Assessing the ambition of post-2020 climate targets: a comprehensive framework

One of the most fundamental questions surrounding the new Paris Agreement is whether countries’ proposals to reduce GHG emissions after 2020 are equally ambitious, considering differences in circumstances between countries. We review a variety of approaches to assess the ambition of the GHG emission reduction proposals by countries. The approaches are applied illustratively to the mitigation part of the post-2020 climate proposals (nationally determined contributions, or NDCs) by China, the EU, and the US. The analysis reveals several clear trends, even though the results differ per individual assessment approach. We recommend that such a comprehensive ambition assessment framework, employing a large variety of approaches, is used in the future to capture a wide spectrum of perspectives on ambition.

POLICY RELEVANCE

Assessing the ambition of the national climate proposals is particularly important as the Paris Agreement asks for regular reviews of national contributions, keeping in mind that countries raise their ambition over time. Such an assessment will be an important part of the regular global stocktake that will take place every five years, starting with a ‘light’ version in 2018. However, comprehensive methods to assess the proposals are lacking. This article provides such a comprehensive assessment framework.     

How to operationalize accounting under Article 6 market mechanisms of the Paris Agreement

The role of market mechanisms was far from certain in the lead up to the 2015 Paris Climate Conference. The use of ‘constructive ambiguity’ led to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, with Article 6.2 specifying a mechanism with limited international oversight, and Article 6.4 establishing a ‘Sustainable Development Mechanism’ (SDM) subject to detailed rules. Clear operationalization of these mechanisms remains a challenge, especially regarding the critical accounting issue that could not be resolved at the 2018 Katowice Climate Conference (COP24) – how to apply corresponding adjustments, especially regarding sectors not covered by targets under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs). By using fictitious examples, we explain two possible approaches to using Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) under Article 6.2 for achieving NDCs: a ‘target-based’ one where the acquiring Party adds the ITMO amount to the target level of its NDC; and a ‘tally-based’ one where the acquiring Party removes the ITMO amount from the final tally of its NDC. We discuss how these approaches influence the way to make corresponding adjustments and to avoid ‘double counting’. The first one leads to ‘target/budget-based accounting’, the second one to ‘emission-based accounting’. For mitigation outside the scope of the host Party's NDC, we propose using a tally-based interpretation of ITMO use, as opposed to the target-based variety used in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and stress the need for additionality testing. This interpretation allows for mandatory corresponding adjustments for all ITMO usage, while the host Party NDC level remains unchanged. A buffer registry is created for corresponding non-NDC adjustments of the selling party.

Key policy insights

• Under the Paris Agreement, transfers of emissions units between two countries through the Article 6 mechanisms need a corresponding adjustment on both sides to prevent double counting.

• Corresponding adjustments can be applied either to emissions targets under NDCs or measured emissions levels.

• The transfer of emissions reduction credits generated outside an NDC should lead to a corresponding adjustment of a buffer registry of the selling country, but not its emissions level/NDC target. Such credits should only be generated if additionality of the reductions is shown.

     

Additionality revisited: guarding the integrity of market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement

ABSTRACT

The Paris Agreement requires mitigation contributions from all Parties. Therefore, the determination of additionality of activities under the market mechanisms of its Article 6 will need to be revisited. This paper provides recommendations on how to operationalize additionality under Article 6. We first review generic definitions of additionality and current approaches for testing of additionality before discussing under which conditions additionality testing of specific activities or policies is still necessary under the new context of the Paris Agreement, that is, in order to prevent increases of global emissions. We argue that the possibility of ‘hot air’ generation under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs) requires an independent check of the NDC’s ambition. If the NDC of the transferring country does contain ‘hot air’, or if the transferred emission reductions are not covered by the NDC, a dedicated additionality test should be required. While additionality tests of projects and programmes could continue to be done through investment analysis, for policy instruments new approaches are required. They should be differentiated according to type of policy instrument. For regulation, we suggest calculating the resulting pay-back period for technology users. If the regulation generates investments exceeding a payback period threshold, it could be deemed additional. Similarly, carbon pricing policies that generate a carbon price exceeding a threshold could qualify; for trading schemes an absence of over-allocation needs to be shown. The threshold should be differentiated according to country categories and rise over time.

