To what extent can a long-term temperature target guide near-term climate change commitments?

The question of appropriate timing and stringency of future greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions remains an issue in the discussion of mitigation responses to the climate change problem. It has been argued that our near-term action should be guided by a long-term vision for the climate, possibly a long-term temperature target. In this paper, we review proposals for long-term climate targets to avoid ‘dangerous’ climate change. Using probability estimates of climate sensitivity from the literature, we then generate probabilistic emissions scenarios that satisfy temperature targets of 2.0, 2.5, and 3.0°C above pre-industrial levels with no overshoot. Our interest is in the implications of these targets on abatement requirements over the next 50 years. If we allow global industrial GHG emissions to peak in 2025 at 14 GtCeq, and wish to achieve a 2.0°C target with at least 50% certainty, we find that the low sensitivity estimate in the literature suggests our industrial emissions must fall to 9 GtCeq by 2050: equal to the level in 2000. However, the average literature sensitivity estimate suggests the level must be less than 2 GtCeq; and in the high sensitivity case, the target is simply unreachable unless we allow for overshoot. Our results suggest that in light of the uncertainty in our knowledge of the climate sensitivity, a long-term temperature target (such as the 2.0°C target proposed by the European Commission) can provide limited guidance to near-term mitigation requirements.     

Evaluating the US Mid-Century Strategy for Deep Decarbonization amidst early century uncertainty

The recent change in US presidential administrations has introduced significant uncertainty about both domestic and international policy support for continued reductions in GHG emissions. This brief analysis estimates the potential climate ramifications of changing US leadership, contrasting the Mid-Century Strategy for Deep Decarbonization (MCS) released under the Obama Administration, with campaign statements, early executive actions, and prevailing market conditions to estimate potential emission pathways under the Trump Administration. The analysis highlights areas where GHG reductions are less robust to changing policy conditions, and offers brief recommendations for addressing emissions in the interim. It specifically finds that continued reductions in the electricity sector are less vulnerable to changes in federal policy than those in the built environment and land use sectors. Given the long-lived nature of investments in these latter two sectors, however, opportunities for near-term climate action by willing cities, states, private landowners, and non-profit organizations warrant renewed attention in this time of climate uncertainty.

Key policy insights

• The recent US presidential election has already impacted mitigation goals and practices, injecting considerable uncertainty into domestic and international efforts to address climate change.

• A strategic assessment issued in the final days of the Obama Administration for how to reach long-term climate mitigation objectives provides a baseline from which to gauge potential changes under the Trump Administration.

• Though market trends may continue to foster emission declines in the energy sector, emission reductions in the land use sector and the built environment are subject to considerable uncertainty.

• Regardless of actions to scale back climate mitigation efforts, US emissions are likely to be flat in the coming years. Assuming that emissions remain constant under President Trump and that reductions resume afterwards to meet the Obama Administration mid-century targets in 2050, this near-term pause in reductions yields a difference in total emissions equivalent to 0.3–0.6 years of additional global greenhouse gas emissions, depending on the number of terms served by a Trump Administration.

     

Time to act now? Assessing the costs of delaying climate measures and benefits of early action

This paper compares the results of the three state of the art climate-energy-economy models IMACLIM-R, ReMIND-R, and WITCH to assess the costs of climate change mitigation in scenarios in which the implementation of a global climate agreement is delayed or major emitters decide to participate in the agreement at a later stage only. We find that for stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentrations at 450?ppm CO₂-only, postponing a global agreement to 2020 raises global mitigation costs by at least about half and a delay to 2030 renders ambitious climate targets infeasible to achieve. In the standard policy scenario??in which allocation of emission permits is aimed at equal per-capita levels in the year 2050??regions with above average emissions (such as the EU and the US alongside the rest of Annex-I countries) incur lower mitigation costs by taking early action, even if mitigation efforts in the rest of the world experience a delay. However, regions with low per-capita emissions which are net exporters of emission permits (such as India) can possibly benefit from higher future carbon prices resulting from a delay. We illustrate the economic mechanism behind these observations and analyze how (1) lock-in of carbon intensive infrastructure, (2) differences in global carbon prices, and (3) changes in reduction commitments resulting from delayed action influence mitigation costs.     

