全球贸易隐含碳变化及其影响分析

基于最新的GTAP8 (Global Trade Analysis Project）数据库,使用投入产出法,分析了2004年到2007年全球贸易变化下南北集团贸易隐含碳变化及对全球碳排放的影响。结果显示,随着发展中国家进出口规模扩张,全球贸易隐含碳流向的重心逐渐向发展中国家转移。2004年到2007年,发达国家高端设备制造业和服务业出口以及发展中国家资源、能源密集型行业及中低端制造业出口的趋势加强,该过程的生产转移导致全球碳排放增长4.15亿t,占研究时段全球贸易隐含碳增量的63%。未来发展中国家的出口隐含碳比重还将进一步提高。贸易变化带来的南北集团隐含碳流动变化对全球应对气候变化行动的影响日益突出,发达国家对此负有重要责任。     

基于多区域投入产出模型中美贸易隐含能源、碳排放的测算

采用多区域投入产出模型（MRIO）,利用欧盟资助开发的世界投入产出表和环境账户数据,测算了1995—2009年中国与美国的增加值贸易规模及净值,在此基础上利用环境账户中的能源消耗和碳排放数据测算出中美外贸隐含能源和隐含碳排放总体水平及其行业结构。研究表明：1995—2009年,中国对美国的增加值出口保持持续增长的态势,尤其是在中国加入世界贸易组织（WTO）后,但随后受2008年全球经济危机的影响,中国增加值出口规模有所减小;相比于美国,中国单位增加值能耗和碳排放水平较高,从而导致较大规模的隐含能源和隐含碳出口,长期处于隐含能源和隐含碳净输出国地位,且净输出规模呈现出上升的趋势;从行业结构来看,电力、燃气及水的供应业等能源行业是中国出口隐含能源和隐含碳排放的主要行业来源。     

国家自主决定贡献的减排力度评价

基于气候变化综合模型——全球变化评价模型（GCAM-TU),分析了2030年各国家/地区减排承诺下能源相关CO₂的全球排放路径与不同可能性下2℃温升目标对应的最优排放路径的差距。研究发现,当前减排承诺下的全球排放路径与最优路径仍存在一定差距,各国家/地区需加大2030年后的减排承诺力度。进一步分析了主要国家/地区在各自减排承诺下的碳强度下降率、减排成本和人均碳排放,得出中国在全球减排进程中的努力和贡献是巨大的,而南非、日本等国承诺力度不足。为实现自主决定贡献,中国终端能源消耗将较参考情景有所下降,能源结构将进一步优化。     

全球碳排放格网化格局的变化

基于世界各国年碳排放总量数据和人口密度数据,将人口密度作为一项经济-人口综合指标来对碳排放进行空间分配,运用ArcGIS空间分析工具,做出了1950年、1980年、2014年共3期的全球碳排放空间分布格局图 （0.1?×0.1?),并对各期分布格局及变化进行了比较分析。结果显示：1950年主要碳排放区为美国的东部和欧洲地区,1980年新增中国东部、日本、韩国等为全球碳排放的主要区域,2014年新增印度、东南亚为主要排放区。各碳排放区的排放量总体上大幅增加,少数地区略有减少,这与其工业发展所处的不同阶段有关。该数据能够反映当前全球不同区域的碳排放水平的空间格局,为全球变化研究提供基础数据。     

河北省贸易隐含二氧化碳排放及其影响因素研究

针对全球气候变化而引发国家间减排责任的争吵,需要各国从生产和消费的角度来认识二氧化碳排放,国家内部区域之间减排责任的分担也应该从生产和消费两个角度加以认识。为此,本文利用投入产出分析方法和EEBT(双边贸易隐含排放)核算方法核算河北省的二氧化碳排放,发现河北省生产型二氧化碳排放远大于其消费型二氧化碳排放,其中国内流出/流入引发的二氧化碳排放量较大。在利用SDA(结构分解分析法)分析影响贸易隐含二氧化碳排放变化因素时,发现行业二氧化碳排放强度变化对隐含二氧化碳排放具有积极影响,而国民经济行业之间技术经济关系的变化对隐含二氧化碳排放具有消极影响。因此,河北省在利用技术手段降低行业二氧化碳排放强度的同时,还要筛选关键性部门加以重点管理。同时,河北省贸易隐含二氧化碳排放及其影响因素变化对国家制定区域减排责任也有较强参考价值。     

