Climate change beliefs, concerns, and attitudes toward adaptation and mitigation among farmers in the Midwestern United States

A February 2012 survey of almost 5,000 farmers across a region of the U.S. that produces more than half of the nation’s corn and soybean revealed that 66 % of farmers believed climate change is occurring (8 % mostly anthropogenic, 33 % equally human and natural, 25 % mostly natural), while 31 % were uncertain and 3.5 % did not believe that climate change is occurring. Results of initial analyses indicate that farmers’ beliefs about climate change and its causes vary considerably, and the relationships between those beliefs, concern about the potential impacts of climate change, and attitudes toward adaptive and mitigative action differ in systematic ways. Farmers who believed that climate change is occurring and attributable to human activity were significantly more likely to express concern about impacts and support adaptive and mitigative action. On the other hand, farmers who attributed climate change to natural causes, were uncertain about whether it is occurring, or did not believe that it is occurring were less concerned, less supportive of adaptation, and much less likely to support government and individual mitigative action. Results suggest that outreach with farmers should account for these covariances in belief, concerns, and attitudes toward adaptation and mitigation.     

Representing global climate change,adaptation and mitigation

The diagrammatic representation of climate change, adaptation and mitigation is important in conceptualizing the problem, identifying important feedbacks, and communicating between disciplines. The Synthesis Report of the IPCC's Third Assessment Report, 2001, uses a “cause and effect” approach developed in the integrated assessment literature. This viewpoint reviews this approach and suggests an alternative, based on stocks and flows. The alternative gives a much richer representation of the problem so that it includes the enhanced greenhouse effect, ancillary benefits of mitigation, the distinction between climate-change and other stresses on natural systems, and a more refined distinction between adaptation and mitigation.     

Attitudes toward climate change mitigation policies: a review of measures and a construct of policy attitudes

Research on policy support or public acceptability of climate change policies is proliferating. There is, however, a great diversity in how these evaluative responses have been defined, operationalized, and measured across studies. In order to shed some light on this subject, we reviewed 118 studies published over the last 15 years aiming at measurement of policy acceptability, acceptance, support, and other responses to climate change mitigation policies. We found that conceptual vagueness and weak theoretical embedding are pervasive in the field, which leads to uncertainty over what is being measured, ambiguity of policy recommendations, and difficulties in comparing empirical results. In response, we propose a construct of policy attitudes as an overarching concept comprising the diversity of measures and constructs already in use. The purpose of the construct is to serve as a common basis for operationalization and survey design. In order to inform policy makers, researchers should be clear in how they formulate surveys with a focus on questions of importance to research and policy-making.

Key policy insights

• Acceptability, acceptance, and support are defined as distinct and possibly empirically distinguishable classes of responses evaluating a policy proposal. These responses are expressions of underlying policy attitudes.

• People may respond to policies in other ways as well, including lack of interest.

• There is no popularity threshold for a policy to be safe to implement, but instead it is a matter of identifying the conditions of policy support or other responses.

• Results obtained using different measures of mitigation policy attitudes vary widely with respect to the characteristics of the policy in question and the measured response. Thus, great care must be taken when designing surveys and interpreting their results.

     

Felt responsibility and climate engagement: Distinguishing adaptation from mitigation

Policy makers and citizens must choose from among a growing variety of strategic options as they try to cope optimally with climate change. As a means of more accurately predicting different types of climate change engagement, we empirically distinguish individuals’ felt responsibility for mitigation (FRm) from felt responsibility for adaptation (FRa), and assess support for different climate action strategies (mitigation and adaptation). We surveyed two U.S. samples two months apart, and the replication study confirmed Study 1′s findings of differing predictive powers for FRm vs. FRa. Each type of felt responsibility, controlling for the other, served as a mediator between belief in global warming (as well as belief in anthropogenic cause of climate change) and its corresponding climate action strategy (mitigation vs. adaptation). FRa predicted adaptation measures but not mitigation measures, while FRm predicted mitigation measures more strongly than it predicted adaptation but did predict both action strategies. We also found important individual differences: people’s disposition toward behaving proactively correlated positively with all types of climate engagement, and political orientation (liberal/conservative ideology) interacted with climate action strategy (mitigation vs. adaptation) in predicting all engagement variables. Comparing levels of support across the political spectrum, the mitigation measures were highly polarizing, while the adaptation measures were less divisive.     

