On geography as science

The paper attempts a preliminary exploration of some of the issues raised if we choose to account geography a “science”. The inherent equivocation of the notion of “science” is first examined, and the methodological implications are emphasised, leading into a brief consideration of inductivism and deductivism; it is concluded that deductivism, despite some valid questions which hang over it, represents the more secure methodological framework, and some of the implications of this conclusion for geographical study in general are explored. The importance of deductivism in physical geography is then considered, and the special problems of human geography are also examined, notably the significance of human volition and of value judgments in social, economic and cultural geography. The methodological implications of human perception are also reviewed. Regional geography is then briefly evaluated, and the possibilities of applying techniques of systems analysis to its problems are developed, viewing these techniques as a special phase of scientific method. Some issues relating to the notion of causality are then raised, with special reference to the crucial distinctions between the notion of causality in natural science and the related concept in historical study, and, by extension, in certain aspects of geography also. The paper concludes with a brief evaluation of the quantitative movement in geography, paying particular attention to the role of mathematics in science in general and in geography in particular.