美中在气燃变化问题上加强合作：《克服美中气候变化合作的障碍》

在美国奥巴马政府新国务卿希拉里·克林顿访问中国前夕,2月5日美国著名智库布鲁金斯学会发表了题为《克服美中气候变化合作的障碍》的报告。报告指出,中美两国加在一起每年向大气排放的温室气体高达全球总量的40％以上。     

气候变化国家评估报告（Ⅲ）：中国应对气候变化对策的综合评价

 回顾了国际社会应对气候变化的进程，对国内外的碳排放状况、中国减缓碳排放的技术潜力、中国减缓碳排放的宏观影响、全球减缓气候变化的公平性与国际合作行动等问题进行了分析与评估。提出了中国减缓气候变化的思路与对策，指出在全球应对气候变化的形势下，中国要积极适应国际政治、经济及贸易格局变动的趋势，将减缓气候变化对策纳入国家经济与社会发展战略与规划之中，促进国家经济和社会的全面、协调和可持续发展。     

全球低碳化转型与中国的应对战略

《巴黎协定》确立了2020年后全球气候治理新机制,明确了全球应对气候变化长期目标,将加速世界范围内经济发展方式的低碳转型,推进能源体系的革命性变革,促进社会生产方式和消费方式的根本性转变,进而促进人类社会文明形态由工业文明向生态文明演变。全球低碳转型的紧迫形势,将重塑世界范围内经济、贸易、技术的竞争格局。中国以生态文明建设为指引,探索绿色低碳发展路径,确立有雄心、有力度的国家自主决定贡献目标和行动计划,推动能源生产和消费革命,加快经济发展方式的转变,既是顺应世界低碳转型的潮流,又是缓解国内资源环境制约和实现可持续发展的内在需要,是促进经济发展、环境保护和减缓碳排放的多赢战略。中国要以全球长期减排目标为指引,制定中长期低碳发展战略,打造低碳先进技术和发展方式的核心竞争力,同时深度参与全球治理,为建设人类命运共同体,应对全球生态危机体现大国的责任担当。     

世界排放大国CO2排放和GDP的格兰杰因果分析及其对国际气候治理的影响和意义

基于1990—2015年世界前20个排放大国碳排放量和国内生产总值（GDP）的时间序列数据,采用协整分析、格兰杰因果检验,对主要排放大国碳排放与经济增长之间的关系进行了实证分析。通过协整分析得出大多数国家的碳排放量与经济增长之间存在长期均衡关系;碳排放量和GDP的格兰杰检验结果显示,大多数世界排放大国碳排放与经济增长之间存在单向因果关系。发达国家主要表现为经济增长是碳排放的格兰杰原因,发展中国家则主要表现为碳排放是经济增长的格兰杰原因。研究结果反映了发达国家和发展中国家在碳减排问题上的阶段性特征,碳减排对发展中国家经济发展的负面影响明显大于发达国家。基于格兰杰因果分析结果,国际气候治理进程中关于要求发展中国家现阶段提出大幅减排目标的诉求不符合发展中国家发展阶段特征,可能影响发展中国家经济发展的正常秩序和规律。发达国家基于历史排放责任、发展阶段和能力,都应该带头开展减排行动,并帮助发展中国家实现转型、升级发展,降低经济发展对碳排放的依赖。国际气候治理需要根据并考虑不同国家的发展需求和特征,形成国际合作制度安排,实现社会经济发展与全球气候治理的协同。     