Key policy insights

• Without additionality testing, market mechanisms under the Paris Agreements might lead to an international diffusion of ‘hot air’. To avoid this, an independent assessment of NDC ambition is in order. Otherwise, activities under the mechanisms need to undergo specific additionality tests.

• Additionality testing of projects and programmes should build on the experience developed under the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms.

• Bold approaches are needed for assessing additionality of policies. To avoid cumbersome assessment of all activities triggered by such policies, highly aggregated approaches are suggested, ranging from payback period thresholds for technologies mandated by regulation to minimum price levels triggered by carbon pricing policies. Over time, the stringency of threshold values should increase.

     

巴黎协定——全球气候治理的新起点

巴黎气候变化大会完成了历时4年的德班平台谈判进程,达成了以《巴黎协定》（简称《协定》）为核心的一系列决定。《协定》确立了一种全缔约方参与,以“自主贡献+审评”为中心,全面涉及减缓、适应及其支持的全球应对气候变化新模式。这一模式在继承《公约》原则的基础上,明确了发达国家和发展中国家各自的责任,通过国家自主贡献的方式充分动员所有缔约方采取应对气候变化行动,促进可持续发展。《协定》还鼓励除缔约方外的其他主体积极参与应对气候变化进程,鼓励市场和非市场机制的加入,动员资金流向绿色低碳领域。在制度安排上,《协定》体现了激励、透明、非对抗、非惩罚性的特点。《协定》的达成标志着全球气候治理进入了新的发展阶段,传递出全球推动实现绿色低碳、气候适应型和可持续发展的强有力信号。然而由于《协定》全面平衡了各方的利益,在未来的遵约细节和实施落实方面将会有更多的难题,如果处理不当,将可能会损害发展中国家的利益,尤其是发展中大国。     

走向《巴黎协定》温升目标：已经在路上

目前欧盟、中国、日本、韩国、加拿大,以及南非等国家或地区,已经公布了温室气体中和或者碳中和的目标,如果加上很可能很快也会提出碳中和目标的美国,全球有可能近70%的CO₂排放的国家或地区提出碳中和的目标。由于这些国家或地区是全球技术主导和经济主导地,因而全球2050年左右实现碳中和具有可行性。2050年左右实现碳中和,即和《巴黎协定》2℃目标,甚至和其1.5℃温升目标下的减排路径相一致。研究表明实现2050年左右碳中和有其可行性,实现该目标需要更多的技术创新,未来将是各个国家技术竞争和经济竞争阶段。     

Global Monsoon Changes under the Paris Agreement Temperature Goals in CESM1(CAM5)

Based on experiments with the Community Earth System Model, version 1(Community Atmosphere Model, version 5)[CESM1(CAM5)], and an observational dataset, we found that CESM1-CAM5 is able to reproduce global monsoon(GM)features, including the patterns of monsoon precipitation and monsoon domains, the magnitude of GM precipitation(GMP,the local summer precipitation), GM area(GMA), and GM percentage(the ratio of the local summer precipitation to annual precipitation). Under the Paris Agreement temperature goals, the GM in CESM1-CAM5 displays the following changes:(1)The GMA is ambiguous under the 1.5℃ temperature goal and increases under the 2.0℃ temperature goal. The increase mainly results from a change in the monsoon percentage.(2) The GM, land monsoon and ocean monsoon precipitation all significantly increase under both the 1.5℃ and 2.0℃ goals. The increases are mainly due to the enhancement of humidity and evaporation.(3) The percentages of GM, land monsoon and ocean monsoon feature little change under the temperature goals.(4) The lengths of the GM, land monsoon and ocean monsoon are significantly prolonged under the temperature goals.The increase in precipitation during the monsoon withdrawal month mainly accounts for the prolonged monsoons. Regarding the differences between the 1.5℃ and 2.0℃ temperature goals, it is certain that the GMP displays significant discrepancies.In addition, a large-scale enhancement of ascending motion occurs over the southeastern Tibetan Plateau and South China under a warming climate, whereas other monsoon areas experience an overall decline in ascending motion. This leads to an extraordinary wetting over Asian monsoon areas.     

