Tankering strategies for evading emissions trading in aviation

Which actors in the aviation sector ought to be obliged to participate in emissions trading? The European Commission opted for the aircraft operator in their proposal for a Directive. A major drawback is that non-EU aircraft operators might legally challenge their inclusion in this scheme and, if the challenge was successful, discrimination between EU and non- EU operators would undermine the scheme. An alternative would be to place an obligation on fuel suppliers to prove possession of allowances, thus avoiding discrimination. However, emissions trading can be evaded to some extent by increased refuelling beyond EU boundaries (tankering). Typical city pairs were used to analyse the conditions under which such tankering strategies are economically attractive. The analysis shows that the attractiveness of tankering depends substantially on the relationship between fuel prices and allowance prices. If the price relation as of March 2006 is taken as a basis, tankering would be attractive within a radius of up to 4,000 km especially on southbound and eastward routes. Emissions trading could, under unfavourable conditions, be evaded for up to 20% of the total fuel consumption in aviation with the help of tankering. Although this value is only a theoretical upper limit, more than 10% of fuel consumption could be affected by tankering.     

Slovenia's climate policy efforts: CO2 tax and implementation of EU ETS

Slovenia is required to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to an average of 8% below the base year 1986 in the period 2008–2012, due to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. It was the first of the transition countries to implement a CO₂ tax in 1997. At the beginning of 2005, Slovenia joined other EU Member States by implementing the Emissions Trading Scheme. In contrast with other new EU Member States, Slovenia will be a net buyer of allowances. Therefore future movements on the emissions market will play an important role in the compliance costs of achieving the Kyoto target. The main purpose of this article is to present the establishment and characteristics of the first national allocation plan (NAP1) and to describe the main elements of the second national allocation plan (NAP2) for Slovenia within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the expected movements on the emissions allowances market in Slovenia, the expected compliance cost of achieving the Kyoto target and to present the main characteristics and efficiency of the CO₂ tax in Slovenia.     

Achieving a low-carbon society

Climate change is perhaps the central challenge that faces humanity. If the concept of green growth is to be anything more than a mere rebranding of the concept of sustainability, then it must elucidate the relationship between economic activity and pollution and provide a more detailed economic account of it. The articles in this Special Issue focus on ways in which GHG emissions may be reduced while satisfying the increasing demand for energy: from global, technological or economic solutions, to sub-national, financial or regulatory ones. Although the wide disparity in income between the least and most wealthy makes it difficult to reach a consensus on the best way to achieve a low-carbon society, the scale and potential effects of climate change make it imperative that one is reached.     

Korea’s approach to overcoming difficulties in adopting the emission trading scheme

In this study, we aim to describe the background for design characteristics of emissions trading schemes (ETS) in developing and emerging economies, with a particular focus on the case of Korea. These countries may face unique hardships such as fierce opposition from industry sectors, the presence of a power imbalance between the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and ministries that are in charge of supporting output growth, and the absence or incomplete development of financial markets and auctioning mechanisms. To overcome these hardships, the Korean government legislated laws that defined timelines for every stage of ETS development, established a strategic governance architecture to make up the weak position of the MOE, offered strong market-stabilizing measures focused on maintaining the allowance price below a certain level, and provided support packages to make the low-carbon transition easy by compensating for losses caused by the Korea Emissions Trading Scheme (KETS). Such policy instruments that made adoption of KETS easier could be obstacles to making it efficient.

Policy relevance

In the process of adopting a cap-and-trade system, both a developing economy and an emerging economy may face unique hardships, such as strong opposition from industry sectors, the presence of a power imbalance between the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and ministries that are in charge of supporting output growth, and the absence or incomplete development of financial markets and auctioning mechanisms. To make up for the weak base of Korea’s ETS, the government legislated laws that defined timelines for every stage of the ETS development, established a strategic governance architecture to make up for the weak position of the MOE, offered strong market-stabilizing measures focused on maintaining the allowance price below a certain level, and provided support packages to make the low-carbon transition easy by compensating for losses caused by the Korea’s ETS. Korea’s experiences can be shared with other developing economies that are considering adoption of a cap-and-trade scheme.     