The role of negative CO2 emissions for reaching 2 °C—insights from integrated assessment modelling

Limiting climate change to 2 °C with a high probability requires reducing cumulative emissions to about 1600 GtCO₂ over the 2000–2100 period. This requires unprecedented rates of decarbonization even in the short-run. The availability of the option of net negative emissions, such as bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) or reforestation/afforestation, allows to delay some of these emission reductions. In the paper, we assess the demand and potential for negative emissions in particular from BECCS. Both stylized calculations and model runs show that without the possibility of negative emissions, pathways meeting the 2 °C target with high probability need almost immediate emission reductions or simply become infeasible. The potential for negative emissions is uncertain. We show that negative emissions from BECCS are probably limited to around 0 to 10 GtCO₂/year in 2050 and 0 to 20 GtCO₂/year in 2100. Estimates on the potential of afforestation options are in the order of 0–4 GtCO₂/year. Given the importance and the uncertainty concerning BECCS, we stress the importance of near-term assessments of its availability as today’s decisions has important consequences for climate change mitigation in the long run.     

Implications of delayed actions in addressing carbon dioxide emission reduction in the context of geo-engineering

Carbon dioxide emissions need to be reduced well below current emissions if atmospheric concentrations are to be stabilised at a level likely to avoid dangerous climate change. We investigate how delays in reducing CO₂ emissions affect stabilisation scenarios leading to overshooting of a target concentration pathway. We show that if geo-engineering alone is used to compensate for the delay in reducing CO₂ emissions, such an option needs to be sustained for centuries even though the period of overshooting emissions may only last for a few decades. If geo-engineering is used for a shorter period, it has to be associated with emission reductions significantly larger than those required to stabilise CO₂ without overshooting the target. In the presence of a strong climate–carbon cycle feedback the required emission reductions are even more drastic.     

Air quality planning in California’s changing climate

California is home to some of the worst air quality in the nation and ninety percent of the state’s population lives in areas that are out of attainment with at least one of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. Increasing temperatures associated with climate change will make meeting air quality standards more difficult. Under a changing climate, additional emission reductions will be needed to achieve clean air standards. These additional emission reductions and associated costs are called the “climate penalty.” Air quality planning is the process of assessing the emission reductions needed to meet air quality standards and outlining the programs and policies that will be implemented to achieve these emission reductions. This paper reviews the challenges that a changing climate will pose for air quality planning in California and identifies opportunities for adaptation. While state air quality regulators in California are taking enormous strides to address global warming, less work is happening at the regional, air district level. Air districts are the agencies responsible for developing air quality improvement plans. An important first step for regional air quality regulators will be to quantify the climate penalty and understand their region’s vulnerability to climate change. Limitations in regulatory authority could impede measures to improve preparedness. Regional agencies will likely need to look to state and federal agencies for additional emission reductions.     

Interpretation of IPCC AR6 on buildings北大核心CSCD

IPCC于2022年4月正式发布了第六次评估报告(AR6)第三工作组(WGⅢ)报告《气候变化2022:减缓气候变化》,该报告以已发布的第一和第二工作组报告作为基础,评估了各领域减缓气候变化的进展。报告的第九章建筑章节系统全面地评估了全球建筑领域的温室气体排放现状、趋势和驱动因素,综述并评估了建筑减缓气候变化的措施、潜力、成本和政策。报告主要结论认为,全球建筑领域有可能在2050年实现温室气体净零排放,但如果政策措施执行不力,将有可能在建筑领域形成长达几十年的高碳锁定效应。报告的主要结论将成为全球建筑领域应对气候变化行动的重要参考,对于我国建筑领域实现碳达峰、碳中和目标也有非常重要的借鉴意义。     

An equity first, risk-based framework for managing global climate change

This paper presents an alternative framework to the approach currently embodied in the Kyoto Protocol for managing global climate change post-2012. The framework has two key provisions. The first is that each person in the world would be ‘allowed’ an equal amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This is labeled the equity-first provision. The second provision focuses on incorporating risk concepts into the setting of GHG emission reductions. It is proposed that the global climate be managed as to avoid three categories of risks: (I) Substantial regional economic, political, and/or biological impacts; (II) Severe global economic, political, and/or biological impacts; and (III) Extinction of humans. Acceptable risk thresholds are suggested to be one-in-a-million, one-in-one-hundred-million, and one-in-ten-billion, respectively. This equity-first, risk-based framework overcomes many criticisms of the current Kyoto Protocol: it explicitly involves all countries on earth; it avoids several administrative issues that are anticipated to plague a global carbon emissions trading market; and it avoids several contentious issues associated with pegging carbon emission reductions to 1990 levels. Because the framework is risk-based and emissions are tied to population and not historic emission levels, the basic framework would not have to be frequently renegotiated, as will be needed for the Kyoto-style approach to take the world past that agreement's 2012 endpoint.     