《巴黎协定》与国际减缓气候变化合作模式的变迁

由于温室气体排放的全球外部性属性,减缓气候变化必须通过国际合作实现,必须体现一定程度的中央集权,考虑参与主体广泛性、减缓行动的范围和行动力度三大要素。《联合国气候变化框架公约》《京都议定书》及其“多哈修正案”“坎昆协议”等方案,对中央集权程度和三大要素各有取舍,构建了不同的国际减缓气候变化合作模式,但从实践看都未能解决国际减缓合作的问题。《巴黎协定》构建了“承诺+审评”的新模式,有望实现参与主体和行动范围的全覆盖,并通过透明度、遵约和全球盘点机制鼓励各参与方提高行动力度。然而要实现公约目标和科学应对气候变化的要求,《巴黎协定》下的国际减缓合作必须通过强化资金、技术、能力建设机制来保障,并通过进一步明确中长期量化目标来促进各方提高行动力度。     

The global climate action summit: increasing ambition during turbulent times

In September 2018, leaders in climate action within and outside the U.S. will convene in San Francisco for the Global Climate Action Summit. They plan to demonstrate strong ongoing commitment to exceeding the goals set out in the Paris Agreement, despite U.S. federal opposition under President Trump, and to spur greater ambition among subnational governments and the private sector. Now that the Trump Administration is working to undo the progress made under President Obama, it is more important than ever that states and cities, as well as the private sector, redouble their efforts. Since the 2016 election, many U.S. states have demonstrated leadership by establishing ever-more ambitious clean energy and electric vehicle targets through legislation and executive action; by pushing back on the Trump Administration in public forums and in the courts; and by banding together to realise greater effectiveness through collective action. The commitment of leading states, cities, and businesses alone will not be enough to achieve the rapid reductions needed to keep planetary warming to 1.5 degrees C in the absence of U.S. federal efforts. But coming after a summer of extreme weather events, the Summit represents a critical opportunity to re-energise constituencies, highlight the need for urgent and ambitious action, and bring climate change to the forefront of policy conversations across the U.S. and beyond.

Key policy insights

• The reversal of U.S. ambitious clean energy and transportation policy, including replacing the Clean Power Plan, freezing fuel standards, and withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, have created a gap at the federal level under President Trump that will be difficult – but perhaps not impossible – to fill with subnational action.

• States, local governments, and the private sector have shown a strengthened commitment to combating climate change and to the goals set out in the Paris Agreement through more ambitious legislative and executive targets, and regional initiatives like RGGI and cross-jurisdictional zero emissions vehicle programmes.

• The Global Climate Action Summit in September 2018 is a pivotal moment to energise a broader coalition within and outside the U.S. towards catalysing the level of ambition needed to exceed goals set out in the Paris Agreement.

     

美国宣布退出《巴黎协定》后全球气候减缓、资金和治理差距分析

2017年6月1日,美国总统特朗普正式宣布退出《巴黎协定》,有关美国退协原因、后续影响和应对策略的研究成为国际社会关注的焦点。本文基于自主构建的美国政策评估模型,综合定性定量分析,系统评估了美国宣布退出《巴黎协定》可能造成的全球气候变化减缓、资金和治理"三大赤字",并据此提出中国的应对策略和建议。研究表明,考虑美国退协对后续政策的影响,美国2030年的排放将有可能达57.9（56.0~59.8）亿t CO₂-eq,仅相当于在2005年的水平上下降12.1%（9.1%~15.0%）,相对自主贡献目标情景将上升16.4（12.5~20.1）亿t CO₂-eq,额外增加8.8%~13.4%的全球减排赤字。美国拒绝继续履行资金支持义务还将使得本不充裕的气候资金机制更加雪上加霜,绿色气候基金（GCF）的筹资缺口将增加20亿美元,而长期气候资金（LTF）的缺口每年将增加50亿美元左右。这就要求欧盟和日本对GCF的捐助至少上升40%,同时欧盟及其成员国的长期资金支持至少上浮25.2%才能填补上述资金赤字。美国是全球气候博弈的重要一方,且美国退协的影响已蔓延至全球治理的主要议事平台,期望中欧、基础四国+等模式短期内迅速填补美国退出后全球气候治理的治理赤字是不现实的,政治推动乏力的情况可能会在今后一段时期内始终存在。虽然国际社会对中国领导全球气候治理充满期待,但中国应有清醒认识,全面评估"接盘"美国领导力的成本、效益和可行性,并秉持"国家利益"优先的原则,谋定而后动。同时,中国应聚焦国内工作,凝聚应对气候变化的战略共识,做好长期战略谋划,并积极推动国际社会从合作中寻找出路应对"三大赤字"难题。     

Environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement establishes provisions for using international carbon market mechanisms to achieve climate mitigation contributions. Environmental integrity is a key principle for using such mechanisms under the Agreement. This paper systematically identifies and categorizes issues and options to achieve environmental integrity, including how it could be defined, what influences it, and what approaches could mitigate environmental integrity risks. Here, environmental integrity is assumed to be ensured if the engagement in international transfers of carbon market units leads to the same or lower aggregated global emissions. Four factors are identified that influence environmental integrity: the accounting for international transfers; the quality of units generated, i.e. whether the mechanism ensures that the issuance or transfer of units leads to emission reductions in the transferring country; the ambition and scope of the mitigation target of the transferring country; and incentives or disincentives for future mitigation action, such as possible disincentives for transferring countries to define future mitigation targets less ambitiously or more narrowly in order to sell more units. It is recommended that policy-makers combine several approaches to address the significant risks to environmental integrity.

Key policy insights

• Robust accounting is a key prerequisite for ensuring environmental integrity. The diversity of nationally determined contributions is an important challenge, in particular for avoiding double counting and for ensuring that the accounting for international transfers is representative for the mitigation efforts by Parties over time.

• Unit quality can, in theory, be ensured through appropriate design of carbon market mechanisms; in practice, existing mechanisms face considerable challenges in ensuring unit quality. Unit quality could be promoted through guidance under Paris Agreement Article 6, and reporting and review under Article 13.

• The ambition and scope of mitigation targets is key for the incentive for transferring countries to ensure unit quality because countries with ambitious and economy-wide targets would have to compensate for any transfer of units that lack quality. Encouraging countries to adopt ambitious and economy-wide NDC targets would therefore facilitate achieving environmental integrity.

• Restricting transfers in instances of high environmental integrity risk – through eligibility criteria or limits – could complement these approaches.

     

《巴黎协定》下市场机制建设中的风险与对策

《巴黎协定》（《协定》）第6条设立了合作方法和可持续发展机制两种市场机制。受国家自主贡献（NDC）减排目标多样性和未来减排努力不确定性等因素的影响,《协定》下市场机制在设计和实施中面临着巨大的风险和挑战,主要包括缺乏稳健的核算规则、不恰当的额外性评估带来的环境完整性风险以及经济激励下缔约方不积极扩大减排目标覆盖范围、提高减排行动力度的风险。为了降低风险给全球减排行动可能带来的负面影响,必须建立稳健的核算规则,在额外性评估中合理考虑东道国NDC下的减排承诺,并通过设立参与资质要求等方式确保市场机制促进缔约方扩大减排目标覆盖范围。建议中国结合国内碳市场的发展现状,从识别《协定》下市场机制对我国的要求和影响、进行相关能力建设、设立严格的监管措施和建立所需机构等方面入手,为我国有效参与做好充分准备。     

巴黎协定背景下全球减排博弈模拟研究

构建了具有7个国家集团的全球多国家集团气候博弈集成评估模拟系统,针对《巴黎协定》背景下各国至2050年以及2100年的减排目标,分别对减排博弈的纳什均衡、博弈不确定性以及外部政策对减排博弈的影响展开了模拟分析。研究发现：在基准情景下,全球各国将在2030年后均选择不减排策略,全球至2100年升温达到2.62℃;而模型参数的不确定性也未能突破全球零减排的纳什均衡;而仅当在全球范围内对不减排采取惩罚措施时,全球零减排的纳什均衡点被打破。但在当前《巴黎协定》减排承诺下,为达到2℃的温控目标,加大2030—2050年的减排幅度至关重要,否则全球将在2040年左右突破2℃阈值。     

When less is more: limits to international transfers under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

International carbon markets can be an important tool in achieving countries’ mitigation targets under the Paris Agreement, but they are subject to a number of environmental integrity risks. An important risk is that some countries have mitigation targets that correspond to higher levels of emissions than independent projections of their likely emissions. If such ‘hot air’ can be transferred to other countries, it could increase aggregated emissions and create a perverse incentive for countries not to enhance the ambition of future mitigation targets. Limits to international transfers of mitigation outcomes have been proposed to address this risk. This article proposes a typology for such limits, explores key design options, and tests different types of limits in the context of 15 countries. Our analysis indicates that limits to international transfers could, if designed appropriately, prevent most of the hot air contained in current mitigation targets from being transferred, but also involve trade-offs between different policy objectives. Given the risks from international transfer of hot air and the uncertainty over whether other approaches will be effective in ensuring environmental integrity, we recommend that countries take a cautious approach and pursue a portfolio of approaches to ensure environmental integrity, in which case limits could provide for additional safeguards.