Modelling risk adaptation and mitigation behaviour under different climate change scenarios

The main objective of this study is to simulate household choice behavior under varying climate change scenarios using choice experiments. Economic welfare measures are derived for society’s willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce climate change induced flood risks through private insurance and willingness to accept compensation (WTAC) for controlled flooding under varying future risk exposure levels. Material flood damage and loss of life are covered in the insurance policy experiment, while the WTAC experiment also captures the economic value of immaterial flood damage such as feelings of discomfort, fear and social disruption. The results show that WTP and WTAC are substantial, suggesting a more prominent role of external social damage costs in cost-benefit analysis of climate change and flood mitigation policies.     

Farmer perceptions of climate change: Associations with observed temperature and precipitation trends,irrigation, and climate beliefs

How individuals perceive climate change is linked to whether individuals support climate policies and whether they alter their own climate-related behaviors, yet climate perceptions may be influenced by many factors beyond local shifts in weather. Infrastructure designed to control or regulate natural resources may serve as an important lens through which people experience climate, and thus may influence perceptions. Likewise, perceptions may be influenced by personal beliefs about climate change and whether it is human-induced. Here we examine farmer perceptions of historical climate change, how perceptions are related to observed trends in regional climate, how perceptions are related to the presence of irrigation infrastructure, and how perceptions are related to beliefs and concerns about climate change. We focus on the regions of Marlborough and Hawke’s Bay in New Zealand, where irrigation is utilized on the majority of cropland. Data are obtained through analysis of historical climate records from local weather stations, interviews (n = 20), and a farmer survey (n = 490). Across both regions, no significant historical trends in annual precipitation and summer temperatures since 1980 are observed, but winter warming trends are significant at around 0.2–0.3 °C per decade. A large fraction of farmers perceived increases in annual rainfall despite instrumental records indicating no significant trends, a finding that may be related to greater perceived water availability associated with irrigation growth. A greater fraction of farmers perceived rainfall increases in Marlborough, where irrigation growth has been most substantial. We find those classes of farmers more likely to have irrigation were also significantly more likely to perceive an increase in annual rainfall. Furthermore, we demonstrate that perceptions of changing climate – regardless of their accuracy – are correlated with increased belief in climate change and an increased concern for future climate impacts. Those farmers that believe climate change is occurring and is human induced are more likely to perceive temperature increases than farmers who believe climate change is not occurring and is not human induced. These results suggest that perceptions are influenced by a variety of personal and environmental factors, including infrastructure, which may in turn alter decisions about climate adaptation.     

Interface bureaucrats and the everyday remaking of climate interventions: Evidence from climate change adaptation in Zambia

When climate change policies are implemented in practice, they travel through the hands of a range of practitioners who not only mediate but also potentially transform climate interventions. This article highlights the role of a group of actors whose practices have so far received little attention in the study of climate change governance, namely the public servants who are responsible for the everyday implementation of national climate change policies and associated programmes on the ground. Situated at the frontline of the state and often engaging directly with citizens, these “interface bureaucrats” occupy a complex position in which they must balance their role as representatives of the state with the need to accommodate the pressures, interests and practical challenges associated with everyday policy implementation. In this article we examine how interface bureaucrats in Zambia seek to navigate this role as they go about implementing national climate change adaptation policies in practice, and what this means for the nature and outcome of these interventions. We identify key dilemmas of the interface bureaucrats in our study areas, namely (i) intervening with limited reach, (ii) implementing generic policies, and (iii) managing conflicting interests. We show how they address these dilemmas through highly pragmatic practices involving informal agreements with community members, discretionary adjustments of official policies, and negotiation of contested interventions. As a result, the nature and outcomes of climate change adaptation interventions end up differently from the official policies and the underlying governance interests of the central state. Our findings suggest a need for greater attention to the role of interface bureaucrats as everyday climate policy makers and point to the significance of pragmatism and compromise in the interaction between state actors and citizens in environmental interventions.     

Harmonising climate change adaptation and mitigation: The case of tourist resorts in Fiji

Tourism in island states is vulnerable to climate change because it may result in detrimental changes in relation to extreme events, sea level rise, transport and communication interruption. This study analyses adaptation to climate change by tourist resorts in Fiji, as well as their potential to reduce climate change through reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. Interviews, site visitations, and an accommodation survey were undertaken. Many operators already prepare for climate-related events and therefore adapt to potential impacts resulting from climate change. Reducing emissions is not important to operators; however, decreasing energy costs for economic reasons is practised. Recommendations for further initiatives are made and synergies between the adaptation and mitigation approaches are explored.     