全球长期减排目标与碳排放权分配原则

全球长期减排目标将对世界未来的碳排放形成严重制约,减排义务的分担原则涉及各国的发展空间,事关根本利益。部分发达国家倡导人均排放趋同原则,回避发达国家的历史责任,中国等发展中国家提出人均累积排放趋同原则,强调公平性。按人均累积排放量计算,发达国家自工业革命以来的CO₂排放量已远超出其到2050年前应有的限额,其当前和今后相当长时期的高人均排放都将继续挤占发展中国家的排放空间。因此,发达国家在哥本哈根会议的中近期减排承诺中必须深度减排,以实现全球长期减排目标下的排放轨迹,并为发展中国家留有必要的发展空间。同时必须对发展中国家给予充足的资金和技术支持,作为对其过度挤占发展中国家发展空间的补偿,使发展中国家能够在可持续发展框架下,提高应对气候变化的能力。我国在对外坚持公平原则,努力争取合理的排放空间的同时,对内要加强向低碳经济转型,努力实现保护全球气候和国内可持续发展的双赢。     

Integrated scenarios of acidification and climate change in Asia and Europe

Two integrated assessment models, one for climate change on a global scale (IMAGE 2) and another for the regional analysis of the impacts of acidifying deposition (RAINS), have been linked to assess the impacts of reducing sulphur emission on ecosystems in Asia and Europe. While such reductions have the beneficial effect of reducing the deposition of acidifying compounds and thus the exceedance of critical loads of ecosystems, they also reduce the global level of sulphate aerosols and thus enhance the impact of increased emissions of greenhouse gases, and consequently increase the risk of potential vegetation changes. The calculations indicate that about 70% of the ecosystems in Asia would be affected by either acid deposition or climate change in the year 2100 (up from 20% in 1990) for both sulphur emission scenarios (controlled and uncontrolled), whereas in Europe the impacted area would remain at a level of about 50%, with a dip early next century. More generally, the effects of reducing sulphur emissions and thus enhancing climate change would about balance for the Asian region, whereas for Europe the desirable impact of sulphur emission reductions would greatly outweigh its undesirable effects.     

Learning and climate change

Abstract

Learning—i.e. the acquisition of new information that leads to changes in our assessment of uncertainty—plays a prominent role in the international climate policy debate. For example, the view that we should postpone actions until we know more continues to be influential. The latest work on learning and climate change includes new theoretical models, better informed simulations of how learning affects the optimal timing of emissions reductions, analyses of how new information could affect the prospects for reaching and maintaining political agreements and for adapting to climate change, and explorations of how learning could lead us astray rather than closer to the truth. Despite the diversity of this new work, a clear consensus on a central point is that the prospect of learning does not support the postponement of emissions reductions today.     

Is it possible to limit global warming to no more than 1.5°C?

This study explores the feasibility of limiting increases in global temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. A probabilistic simple climate model is used to identify emissions paths that offer at least a 50% chance of achieving this goal. We conclude that it is more likely than not that warming would exceed 1.5°C, at least temporarily, under plausible mitigation scenarios. We have identified three criteria of emissions paths that could meet the 1.5°C goal with a temporary overshoot of no more than 50 years: early and strong reductions in emissions, with global emissions peaking in 2015 and falling to at most 44–48 GtCO₂e in 2020; rapid reductions in annual global emissions after 2020 (of at least 3–4% per year); very low annual global emissions by 2100 (less than 2–4 GtCO₂e) and falling to zero (or below) in the 22nd century. The feasibility of these characteristics is uncertain. We conclude that the proposed date of review of the 1.5°C goal, set at 2015, may be too late to achieve the necessary scaling up of emissions cuts to achieve this goal.     

Spain: words that succeed and climate policies that fail

Official figures submitted in 2002 showing the trends of GH gases during the period 1990-2000 indicate that Spain is a long way from in attaining its commitments with the international and national programmes on climate change. Both structural and cultural factors are used to explain the evolution in climate politics and the growth of its emissions with particular emphasis given to the lack of public participation in this respect. It is also argued that Spain will have either to buy emission reductions abroad or/and find new ways to reduce GH in a more decentralised manner in tune with its current Autonomous Communities’ (ACs) political organisation.     

