城镇化模式与低碳发展的关联分析——以石家庄市为例

不同城镇化发展模式对城市碳排放有显著影响。以石家庄市为案例,基于历年统计数据及实地调研数据,采用情景分析方法,定量核算石家庄市不同城镇化模式下的碳排放,结果表明在不同的城镇化模式下,石家庄市能源消费和碳排放将存在显著差异。与延续目前相对高碳的城镇化模式相比,在低碳城镇化模式下,2015—2030年,在城镇化率同样提升18.7%的情景下,碳排放的年均增速将由4.3%下降至0.4%,碳减排效果非常显著。     

未来甲烷排放增加对平流层水汽和全球臭氧的影响

利用一个耦合的大气化学-气候模式(WACCM3)研究了地表甲烷排放增加对平流层水汽和全球臭氧变化的影响.结果表明,如果地表甲烷的排放量在2000年的基础上增加50%(达到政府间气候变化专门委员会A1B排放情景中2050年的值),平流层水汽体积分数将平均增加约0.8×10^-6.南半球平流层甲烷转化为水汽的效率比北半球高.在北半球平流层中,1mol甲烷分子可以转化为约1.63mol的水汽分子,而在南半球1mol甲烷分子大概可以转化为约1.82mol的水汽分子.甲烷排放增加50%将使全球中低纬度地区以及北半球高纬度地区的臭氧柱总量增加1%-3%,使南半球高纬度地区臭氧柱总量增加近8%,而秋季(南半球春季)南极地区臭氧柱总量增加幅度可高达20%,南极臭氧的这种显着增加主要是由于甲烷增加造成的化学反馈所致.在北半球中高纬度地区,甲烷增加引起的臭氧变化主要与甲烷氧化导致的水汽增加有关.研究还表明,未来甲烷排放增加对臭氧的恢复作用其实与溴化物排放的减少一样重要.     

Effects of economic recession and local weather on climate change attitudes

How are large companies responding to the challenges of reducing their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions? An analysis of the published climate change policies and performance of 125 large European companies is presented. The results suggest that most large European companies have now developed the management systems and processes necessary for them to effectively manage their GHG emissions and related business risks. However, there is a significant disconnect between the targets that companies set for themselves and the more ambitious targets being set by the European Union (which has committed to a 20% reduction in its emissions by 2020 against a 1990 baseline). Of the companies surveyed, just over one-third had stabilized or reduced their total GHG emissions over the period 2002–2007, and fewer than one-third expected their emissions to stabilize or reduce in the coming years. The relationship between the quality of corporate policies and performance outcomes (in terms of GHG emissions) suggests that while companies with stronger policies are likely to have relatively better performance, only a minority of those companies with the highest-quality policies are committing to absolute reductions in their GHG emissions.     

A shale gas revolution for China?

The question of whether China is on the verge of a ‘shale gas revolution’ is examined. This has potentially significant consequences for energy policy and climate change mitigation. Contrary to the optimistic reading of some commentators, it argues that various technological, environmental, political, regulatory and institutional factors will constrain the growth of China's shale gas market and that such a revolution might in any event have consequences that are at best mixed, at worst antithetical to climate change mitigation.Policy relevanceChina's reserves of unconventional gas have the potential to transform energy policy, as has occurred in the US, resulting in the substitution of shale gas for coal in the energy mix. Because gas emits only approximately half the GHG per unit as coal, such a move would have important implications for climate policy. However, substantial obstacles stand in the way of the ‘energy revolution’ that some policy analysts see China as embarking upon. The need to acknowledge these obstacles, particularly those relating to regulation and governance (and whether or to what extent they can be overcome), is an issue of profound importance to the future of climate and energy policy.     

The population structural transition effect on rising per capita CO2 emissions: evidence from China

ABSTRACT

The per capita CO₂ emissions (PCCE) of many developing countries like China have been rising faster than total CO₂ emissions, and display spatial divergence. Such temporal growth and spatial divergence will have a significant influence on efforts to mitigate CO₂ emissions. Given the research gap on the impact of the structural transition in population on PCCE, we constructed an econometric model using the dynamic panel method. The results reveal that the population structural transition has a significant nonlinear impact on PCCE, as the rate of population growth in China decelerates. Both demographic ageing and urban-rural migration have a stronger impact on PCCE than other factors. This effect, however, decreases beyond a certain threshold. An increase in the number of households due to urbanization and family downsizing has resulted in a positive effect on PCCE, without a threshold turning point. The research also finds that an increased share of the service sector in employment can reduce PCCE only if the sector employs more than 31.56% of the total employed population. Overall, these findings indicate that policymakers should pay attention to the prominence of the demographic structural transition for effective climate policy.