碳边境调节机制最新进展及潜在影响

2023年5月17日,欧盟碳边境调节机制法规正式生效,年底就要进入试运行阶段。法规要求出口特定产品到欧盟的企业为产品生产过程中所产生的温室气体排放支付费用。根据各国学者的建模分析,这将增加所有销往欧盟市场的相关产品的温室气体排放成本,对欧盟以外国家的生产、贸易、就业和收入产生不利影响,而欧盟国家的企业则获得相对的竞争优势,这引发了诸多争议。对此,中国应在多边主义框架下积极与欧盟开展磋商,争取全球各国在公平的前提下提升减排雄心,同时加紧全国碳市场建设,促进国内的碳价提高到足以反映国内减排成本的水平,促进相关行业的碳排放核算能力建设,以求降低增加的管理成本,并推动低碳技术的发展,以降低欧盟碳边境调节机制带来的负面影响。     

基于MRIO模型的中美欧日贸易隐含碳特点对比分析

基于GTAP8数据库,构建了2004年和2007年全球多区域投入产出（MRIO）表,测算了中国、美国、欧盟和日本基于生产端和消费端的碳排放量,对比了中、美、欧、日各自对外贸易隐含碳特征,分析了中美、中欧、中日双边贸易中的隐含碳特点。结果表明：2004和2007年,中国基于生产端的碳排放高出消费端15%以上,而美、欧、日则低5%左右;中国是隐含碳净出口国,而美、欧、日则属于隐含碳净进口国;中国出口隐含碳最高的前三个行业依次是设备制造业、纺织服装业和其他制造业;美、欧出口隐含碳最多的行业则是设备制造业、交通业和石化工业,日本的出口隐含碳高度集中于设备制造业。     

Spatially-explicit footprints of agricultural commodities: Mapping carbon emissions embodied in Brazil's soy exports

Reliable estimates of carbon and other environmental footprints of agricultural commodities require capturing a large diversity of conditions along global supply chains. Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) faces limitations when it comes to addressing spatial and temporal variability in production, transportation and manufacturing systems. We present a bottom-up approach for quantifying the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions embedded in the production and trade of agricultural products with a high spatial resolution, by means of the integration of LCA principles with enhanced physical trade flow analysis. Our approach estimates the carbon footprint (as tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents per tonne of product) of Brazilian soy exports over the period 2010–2015 based on ~90,000 individual traded flows of beans, oil and protein cake identified from the municipality of origin through international markets. Soy is the most traded agricultural commodity in the world and the main agricultural export crop in Brazil, where it is associated with significant environmental impacts. We detect an extremely large spatial variability in carbon emissions across sourcing areas, countries of import, and sub-stages throughout the supply chain. The largest carbon footprints are associated with municipalities across the MATOPIBA states and Pará, where soy is directly linked to natural vegetation loss. Importing soy from the aforementioned states entailed up to six times greater emissions per unit of product than the Brazilian average (0.69 t t⁻¹). The European Union (EU) had the largest carbon footprint (0.77 t t⁻¹) due to a larger share of emissions from embodied deforestation than for instance in China (0.67 t t⁻¹), the largest soy importer. Total GHG emissions from Brazilian soy exports in 2010–2015 are estimated at 223.46 Mt, of which more than half were imported by China although the EU imported greater emissions from deforestation in absolute terms. Our approach contributes data for enhanced environmental stewardship across supply chains at the local, regional, national and international scales, while informing the debate on global responsibility for the impacts of agricultural production and trade.     