Variation in the climatic response to SRES emissions scenarios in integrated assessment models

Integrated assessment models (IAMs) have commonly been used to understand the relationship between the economy, the earth’s climate system and climate impacts. We compare the IPCC simulations of CO₂ concentration, radiative forcing, and global mean temperature changes associated with five SRES ‘marker’ emissions scenarios with the responses of three IAMs—DICE, FUND and PAGE—to these same emission scenarios. We also compare differences in simulated temperature increase resulting from moving from a high to a low emissions scenario. These IAMs offer a range of climate outcomes, some of which are inconsistent with those of IPCC, due to differing treatments of the carbon cycle and of the temperature response to radiative forcing. In particular, in FUND temperatures up until 2100 are relatively similar for the four emissions scenarios, and temperature reductions upon switching to lower emissions scenarios are small. PAGE incorporates strong carbon cycle feedbacks, leading to higher CO₂ concentrations in the twenty-second century than other models. Such IAMs are frequently applied to determine ‘optimal’ climate policy in a cost–benefit approach. Models such as FUND which show smaller temperature responses to reducing emissions than IPCC simulations on comparable timescales will underestimate the benefits of emission reductions and hence the calculated ‘optimal’ level of investment in mitigation.     

Differentiating Future Commitments on the Basis of Countries’ Relative Historical Responsibility for Climate Change: Uncertainties in the ‘Brazilian Proposal’ in the Context of a Policy Implementation

During the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, Brazil proposed allocating the greenhouse gas emission reductions of Annex I Parties according to the relative effect of a country’s historical emissions on global temperature increase. This paper analyses the impact of scientific uncertainties and of different options in policy implementation (policy choices) on the contribution of countries’ historical emissions to indicators of historical responsibility for climate change. The influence of policy choices was found to be at least as large as the impact of the scientific uncertainties analysed here. Building on this, the paper then proceeds to explore the implications of applying the Brazilian Proposal as a climate regime for differentiation of future commitments on the global scale combined with an income threshold for participation of the non-Annex I regions. Under stringent climate targets, such a regime leads to high emission reductions for Annex I regions by 2050, in particular for Europe and Japan. The income threshold assumptions strongly affect the Annex I reductions, even more than the impact of another burden-sharing key. A variant of the Brazilian Proposal, allocating emission reductions on the basis of cumulative emissions since 1990, would lead to a more balanced distribution of emission reductions.     

Creating incentives for avoiding further deforestation: the nested approach

Since 2005, Parties to the UNFCCC have been negotiating policy options for incentivizing reductions of (greenhouse gas) emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) in a future climate regime. Proposals on how to operationalize REDD range from market-based to pure fund-based approaches. Most of the current proposals suggest accounting for REDD at the national level. Accounting for emission reductions and implementing policy reform for curbing deforestation will take time and imply high levels of technical and institutional capacity. Therefore it is essential that developing countries receive sufficient support to implement national REDD programmes. To save time and ensure prompt action in reducing deforestation, a REDD approach is proposed that integrates project-level and subnational REDD schemes into national-level accounting. This ‘nested approach’ can achieve meaningful reductions in GHG emissions from improved forest governance and management, while allowing for an immediate and broad participation by developing countries, civil society and the private sector.     

Can developed economies combat dangerous anthropogenic climate change without near-term reductions from developing economies?

Developing economy greenhouse gas emissions are growing rapidly relative to developed economy emissions (Boden et al. 2010) and developing economies as a group have greater emissions than developed economies. These developments are expected to continue (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2010), which has led some to question the effectiveness of emissions mitigation in developed economies without a commitment to extensive mitigation action from developing economies. One often heard argument against proposed U.S. legislation to limit carbon emissions to mitigate climate change is that, without participation from large developing economies like China and India, stabilizing temperature at 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial (United Nations 2009), or even reducing global emissions levels, would be impossible (Driessen 2009; RPC Energy Facts 2009) or prohibitively expensive (Clarke et al. 2009). Here we show that significantly delayed action by rapidly developing countries is not a reason to forgo mitigation efforts in developed economies. This letter examines the effect of a scenario with no explicit international climate policy and two policy scenarios, full global action and a developing economy delay, on the probability of exceeding various global average temperature changes by 2100. This letter demonstrates that even when developing economies delay any mitigation efforts until 2050 the effect of action by developed economies will appreciably reduce the probability of more extreme levels of temperature change. This paper concludes that early carbon mitigation efforts by developed economies will considerably affect the distribution over future climate change, whether or not developing countries begin mitigation efforts in the near term.     

