Aubrites are achondritic meteorites (enstatite pyroxenites) that were formed in highly reduced magmatic environments on a differentiated parent body sharing a common oxygen isotope reservoir with enstatite chondrites (EC), Earth and Moon, and could be considered as a geochemical model of the early proto-Earth. Some pyroxenes of the Pesyanoe aubrite have high abundance of gaseous inclusions, captured during the crystallization of the rocks. Investigation of the inclusions by IR spectroscopy reveals presence of OH− groups and C–H bonds. The former are assigned to protonated point defects in enstatite lattice and the latter to compounds occupying void walls. Molecular water and CO2 were not observed. Volatile components released from the samples of the Pesyanoe enstatite by stepwise crushing and heating are composed of CO2, H2O and a non-condensable phase. Hydrogen isotopic composition of volatiles extracted in form of molecular water in Px-separates varies in the range δD = −61 – −84‰ with mean value of δD = −73 ± 16‰ VSMOW and is within the ranges of ECs and Earth’s mantle. The total abundance of H2 in the pyroxene of Pesyanoe were estimated as at least 0.047 ppm that is too low in comparison with that of enstatite chondrites (≥30 ppm H2) and could indicate nearly complete degassing of the Pesyanoe primitive precursor material during the Pesyanoe parent body accretion or a mantle degassing in igneous differentiation process. In a last case a primitive precursor could have D/H ratio different from that of enstatite chondrites. 相似文献
A ‘filament’ event bed/level corresponds to the occurrence of thin elongate calcitic, shells, or plates of pelagic, bivalve or crinoidal, origin, within pelagic, laminated and organic-matter rich limestones. These organic-rich limestones had been generally deposited under hypoxic/anoxic conditions in an outer-ramp environment. These thin elongate, bivalve shells, or crinoidal plates, are found broken in small pieces, disintegrated, or simply preserved parallel to bedding as almost complete specimens. Such ‘filament’ beds were spotted in SE Turkey in deposits, namely the Karababa-A Member, around the Cenomanian-Turonian boundary (C/TB) and above. On a global scale, these filament event beds illustrate sea-level rise related to eustacy and/or climatic change. The abundance of filaments close to the C/TB is a biological marker of high organic productivity resulting from a climatic change to warmer conditions. The prevailing higher sea-level conditions were then favourable to the accumulation and preservation of organic-rich facies, characteristic of the Oceanic Anoxic Event 2 (OAE2). Using both biostratigraphic and carbon isotopic data, those deposits were dated from the latest Cenomanian-Turonian age. ‘Filament’ event beds were recorded in the same order, except for some small differences. A good number of these bio-events are global. Consequently, on a global scale, they are susceptible to constrain the C/TB, especially the base of the Turonian stage, with a significant degree of confidence. 相似文献
Energy-intensive industries play an important role in low-carbon development, being particularly exposed to climate policies. Concern over possible carbon leakage in this sector poses a major challenge for designing effective carbon pricing instruments (CPI). Different methodologies for assessing carbon leakage exposure are currently used by different jurisdictions, each of them based on different approaches and indicators. This paper aims to analyse the extent to which the use of different methodologies leads to different results in terms of exposure to the risk of carbon leakage, using the Brazilian industry sector as a case study. Results indicate that carbon leakage exposure is an expected outcome of eventual CPI implementation in Brazilian industry. However, results vary according to the chosen methodology, so the definition of the criteria is paramount for assessing sectoral exposure to the risk of carbon leakage.
Key policy insights
Despite increasing discussion about the implementation of carbon pricing on the Brazilian industrial sector, the evaluation of carbon leakage risks is still neglected.
Assessments of the risk of carbon leakage are directly related to the indicators and criteria used by each methodology. Thus, a given subsector may present different levels of exposure to carbon leakage depending on the methodological choice.
More than a purely technical discussion, the methodological definition of carbon leakage risk is a political discussion – it can be well-conducted, leading to the success of a CPI, or even sabotaged, by implicitly subsidizing energy-intensive industries.
While carbon pricing is widely seen as a crucial element of climate policy and has been implemented in many countries, it also has met with strong resistance. We provide a comprehensive overview of public perceptions of the fairness of carbon pricing and how these affect policy acceptability. To this end, we review evidence from empirical studies on how individuals judge personal, distributional and procedural aspects of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade. In addition, we examine preferences for particular redistributive and other uses of revenues generated by carbon pricing and their role in instrument acceptability. Our results indicate a high concern over distributional effects, particularly in relation to policy impacts on poor people, in turn reducing policy acceptability. In addition, people show little trust in the capacities of governments to put the revenues of carbon pricing to good use. Somewhat surprisingly, most studies do not indicate clear public preferences for using revenues to ensure fairer policy outcomes, notably by reducing its regressive effects. Instead, many people prefer using revenues for ‘environmental projects’ of various kinds. We end by providing recommendations for improving public acceptability of carbon pricing. One suggestion to increase policy acceptability is combining the redistribution of revenue to vulnerable groups with the funding for environmental projects, such as on renewable energy.
Key policy insights
If people perceive carbon pricing instruments as fair, this increases policy acceptability and support.
People’s satisfaction with information provided by the government about the policy instrument increases acceptability.
While people express high concern over uneven distribution of the policy burden, they often prefer using carbon pricing revenues for environmental projects instead of compensation for inequitable outcomes.
Recent studies find that people’s preferences shift to using revenues for making policy fairer if they better understand the functioning of carbon pricing, notably that relatively high prices of CO2-intensive goods and services reduce their consumption.
Combining the redistribution of revenue to support both vulnerable groups and environmental projects, such as on renewable energy, seems to most increase policy acceptability.
In principle, many climate policymakers have accepted that large-scale carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is necessary to meet the Paris Agreement’s mitigation targets, but they have avoided proposing by whom CDR might be delivered. Given its role in international climate policy, the European Union (EU) might be expected to lead the way. But among EU climate policymakers so far there is little talk on CDR, let alone action. Here we assess how best to ‘target’ CDR to motivate EU policymakers exploring which CDR target strategy may work best to start dealing with CDR on a meaningful scale. A comprehensive CDR approach would focus on delivering the CDR volumes required from the EU by 2100, approximately at least 50 Gigatonnes (Gt) CO2, according to global model simulations aiming to keep warming below 2°C. A limited CDR approach would focus on an intermediate target to deliver the CDR needed to reach ‘net zero emissions’ (i.e. the gross negative emissions needed to offset residual positive emissions that are too expensive or even impossible to mitigate). We argue that a comprehensive CDR approach may be too intimidating for EU policymakers. A limited CDR approach that only addresses the necessary steps to reach the (intermediate) target of ‘net zero emissions’ is arguably more achievable, since it is a better match to the existing policy paradigm and would allow for a pragmatic phase-in of CDR while avoiding outright resistance by environmental NGOs and the broader public.
Key policy insights
Making CDR an integral part of EU climate policy has the potential to significantly reshape the policy landscape.
Burden sharing considerations would probably play a major role, with comprehensive CDR prolonging the disparity and tensions between progressives and laggards.
Introducing limited CDR in the context of ‘net zero’ pathways would retain a visible primary focus on decarbonization but acknowledge the need for a significant enhancement of removals via ‘natural’ and/or ‘engineered’ sinks.
A decarbonization approach that intends to lead to a low level of ‘residual emissions’ (to be tackled by a pragmatic phase-in of CDR) should be the priority of EU climate policy.