隐形碳关税:概念辨析与国际治理

碳关税是各国高度关注的贸易问题,因涉及各国经贸利益,南北国家在碳关税问题上分歧很大。任何有关碳关税的政策措施,都会引起发展中国家的强烈反对。因此,部分发达国家试图另辟蹊径,在国际贸易中通过增加生产标准、碳标签等技术要求,以比较隐蔽的方式实现执行碳关税的目的。文中将这些隐蔽的但能起到碳关税执行效果的政策措施归纳为隐形碳关税,并定义隐形碳关税是指那些虽然没有在边境环节征收碳关税,但与征收碳关税起到相同贸易壁垒作用的,对发展中国家出口产品和服务构成限制的政策和措施。隐形碳关税比较典型的表现形式包括生产标准、碳标签等措施。这些措施本身是政策中性的,并不构成隐形碳关税,但如果叠加了转移应对气候变化成本、限制发展中国家产业发展等目的,这些措施的性质便不再中性,而成为现实中的贸易壁垒。隐形碳关税的治理应该是国际气候治理进程的一个部分,《联合国气候变化框架公约》则应是隐形碳关税治理的主要国际平台。无论是在气候公约内还是气候公约外的治理机制,隐形碳关税的国际治理都应遵循气候公约的相关原则,尤其是共同但有区别责任原则,区别对待发达和发展中国家的责任和义务,充分发挥生产标准、碳标签等措施的积极环境效用,同时约束其不当使用,建立公平、互信、务实的国际合作模式,实现气候治理与经济发展的协同。     

Drivers of change in Brazil’s carbon dioxide emissions

Brazil’s economic development has been underpinned by a diverse and – in a global comparison – unusual set of energy carriers, notably hydroelectricity and ethanol from sugar cane. Its energy mix makes Brazil one of the least energy-related carbon-intensive economies worldwide. Given that the country is fast becoming one of the world’s economic powerhouses, decision-makers need to understand the drivers underlying past and current carbon dioxide emissions trends. We therefore investigate a) which key long-term drivers have led to Brazil’s unique emissions profile, and b) the implications of these drivers for Brazil’s national policies. We show that Brazil’s emissions are growing mainly due to increasing individual standards of living, exports and population size, and that this growth is so far unchallenged by technological and structural improvements toward lower emissions intensities and more efficient production structures. As these trends are likely to continue amidst growing international pressure on key economies to reduce their carbon emissions, a decoupling of drivers from emissions is needed to simultaneously meet development and environmental goals.     

Real challenges behind the EU–China PV trade dispute settlement

This article addresses the implications and remaining challenges behind the seemingly happy ending of the recent EU–China trade dispute on solar products. First, the EU's choice of a specific trade defence measure – anti-dumping – was based on shaky arguments. Second, further trade disputes on green goods are very likely, in particular because China is increasingly implementing domestic support policies on green sectors, bringing down Chinese export prices. Third, trade defence measures could be adopted as an expensive option. Alternatively to this, the EU and China could consider setting up constructive and preventive mechanisms in order to stabilize trade and broaden their economic relationship.

Policy relevance

In July 2013 the EU accepted an undertaking by Chinese solar wafer, cell, and module manufacturers to fix minimum import prices for their products, along with a volume cap to be imposed on Chinese solar exports to the EU. In spite of the seemingly happy end of a trade dispute between the two major players in the renewables sector, we show that the possibility of trade disputes over low-carbon products in the near future cannot be ruled out. Drawing on the China–EU photovoltaic ‘dumping case', we highlight some weaknesses in the EU's choice to resort to anti-dumping measures and emphasize the urgent need to invent new forms of trade dialogues between the EU and China as first-choice trade dispute settlement policies.     

China’s future emission reduction challenge and implications for global climate policy

In December 2015, China joined 190 plus nations at Paris in committing to the goal of limiting the rise in global average temperature to ‘well below’ 2°C. Carbon budget analysis indicates that goal will require not only that the European Union and US reduce their emissions by greater than 80% by 2050, but that China at least comes close to doing so as well, if any budget is to be left over for the rest of the world (RoW). Given that RoW emissions are, and will come from, low-income and emerging nations, China’s emission reduction potential is of no small consequence. In this paper, we use the Kaya identity to back out changes in the drivers of CO₂ emissions, including gross domestic product (GDP), energy intensity (E/GDP) and the carbon content of energy (C/E), the latter two calculated to be consistent with China’s long-term GDP growth rate forecasts and specified 2050 CO₂ emission reduction targets. Our results suggest that even achieving China’s highly optimistic renewable energy targets will be very far from sufficient to reduce China’s CO₂ emissions from 9.1?Gt it emitted in 2015 to much below 3?Gt by 2050. Even reducing its emissions to 5?Gt will be challenging, yet this falls far short of what is needed if the world is to meet its ‘well below’ 2°C commitment.