The danger of overvaluing methane’s influence on future climate change

Minimizing the future impacts of climate change requires reducing the greenhouse gas (GHG) load in the atmosphere. Anthropogenic emissions include many types of GHG’s as well as particulates such as black carbon and sulfate aerosols, each of which has a different effect on the atmosphere, and a different atmospheric lifetime. Several recent studies have advocated for the importance of short timescales when comparing the climate impact of different climate pollutants, placing a high relative value on short-lived pollutants, such as methane (CH₄) and black carbon (BC) versus carbon dioxide (CO₂). These studies have generated confusion over how to value changes in temperature that occur over short versus long timescales. We show the temperature changes that result from exchanging CO₂ for CH₄ using a variety of commonly suggested metrics to illustrate the trade-offs involved in potential carbon trading mechanisms that place a high value on CH₄ emissions. Reducing CH₄ emissions today would lead to a climate cooling of approximately ~0.5 °C, but this value will not change greatly if we delay reducing CH₄ emissions by years or decades. This is not true for CO₂, for which the climate is influenced by cumulative emissions. Any delay in reducing CO₂ emissions is likely to lead to higher cumulative emissions, and more warming. The exact warming resulting from this delay depends on the trajectory of future CO₂ emissions but using one business-as usual-projection we estimate an increase of 3/4 °C for every 15-year delay in CO₂ mitigation. Overvaluing the influence of CH₄ emissions on climate could easily result in our “locking” the earth into a warmer temperature trajectory, one that is temporarily masked by the short-term cooling effects of the CH₄ reductions, but then persists for many generations.     

If climate action becomes urgent: the importance of response times for various climate strategies

Most deliberations on climate policy are based on a mitigation response that assumes a gradually increasing reduction over time. However, situations may occur where a more urgent response is needed. A key question for climate policy in general, but even more in the case a rapid response is needed, is: what are the characteristic response times of the response options, such as rapid mitigation or solar radiation management (SRM)? This paper explores this issue, which has not received a lot of attention yet, by looking into the role of both societal and physical response times. For mitigation, technological and economic inertia clearly limit reduction rates with considerable uncertainty corresponding to political inertia and societies’ ability to organize rapid mitigation action at what costs. The paper looks into a rapid emission reductions of 4–6 % annually. Reduction rates at the top end of this range (up to 6 %) could effectively reduce climate change, but only with a noticeable delay. Temperatures could be above those in the year of policy introduction for more than 70 years, with unknown consequences of overshoot. A strategy based on SRM is shown to have much shorter response times (up to decades), but introduces an important element of risk, such as ocean acidification and the risk of extreme temperature shifts in case action is halted. Above all, the paper highlights the role of response times in designing effective policy strategies implying that a better understanding of these crucial factors is required.     

Implications of weak near-term climate policies on long-term mitigation pathways

While the international community has agreed on the long-term target of limiting global warming to no more than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, only a few concrete climate policies and measures to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been implemented. We use a set of three global integrated assessment models to analyze the implications of current climate policies on long-term mitigation targets. We define a weak-policy baseline scenario, which extrapolates the current policy environment by assuming that the global climate regime remains fragmented and that emission reduction efforts remain unambitious in most of the world’s regions. These scenarios clearly fall short of limiting warming to 2 °C. We investigate the cost and achievability of the stabilization of atmospheric GHG concentrations at 450 ppm CO₂e by 2100, if countries follow the weak policy pathway until 2020 or 2030 before pursuing the long-term mitigation target with global cooperative action. We find that after a deferral of ambitious action the 450 ppm CO₂e is only achievable with a radical up-scaling of efforts after target adoption. This has severe effects on transformation pathways and exacerbates the challenges of climate stabilization, in particular for a delay of cooperative action until 2030. Specifically, reaching the target with weak near-term action implies (a) faster and more aggressive transformations of energy systems in the medium term, (b) more stranded investments in fossil-based capacities, (c) higher long-term mitigation costs and carbon prices and (d) stronger transitional economic impacts, rendering the political feasibility of such pathways questionable.