The ocean response to climate change guides both adaptation and mitigation efforts

The ocean's thermal inertia is a major contributor to irreversible ocean changes exceeding time scales that matter to human society. This fact is a challenge to societies as they prepare for the consequences of climate change, especially with respect to the ocean. Here the authors review the requirements for human actions from the ocean's perspective. In the near term (～2030), goals such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will be critical. Over longer times (～2050–2060 and beyond), global carbon neutrality targets may be met as countries continue to work toward reducing emissions. Both adaptation and mitigation plans need to be fully implemented in the interim, and the Global Ocean Observation System should be sustained so that changes can be continuously monitored. In the longer-term (after ～2060), slow emerging changes such as deep ocean warming and sea level rise are committed to continue even in the scenario where net zero emissions are reached. Thus, climate actions have to extend to time scales of hundreds of years. At these time scales, preparation for “high impact, low probability” risks — such as an abrupt showdown of Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation, ecosystem change, or irreversible ice sheet loss — should be fully integrated into long-term planning.摘要在全球变化背景下, 海洋的很多变化在人类社会发展的时间尺度上 (百年至千年) 具有不可逆转性, 海洋巨大的热惯性是造成该不可逆性的主要原因. 这个特征为人类和生态系统应对海洋变化提出一系列挑战. 本文从海洋变化的角度总结了人类应对气候变化的要求, 提出需要进行多时间尺度的规划和统筹. 在近期 (到2030年) , 实现联合国可持续发展目标至关重要. 在中期 (2050–2060年前后) , 全球需要逐步减排并实现碳中和目标. 同时, 适应和减缓气候变化的行动和措施必须同步施行; 全球海洋观测系统需要得以维持并完善以持续监测海洋变化. 在远期 (在2060年之后) , 即使全球达到净零排放, 包括深海变暖和海平面上升在内的海洋变化都将持续, 因此应对全球变化的行动需持续数百年之久. 在该时间尺度, 应对“低概率, 高影响”气候风险 (即发生的可能性较低, 但一旦发生影响极大的事件带来的风险, 例如: 大西洋经圈反转环流突然减弱, 海洋生态系统跨过临界点, 无可挽回的冰盖质量损失等) 的准备应充分纳入长期规划.     

Social capital,trust, and adaptation to climate change: Evidence from rural Ethiopia

Climate change is expected to have particularly severe effects on poor agrarian populations. Rural households in developing countries adapt to the risks and impacts of climate change both individually and collectively. Empirical research has shown that access to capital—financial, human, physical, and social—is critical for building resilience and fostering adaptation to environmental stresses. Little attention, however, has been paid to how social capital generally might facilitate adaptation through trust and cooperation, particularly among rural households and communities. This paper addresses the question of how social capital affects adaptation to climate change by rural households by focusing on the relationship of household and collective adaptation behaviors. A mixed-methods approach allows us to better account for the complexity of social institutions—at the household, community, and government levels—which drive climate adaptation outcomes. We use data from interviews, household surveys, and field experiments conducted in 20 communities with 400 households in the Rift Valley of Ethiopia. Our results suggest that qualitative measures of trust predict contributions to public goods, a result that is consistent with the theorized role of social capital in collective action. Yet qualitative trust is negatively related to private household-level adaptation behaviors, which raises the possibility that social capital may, paradoxically, be detrimental to private adaptation. Policymakers should account for the potential difference in public and private adaptation behaviors in relation to trust and social capital when designing interventions for climate adaptation.     

Emerging meta-organisations and adaptation to global climate change: Evidence from implementing adaptation in Nepal,Pakistan and Ghana

As developing countries move from policy to implementing adaptation to climate change, formal operational structures are emerging that exceed the expertise of any one actor. We refer to these arrangements as ‘meta-organisations’ that comprise many autonomous component organisations tackling adaptation. The meta-organisations set standards, define purposes, and specify appropriate means-ends criteria for delivering adaptation. Using empirical data from the three cases, Nepal, Pakistan and Ghana, the study identifies and analyses six attributes of the meta and component organisational structures. We argue that organisational structures are crucial to understanding adaptation, specifying policy and implementation. Our analysis demonstrates that while each country promotes similar objectives, the emerging structures are quite distinct, shaped by country-specific attributes and issues that lead to different outcomes. Nepal’s priority for a formal process has come at the cost of delayed implementation. Pakistan’s devolved approach lacks legitimacy to scale up the process nationally. Ghana’s use of existing decentralised structures and budgets relegates adaptation below other development priorities. These divergent structures arise from the different needs for legitimacy and accountability, and the relative priority attached to adaptation against other needs.     