Key policy insights

• Under the Paris Agreement there is great pressure on China to very substantially reduce its emissions by 2050.

• While China has attached great importance to renewables and nuclear energy development, even achieving the most optimistic targets would not be sufficient to reduce China’s emissions from 9.1?Gt in 2015 to much below 3?Gt by 2050.

• China’s emission reduction potential falls far short of what is needed if the world is to meet its Paris ‘well below’ 2°C commitment, even if the EU and US reduce their emissions to zero by 2050.

• Emission cuts consistent with the Paris Agreement will require that China and the world give much greater weight to advancing research and development of scalable low-, zero- and negative-carbon sources and technologies.

     

A no cap but trade proposal for emission targets

One problem in international climate policy is the refusal of large developing countries to accept emission reduction targets. Brazil, China and India together account for about 20% of today's CO₂ emissions. We analyse the case in which there is no international agreement on emission reduction targets, but countries do have domestic targets, and trade permits across borders. We contrast two scenarios. In one scenario, Brazil, China and India adopt their business as usual emissions as their target. In this scenario, there are substantial exports of emission permits from developing to developed countries, and substantial economic gains for all. In the second scenario, Brazil, China and India reduce their emissions target so that they have no net economic gain from permit trade. Here, developing countries do not accept responsibility for climate change (as they bear no net costs), but they do contribute to an emission reduction policy by refusing to make money out of it. Adopting such break-even targets can be done at minor cost to developed and developing countries (roughly $2 bn/year each in extra costs and forgone benefits), while developing countries are still slightly better off than in the case without international emissions trade. This result is robust to variations in scenarios and parameters. It contrasts with Stewart and Wiener (2003) who propose granting ‘hot air’ to developing countries to seduce them to accept targets. In 2020, China and India could reduce their emissions by some 10% from the baseline without net economic costs.     

Linking the CDM with domestic carbon markets

Certified emission reductions (CERs) from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects have traditionally served as an indirect link between cap and trade systems around the world. However, since 2010, import restrictions have increased. Reasons for import limitations include the supplementarity principle, genuine concerns about the environmental integrity of CERs and social benefits of CDM projects, pressure from domestic emissions mitigation industries, concerns about competition in the industries in which reductions take place, as well as the attempt to pressure advanced developing countries to accept national emissions commitments under a future international climate policy regime. It is shown that import limitations lead to a decrease in CER prices and a race to generate CERs as quickly as possible. Such effects are visible in the CDM market after the EU announced its import limitations. The exclusion of CERs from specific project types will distort the CDM supply curve and increase the CER price unless the marginal abatement costs of the excluded project type are above the CER world market price. Similarly, exclusion of CERs from specific host countries will increase the price. Substantial differences are found in CER access to national carbon markets around the world.Policy relevanceCDM regulators could try to improve access of CERs to cap and trade schemes through improvements to additionality testing, standardizing baseline and monitoring methodologies and stakeholder consultation. However, regulators should be aware that standardization is no panacea, and controversies may resurface if standardized additionality determination (e.g. through benchmarks or positive lists) are applied for a certain period and found to be problematic. However, domestic policy concerns such as an unwillingness to send money abroad to buy credits, an inability to control market prices, and competitiveness impacts cannot be resolved by CDM reforms. If, despite such reforms of the CDM, blatant protectionism continues, a challenge before the World Trade Organisation (WTO) could be launched to stop discrimination of service exports from specific countries.