Key policy insights

• Policymakers should address rising per capita carbon emissions (PCCE) and their spatial divergence in future climate policies, not just total CO₂ emissions.

• The transitioning demographics of ageing and urbanization in China show a nonlinear, inverted U-shaped effect on PCCE instead of a continuously positive effect.

• Based on the nonlinear effect of employment structure on PCCE, policymakers should focus on the relationship between the structural transition of the economy and PCCE in future climate mitigation policies.

     

Certified emissions reductions and CDM limits: revenue and distributional aspects

The EU allows those installations that are subject to emissions trading to use a limited volume of certified emissions reductions (CERs), generated through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), to cover their own GHG emissions. These CERs can be used in addition to the EU allowances (EUAs), which were primarily allocated free to installations in Phase II of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) from 2008 to 2012. For the year 2008, the CER limits, which are differentiated by EU Member State, created substantial arbitrage rents (due to the CER-EUA spread) of approximately EU€250 million. Different options for the allocation of this rent are discussed and it is found that, according to economic theory, making the right to use CERs tradable or the regulator pre-committing to buying CERs at the level of the relevant limit reduces the inefficiencies connected to the current regulation. Furthermore, auctioning these CER usage rights shifts the rents created through the CER-EUA spread to the Member State itself. The improved design and implementation of CDM limits justifies EU policy makers intervening to correct previously competition-distorting choices.     

Achieving additional emission reductions under a cap-and-trade scheme

Over the last decade, cap-and-trade emissions schemes have emerged as one of the favoured policy instruments for reducing GHG emissions. An inherent design feature of cap-and-trade schemes is that, once the cap on emissions has been set, no additional reductions beyond this level can be provided by the actions of those individuals, organizations and governments within the covered sectors. Thus, the emissions cap constitutes an emissions floor. This feature has been claimed by some to have undesirable implications, in that it discourages ethically motivated mitigation actions and preempts the possibility that local, state and national governments can take additional mitigation action in the context of weak national or regional targets. These criticisms have become prominent in Australia and the US within the public debate regarding the adoption of an emissions trading scheme (ETS). These criticisms and their potential solutions are reviewed. A set-aside reserve is proposed to automatically retire ETS permits, which would correspond to verified and additional emissions reductions. This minimizes the possibility that ethically motivated mitigation actions are discouraged, allows for additional action by other levels of government, while providing transparency to other market participants on the level of permit retirements.     

Alternative climate policy pathways in the US

Although it is likely that the political–economic coalition required for implementing a federal cap-and-trade programme for GHGs in the US is now sufficiently strong, the structural impediments that have prevented its legislative passage remain impressively durable and can be expected to continue to lay waste to congressional proposals for the foreseeable future. Indeed, given the complex history of environmental policy gridlock in Washington since the early 1980s, any expectations that a cap-and-trade programme could have been realistically achieved through the traditional legislative passage in Congress are fundamentally misplaced. Building on previous research, it is argued that – as with most other forms of environmental policy in the US over the past three decades – a national carbon market is more plausible given alternative policy pathways, which if taken are capable of circumventing the Federal Congress altogether. In particular, the interaction between litigation against the federal government and the ‘rulemaking’ authority possessed by the Executive Branch provides the potential space for the current administration to unilaterally establish a model rule for a national carbon-trading programme.

Policy relevance

This article aims to contribute to American climate policy debates by re-thinking the policy mechanisms most capable of establishing a national carbon market in the US. By taking into account the array of structural factors that have prevented the legislative passage of such a programme in federal Congress, a range of alternative policy ‘pathways’ is considered that have historically allowed progressive environmental policies to endure in Washington (despite increased Congressional gridlock over the past few decades). Two specific alternative strategies and the relationship between them are assessed: the use of litigation to impose legal obligations on federal agencies to regulate effluents, and the use of executive authority to define the nature and scope of environmental regulation. The administration's current potential to unilaterally develop a model-rule for a cap-and-trade programme under the Clean Air Act is emphasized, and the political implications of such a strategy are considered.     

Living with limits: growth,resources, and climate change

Is it possible for all of humanity to enjoy the standards of living of today's high-income countries? What would happen if these limits were reached, perhaps because of climate change or a shortage of natural resources essential to production? How would society manage – or fail to manage – such limits? Notwithstanding the current financial and economic crises, these are perhaps the biggest questions confronting our species (and of a host of other species, who are the victims of our decisions). The article begins by considering the biggest economic event of our lifetimes – the ‘great convergence’ and its implications for the demand for resources. The discussion then turns to a specific limit on our development, climate change, which is different from most other limits, because it involves a global public good: the atmosphere. What such limits might mean for our civilization is discussed. One can persuade people to tackle climate change only if those concerned with the dangers persuade ordinary people that action will not come at the expense of their prosperity.