Key policy insights

• Limits to international transfers involve trade-offs between different policy objectives, in particular reducing the risk that countries transfer hot air and enabling participation in carbon markets.

• Under ‘relative’ limits a country may transfer mitigation outcomes to the extent that its actual emissions are below the limit. Relative limits derived from historical emissions data have significant limitations, and none of the tested approaches was found to be effective for all countries. Relative limits based on emission projections could be a more valid approach, although they are also technically and politically challenging.

• Under ‘absolute’ limits a country could only issue, transfer or acquire a certain amount of mitigation outcomes. Absolute limits set at sufficiently low levels could prevent countries from transferring large amounts of hot air, but are bluntly applicable to all countries, whether or not they have hot air.

     

《巴黎协定》特设工作组适应信息通报谈判的最新进展和展望

适应信息通报作为《巴黎协定》下联结国家个体适应行动、全球适应目标以及全球集体适应努力的纽带,是目前《巴黎协定》特设工作组（APA）下唯一的适应议题,会对未来全球适应气候变化的政策和行动产生较大影响。本文总结了APA适应信息通报的谈判进程和最新进展,梳理了不同缔约方和谈判集团对适应信息通报目的、内容、报告渠道、指南和灵活性的立场和观点,展望了适应信息通报未来的谈判走势。中国与大多数发展中国家相比,开展适应行动及提供信息报告的能力较强,在适应信息通报谈判中立场相对灵活,但未来在有关适应的资金支持谈判等方面仍面临着压力,建议推动和深化适应气候变化领域南南合作以团结更多发展中国家,促进全球适应行动,回应发展中国家的关切。     

《巴黎协定》下的国际碳市场机制：基本形式和前景展望

《巴黎协定》第6条建立的两种国际碳市场机制受到广泛关注,将在2020年后的气候制度中发挥至关重要的作用。文中识别了覆盖范围、交易指标类型和管理模式等3个构成国际碳市场机制的关键要素及其不同设计选项,并以此为基础阐明国际碳市场机制的基本形式。梳理并识别谈判中有关国际碳市场机制的焦点问题及其不同规则设计,并在此基础上分析中国参与国际碳市场机制的机遇和挑战。结合中国气候融资、提升减排力度、推动绿色“一带一路”和气候变化南南合作的内在需求以及国内有关市场机制的现有能力,分析提出两种国际碳市场机制在中国近期、中期和远期的发展前景及其所需的能力建设。     

《巴黎协定》实施细则评估与全球气候治理展望

《巴黎协定》在确立2020年后应对气候变化框架性制度安排的同时也给出了一系列留待解决的后续任务,包括制定《巴黎协定》实施细则,细化相应规则、制度和指南等。经过3年的谈判,2018年年底在卡托维兹举行的第24次缔约方会议对《巴黎协定》涉及的除市场机制外的众多议题做出了一揽子安排,建立了一系列指导和帮助各方在2020年后落实和履行《巴黎协定》的实施细则,为全面有效实施《巴黎协定》提供了更明确的指导。本研究致力对《巴黎协定》实施细则的内容和特点、对中国的潜在影响和要求、后续谈判走向以及中国的对策等进行全面深入的梳理和分析。评估发现,实施细则继续保持了《巴黎协定》的“精妙平衡”,严格恪守并充分体现了“自下而上”的《巴黎协定》模式,在为发展中国家保留一定灵活性的基础上统一了报告和审评的“度量衡”,并进一步明确了以五年为周期提高行动和支持力度的序贯决策机制。细则可能给中国引领全球气候治理和国内履约带来新的机遇和挑战。中国需要从观念认识、责任担当、业务协调上做好新的布局,根据国内外新趋势、新特点构建中国特色的气候治理新体系。     

