increase in the build up to 2015 and are adopted by countries covering 89% of global GHG emissions (76% not counting USA) and 90% of global population (86% not counting USA) in 2017.

  • Renewable energy targets saw a steady increase throughout the last decade with coverage of countries in 2017 comparable to that of GHG targets.

  • Key shifts in national measures coincide with landmark international events – an increase in legislation and strategy in the build-up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference and an increase in targets around the Paris Agreement – emphasizing the importance of the international process to maintaining national momentum.

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19.
Upon completion, China’s national emissions trading scheme (C-ETS) will be the largest carbon market in the world. Recent research has evaluated China’s seven pilot ETSs launched from 2013 on, and academic literature on design aspects of the C-ETS abounds. Yet little is known about the specific details of the upcoming C-ETS. This article combines currently understood details of China’s national carbon market with lessons learned in the pilot schemes as well as from the academic literature. Our review follows the taxonomy of Emissions Trading in Practice: A Handbook on Design and Implementation (Partnership for Market Readiness & International Carbon Action Partnership. (2016). Retrieved from www.worldbank.org): The 10 categories are: scope, cap, distribution of allowances, use of offsets, temporal flexibility, price predictability, compliance and oversight, stakeholder engagement and capacity building, linking, implementation and improvements.

Key policy insights

  • Accurate emissions data is paramount for both design and implementation, and its availability dictates the scope of the C-ETS.

  • The stakeholder consultative process is critical for effective design, and China is able to build on its extensive experience through the pilot ETSs.

  • Current policies and positions on intensity targets and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits constrain the market design of the C-ETS.

  • Most critical is the nature of the cap. The currently discussed rate-based cap with ex post adjustment is risky. Instead, an absolute, mass-based emissions cap coupled with the conditional use of permits would allow China to maintain flexibility in the carbon market while ensuring a limit on CO2 emissions.

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20.
Reducing fossil fuel supply is necessary to meet the Paris Agreement goal to keep warming ‘well below 2°C’, yet the Agreement is silent on the topic of fossil fuels. This article outlines reasons why it is important that Parties to the Agreement find ways to more explicitly address the phasing out of fossil fuel production under the UNFCCC. It describes how countries aiming to keep fossil fuel supply in line with Paris goals could articulate and report their actions within the current architecture of the Agreement. It also outlines specific mechanisms of the Paris Agreement through which issues related to the curtailment of fossil fuel supply can be addressed. Mapping out a transition away from fossil fuels – and facilitating this transition under the auspices of the UNFCCC process – can enhance the ambition and effectiveness of national and international climate mitigation efforts.

Key policy insights

  • The international commitment to limit global average temperature increases to ‘well below 2°C’ provides a strong rationale for Parties to the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC to pursue a phase-down in fossil fuel production, not just consumption.

  • Several countries have already made commitments to address fossil fuel supply, by agreeing to phase down coal or oil exploration and production.

  • Integrating these commitments into the UNFCCC process would link them to global climate goals, and ensure they form part of a broader global effort to transition away from fossil fuels.

  • The Paris Agreement provides a number of new opportunities for Parties to address fossil fuel production.

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