Values,climate change,and implications for adaptation: Evidence from two communities in Labrador,Canada

Local material and symbolic values have to date remained underrepresented in climate change research and policy and this gap is particularly salient in places that have been identified as at significant risk from climate change. In such places, the dominant approach to understanding the effects of climate change has been centred on vulnerability; it has highlighted the social determinants of vulnerability and the differential and uneven distribution of effects. This approach cannot, however, illuminate the diverse and nuanced meanings people attach to specific aspects of their way of life, how the changing climate might affect these, and what this implies for adaptation. To address this gap, this empirical study uses the concept of values, defined as trans-situational conceptions of the desirable that give meaning to behaviour and events, and influence perception and interpretation of situations and events. We develop a set of values from 53 qualitative interviews in two remote communities in subarctic easternmost Canada. It draws on these values to frame how effects of climate change, specifically intangible and subjective effects, are felt, and how responses to them are imagined by those affected. The article argues that values are crucial in shaping perception of climate impacts and adaptation to them. Distinct values, such as tradition, freedom, harmony, safety, and unity shape different interpretations and meaning of impacts, and lead to distinct views on how to adapt to these. Conflicting and competing values can act as barriers to adaptation. The findings imply that adaptation research and policy need to address values explicitly if efforts for planned adaptation are to be perceived as legitimate and effective by those affected by the changing climate.     

The climate change mitigation impacts of active travel: Evidence from a longitudinal panel study in seven European cities

Active travel (walking or cycling for transport) is considered the most sustainable and low carbon form of getting from A to B. Yet the net effects of changes in active travel on changes in mobility-related CO₂ emissions are complex and under-researched. Here we collected longitudinal data on daily travel behavior, journey purpose, as well as personal and geospatial characteristics in seven European cities and derived mobility-related lifecycle CO₂ emissions over time and space. Statistical modelling of longitudinal panel (n = 1849) data was performed to assess how changes in active travel, the ‘main mode’ of daily travel, and cycling frequency influenced changes in mobility-related lifecycle CO₂ emissions.We found that changes in active travel have significant lifecycle carbon emissions benefits, even in European urban contexts with already high walking and cycling shares. An increase in cycling or walking consistently and independently decreased mobility-related lifecycle CO₂ emissions, suggesting that active travel substituted for motorized travel – i.e. the increase was not just additional (induced) travel over and above motorized travel. To illustrate this, an average person cycling 1 trip/day more and driving 1 trip/day less for 200 days a year would decrease mobility-related lifecycle CO₂ emissions by about 0.5 tonnes over a year, representing a substantial share of average per capita CO₂ emissions from transport. The largest benefits from shifts from car to active travel were for business purposes, followed by social and recreational trips, and commuting to work or place of education. Changes to commuting emissions were more pronounced for those who were younger, lived closer to work and further to a public transport station.Even if not all car trips could be substituted by active travel the potential for decreasing emissions is considerable and significant. The study gives policy and practice the empirical evidence needed to assess climate change mitigation impacts of urban transport measures and interventions aimed at mode shift to more sustainable modes of transport. Investing in and promoting active travel whilst ‘demoting’ private car ownership and use should be a cornerstone of strategies to meet ‘net zero’ carbon targets, particularly in urban areas, while also reducing inequalities and improving public health and quality of urban life in a post-COVID-19 world.     