《巴黎协定》强化透明度体系的建立与实施展望

以信息报告和审评为主要内容的透明度体系是《巴黎协定》有效实施的重要保障。《巴黎协定》建立了“强化的透明度框架”,并在2018年底达成了实施细则,形成了强化的透明度体系。这一体系建立在既往透明度履约实践基础上,针对缔约方在《巴黎协定》下所承担“共同但有区别”的义务,在为发展中国家提供履约灵活性和支持的情况下,遵循通用的模式、程序和指南。该规则体系有利于提高缔约方履约报告质量和可比性,督促各方履行条约义务,增进全球气候治理多边机制互信。然而这一体系相比既往实践,给发展中国家提出强化要求的同时尚未落实强化的支持,且体系本身的运行效率还有待观察。为此,各国应当做好充分的国内体制机制建设准备,国际社会应当落实对发展中国家履约的支持,强化相应能力建设。     

公平实现《巴黎协定》目标的碳减排贡献分担研究综述

各国目前的国家自主贡献与实现《巴黎协定》温控目标的要求仍有较大的差距,各国进一步强化其自主贡献力度亟需公平的碳减排贡献分担作为目标参考。本文系统梳理了碳减排分配涉及的公平原则及其4个主要维度,即排放责任、经济能力、人均主义和国家主义,评述了依据不同维度或维度组合制定的分配方案的研究进展和存在的问题,并将该领域错综复杂的分歧矛盾分为3个层次,即公平原则维度的选择、分配机制的设计以及具体参数设置。研究发现,目前旨在指导各国提高自主贡献力度的公平分配研究在全面性、一致性和客观性方面仍有缺陷,特别是基于多元文献分析以及综合分配模型的综合分配研究不能全面客观地反映发展中国家对公平的关切。为此,本文针对性地提出了未来碳减排贡献分担综合研究的需求和方向,即需要系统阐述发展中国家视角的公平分配方案并构建一个全面、平衡、客观的综合碳减排贡献分担模型,以提升中国在这一问题上的话语权,在公平实现《巴黎协定》目标的进程中更好地发挥贡献者和引领者的作用。     

Swimming upstream: addressing fossil fuel supply under the UNFCCC

Reducing fossil fuel supply is necessary to meet the Paris Agreement goal to keep warming ‘well below 2°C’, yet the Agreement is silent on the topic of fossil fuels. This article outlines reasons why it is important that Parties to the Agreement find ways to more explicitly address the phasing out of fossil fuel production under the UNFCCC. It describes how countries aiming to keep fossil fuel supply in line with Paris goals could articulate and report their actions within the current architecture of the Agreement. It also outlines specific mechanisms of the Paris Agreement through which issues related to the curtailment of fossil fuel supply can be addressed. Mapping out a transition away from fossil fuels – and facilitating this transition under the auspices of the UNFCCC process – can enhance the ambition and effectiveness of national and international climate mitigation efforts.

Key policy insights

• The international commitment to limit global average temperature increases to ‘well below 2°C’ provides a strong rationale for Parties to the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC to pursue a phase-down in fossil fuel production, not just consumption.

• Several countries have already made commitments to address fossil fuel supply, by agreeing to phase down coal or oil exploration and production.

• Integrating these commitments into the UNFCCC process would link them to global climate goals, and ensure they form part of a broader global effort to transition away from fossil fuels.

• The Paris Agreement provides a number of new opportunities for Parties to address fossil fuel production.

     

美国退出《巴黎协定》对全球气候治理的影响

自特朗普就任美国总统,美国退出《巴黎协定》已在意料中,但当特朗普正式宣布退出仍引发了国际社会的广泛关注。究其宣布退出的考虑不难看出,尽管美国政治信誉、国际合作和长远经济均受影响,但借此特朗普既可以提高其政治影响力、同时又可向国际社会重新要价。从国际应对气候变化的大形势看,美国的退出不会根本逆转全球气候治理的大方向。但美国削减国内气候变化研究、多边环境基金的资金支持和援助等政策将影响气候变化的基础研究和国际应对气候变化多边机制,以及未来应对气候变化的国际合作和长期目标的实现。《联合国气候变化框架公约》的"共同但有区别"的责任原则将受到冲击。就未来而言,全球应对气候变化的正向发展仍旧是主旋律,气候治理正进入多元主体发挥作用的时代,地方和民间组织层面将开展更多的技术创新务实合作,提高气候变化科学及认知的能力建设仍将是长期的任务。