The design of California's cap-and-trade and its impact on electricity markets

California is considering the adoption of a cap-and-trade regulatory mechanism for regulating the greenhouse gas emissions from electricity and perhaps other industries. Two options have been widely discussed for implementing cap-and-trade in the electricity industry. The first is to regulate the emissions from electricity at the load-serving entity (LSE) level. The second option for implementation of cap-and-trade has been called the ‘first-seller’ approach. Conceptually, under first-seller, individual sources (i.e. power plants) within California would be responsible for their emissions, as with traditional cap-and-trade systems. Emissions from imports would be assigned to the ‘importing firm’. An option that has not been as widely discussed is to implement a pure source-based system within California, effectively excluding imports from the cap-and-trade system altogether. This article examines these three approaches to implementing cap-and-trade for California's electricity sector. The article discusses many of the issues relating to measurement and the impacts on bidding and scheduling incentives that are created by the various regulatory regimes.     

Commitments through financial options: an alternative for delivering climate change obligations

Governments willing to commit themselves to maintain carbon prices at or above a certain level face the challenge that their commitments need to be credible both for investors in low-carbon technology and for foreign governments. This article argues that governments can make such commitments by issuing long-term put option contracts on the price of CO₂ allowances. This mechanism gives investors the right, but not the obligation, to sell allowances to the government at the strike price. From the investors' point of view, a government is therefore fully committed to a price floor for allowances in the future. This proposed approach alters the incentives that a government faces when considering noncompliance and serves to prevent non-compliance. The proposal fares well when assessed against criteria to determine its suitability in legitimacy, enforcement, proportionality, lack of interference from other contracting States, and transparency. It also allows for fine-tuning through the number and duration of issued options and the strike price. A robust contract structure is proposed to protect against government interference that might threaten the credibility of commitments.     

Sectoral targets for developing countries: combining ‘common but differentiated re-sponsibilities’ with ‘meaningful participation’

Although a global cap-and-trade system is seen by many researchers as the most cost-efficient solution to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the governments of developing countries refuse to enter into such a system in the short term. Many scholars and stakeholders, including the European Commission, have thus proposed various types of commitments for developing countries that appear less stringent, such as sectoral approaches. A macroeconomic assessment of such a sectoral approach is provided for developing countries. Two policy scenarios in particular are assessed, in which developed countries continue with Kyoto-type absolute commitments, while developing countries adopt an emissions trading system limited to electricity generation and linked to developed countries' cap-and-trade systems. In the first scenario, CO₂ allowances are auctioned by the government, which distributes its revenues as a lump sum to households. In a second scenario, the auction revenues are used to reduce taxes on, or to give subsidies to, electricity generation. The quantitative analysis, conducted with a hybrid general equilibrium model, shows that such options provide almost as much emissions reduction as a global cap-and-trade system. Moreover, in the second sectoral scenario, GDP losses in developing countries are much lower than with a global cap-and-trade system, as is also the effect on the electricity price.     

The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements

The negotiation strategy of the European Union was analysed with respect to the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. Game theory was employed to explore the incentives for key players in the climate policy arena to join future climate agreements. A ?20% unilateral commitment strategy by the EU was compared with a multilateral ?30% emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment climate—economy simulation model, we found that leakage, in the sense of strategic policy reactions on emissions, was negligible. The EU strategy to reduce emissions by 30% (compared with 1990 levels) by 2020, if other Annex-B countries follow suit, does not induce the participation of the USA with a comparable reduction commitment. However, we argue that the original EU proposal can be reshaped so as to stabilize a larger and more ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.     

On the Retrieval of Volcanic Sulfur Dioxide Emissions from GOME Backscatter Measurements

We focus on the retrieval of volcanic sulfur dioxide (SO₂) emissions from an analysis of atmospheric UV backscatter spectra obtained by the Global Ozone Monitoring Experiment (GOME) spectrometer on board the ESA European Remote Sensing Satellite (ERS-2). Here, the last major eruptions of Mt. Etna on Sicily (Italy) in July/August 2001 and October/November 2002 provided an excellent opportunity to study the retrieval of SO₂ columnar amounts from ground-based, LIDAR and satellite measurements. Our study shows that the bulk of emitted SO₂ was confined in the troposphere, mainly between 700 hPa and 400 hPa which is confirmed by trajectory analysis, by LIDAR observations and AVHRR observations. The area of influence of Mt. Etna eruptions ranges from the Western Saharan Desert to Greece and the near east states and even down to the basin of Tschad, Africa. Our analysis revealed that information about the plume height of volcanic eruptions and aerosol parameters is necessary for a reliable quantitative retrieval of SO₂ from space-borne sensor data at periods perturbed by volcanic eruptions.