Resettlement and climate change vulnerability: Evidence from rural China

The literature on migration and climate change has become increasingly attuned to the role of climatic factors in already complex migration dynamics, and amid different kinds of mobility. However, to date little evidence has been provided of the relationship between resettlement and climate change, including the degree to which resettlement may shape the vulnerability of households or communities. In this article we ask: is there any evidence that resettlement may be a driver of vulnerability and if so, what factors make resettled households more vulnerable when compared to non-resettled households? These questions are considered with reference to new evidence drawn from a livelihoods-based vulnerability analysis in a drought-prone, poverty county in China’s Shanxi Province, which encompassed households involved in local poverty resettlement programs. Evidence of the characteristics of resettled households compared to non-resettled households shows that resettlement adversely impacts on the household asset base, particularly in terms of financial and natural capital. It may therefore be a driver of vulnerability. At a time when the Chinese government is repackaging resettlement as a climate change adaptation measure, this article provides evidence that resettlement as it is currently practiced has the potential to amplify rather than alleviate household vulnerability to climate change.     

Natural disasters and climate change beliefs: The role of distance and prior beliefs

Public support of climate policies crucially depends on climate change beliefs. Here we analyze the effects of natural disaster experience on the belief in the existence of climate change. The primary data source is a panel survey covering 22,251 observations from 11,194 geo-located households collected in Germany between 2012 and 2015, combined with satellite imagery of a major flood event in 2013. We find that flood experience had a significant positive effect on the beliefs in the existence of climate change for those respondents living close to the flooded area. However, the effect decreases sharply with distance. We further show that this overall effect is driven by those respondents who already believed in climate change before the flood – they saw their belief confirmed by their experience. In contrast, spatial proximity to the flood had no measurable effect on skeptics. These results imply that climate skeptics may not be influenced by the experience of natural disasters at their doorsteps.     

The use of scenarios as the basis for combined assessment of climate change mitigation and adaptation

Scenarios are used to explore the consequences of different adaptation and mitigation strategies under uncertainty. In this paper, two scenarios are used to explore developments with (1) no mitigation leading to an increase of global mean temperature of 4 °C by 2100 and (2) an ambitious mitigation strategy leading to 2 °C increase by 2100. For the second scenario, uncertainties in the climate system imply that a global mean temperature increase of 3 °C or more cannot be ruled out. Our analysis shows that, in many cases, adaptation and mitigation are not trade-offs but supplements. For example, the number of people exposed to increased water resource stress due to climate change can be substantially reduced in the mitigation scenario, but adaptation will still be required for the remaining large numbers of people exposed to increased stress. Another example is sea level rise, for which, from a global and purely monetary perspective, adaptation (up to 2100) seems more effective than mitigation. From the perspective of poorer and small island countries, however, stringent mitigation is necessary to keep risks at manageable levels. For agriculture, only a scenario based on a combination of adaptation and mitigation is able to avoid serious climate change impacts.     

Institutional dimensions of climate change adaptation: insights from the Philippines

Understanding the institutional dimensions of climate change adaptation (CCA) is critical to the adaptation process. The institutional changes that follow the introduction of a CCA measure affect certain areas of governance, including social, political, policy, and other domains that are already exposed to prevailing institutions. Thus, understanding CCA necessitates analysis of the interplays between and among institutions that exist within a hierarchical structure, as well as the examination of how institutions across different scales define the challenges in CCA implementation. This article contributes to this discussion by investigating the challenges in mainstreaming CCA into local land use planning in Albay, Philippines. It applies a four-stage mixed methodology and uses a modified Institutional Analysis and Development framework as its primary analytical guide. Its findings imply that: (1) mainstreaming CCA is a multi-scale, multi-setting endeavour; (2) mainstreaming CCA operationalization involves networks of interacting institutions and institutional arrangements; and (3) addressing the challenges in mainstreaming needs extensive institutional transformations that reach across the various institutional settings within these networks.

POLICY RELEVANCE

This article advocates that, in designing strategies to address the challenges in mainstreaming CCA, analysts, planners, and policy makers must understand that the challenges exist within a network of institutional settings, and that these challenges encompass a chain of institutional interactions or interplays within this network. Accordingly, overcoming these challenges necessitates broad institutional reforms that go beyond the institutional setting where CCA is to be mainstreamed. Moreover, this article suggests that CCA policy making and analysis must focus on the vertical, horizontal, and network linkages and relationships created by institutional arrangements, as well as on the interplays facilitated by these arrangements. More importantly, there is a need to determine whether the institutional interplays between and among existing and planned institutions are complementary, counterproductive, conflicting, overlapping, neutral, or coexisting. Such knowledge will assist policy makers and analysts to understand the existing and potential barriers to, as well as identify opportunities for, adaptation. Consequently, the solutions to address the barriers, and the strategies that can take advantage of the opportunities, can be formulated effectively.