Self-Organised Criticality and the Response of Wildland Fires to Climate Change

Here I present a new approach to forecasting the effects of climate change on catastrophic events, based on the ‘self-organised criticality’ concept from statistical physics. In particular, I develop the ‘self-organised critical fuel succession model’ (SOCFUS), which deals with wildland fires. I show that there is good agreement between model and data for the response pattern of the whole fire size statistical distribution to weather fluctuations in a boreal forest region. I tentatively predict the fire regime in this region for an instance of possible climate change scenario. I show that the immediate response is sharper than usually thought, but part of the added burning rate might not persist indefinitely. A large fraction of the extra burning in the transition period is likely to be concentrated in a few ‘climate change fires’, much larger than the largest fires that could currently occur. I also suggest that the major fire events recently observed in some tropical rainforest regions belong to a qualitatively different, even more abrupt type of response, which is also predicted by the model. Electronic supplementary material Electronic supplementary material is available for this article at     

Numerical study for potential predictability of short— term anomalous climate change caused by El nino

In this paper, the two-layer IAP model with sea surface temperature anomalies in the equatorial central-eastern Pacific is used to investigate potential predictability of global short-term anomalous climate change caused by El Nino via the “switching” experiments. The experimental results show that short-term anomalous climate change in the tropics is mainly caused by instantaneous response of tropical atmosphere to SSTA in the tropics. The effective period of this kind of anomalous climate is shorter and about monthly scale. In the high latitudes, the anomalous cli-mate is mainly caused by the lag response of atmosphere to SSTA in the tropics. The strongest influence appears in the month after a half year when the SSTA in the tropics disappears. Therefore, potential predictability of short-term anomalous climate change may be reached to one year; anomalous climate change in the middle-latitudes is not only affected by instantaneous response to SSTA in the tropics, but also by lag response to that. Therefore, short-term climate change prediction with monthly time scale can be not only done by using SSTA in the tropics, but also predic-tion of short-term climate after a half year can be done and its effective predictable period may be reached to one year.     

Learning to Adapt: Organisational Adaptation to Climate Change Impacts

Analysis of human adaptation to climate change should be based on realistic models of adaptive behaviour at the level of organisations and individuals. The paper sets out a framework for analysing adaptation to the direct and indirect impacts of climate change in business organisations with new evidence presented from empirical research into adaptation in nine case-study companies. It argues that adaptation to climate change has many similarities with processes of organisational learning. The paper suggests that business organisations face a number of obstacles in learning how to adapt to climate change impacts, especially in relation to the weakness and ambiguity of signals about climate change and the uncertainty about benefits flowing from adaptation measures. Organisations rarely adapt ‘autonomously’, since their adaptive behaviour is influenced by policy and market conditions, and draws on resources external to the organisation. The paper identifies four adaptation strategies that pattern organisational adaptive behaviour.     

A rose by any other name ...?: What members of the general public prefer to call “climate change”

Unlike many other environmental problems, the terms used to describe the phenomenon of increasing atmospheric concentrations of anthropogenic greenhouse gases are many, with multiple and sometimes conflicting meanings. Whether there are meaningful distinctions in public perceptions of “global warming,” “climate change,” and “global climate change” has been a topic of research over the past decade. This study examines public preferences for these terms based on respondent characteristics, including climate change beliefs, political affiliation, and audience segment status derived from the “Global Warming’s Six Americas” classification. Certainty of belief in global warming, political affiliation and audience segment status were found to be the strongest predictors of preference, although “I have no preference” was the modal response. Global warming appears to be a more polarizing term than climate change, preferred most by people already concerned about the issue, and least by people who don’t believe climate change is occurring. Further research is needed to identify which of these two names promotes the engagement of people across the spectrum of climate change beliefs in constructive dialogue about the issue.     

Personal harm and support for climate change mitigation policies: Evidence from 10 U.S. communities impacted by extreme weather

A growing body of research examines the role of extreme weather experience—as one of the most personal, visceral (and increasingly frequent and severe) impacts of climate change—in shaping views on climate change. A remaining question is whether the experience of an extreme weather event increases climate change concern via experiential learning or reinforces existing views via motivated reasoning. Building on this work, we explore the relationship between personal experience and climate change policy preferences using surveys in 10 communities that experienced extreme weather events (3 tornadoes, 3 floods, 2 wildfires, 1 hurricane and 1 landslide). We find that self-reported personal harm aligns with objective measures of event impacts and that personal harm (i.e., experience) is associated with higher levels of policy support. However, we do not find that objective measures of event impacts are related to policy support. Though political ideology (i.e., motivated reasoning) dominates our model of policy support in predictable ways, personal harm moderates this relationship suggesting that conservatives reporting higher levels of personal harm from the event are, on average, more likely to express support for climate policy than those reporting lower levels of harm. We postulate that while extreme weather events may serve as teachable moments on climate change, their lessons may only reach conservatives who feel personally harmed, even in the communities most affected.     

Assessing mitigation-adaptation scenarios for reducing catastrophic climate risk

Countries can use both mitigation and adaptation strategies to protect their citizens from catastrophic risk posed by climate change (e.g., shift in the jet stream). A nation can mitigate by reducing CO₂ emissions, which reduces the probability of a catastrophic event; it can adapt by altering the infrastructure so that damages can be reduced in the event a catastrophe is realized. Herein we add to the current literature by extending the endogenous risk framework into a dynamic framework permitting analysis of both mitigation and adaptation while allowing for the dynamic process of global climate change. Our results suggest adaptation to catastrophe is a small fraction of the national climate protection budget relative to mitigation when nations cooperate fully, when damages are both continuous and catastrophic, and when nations have a short planning horizon. Adaptation becomes more important relative to mitigation when nations are unlikely to cooperate, when damages are mainly catastrophic, or when the nation’s planning horizon increases.     

Management Under Anarchy: The International Politics of Climate Change

This article analyzes climate change from the perspective of international politics. In the anarchy of the international system, various cooperation problems have stalled the formation of an effective climate regime at the international level. Obstacles occur at three stages of regime formation: the bargaining stage, the transition stage, and the implementation stage. The importance of the transition stage of cooperation, which takes place between the signing of an agreement and its entry into force, has been overlooked by international relations scholars and is particularly important in the climate case. The article assesses the possibility of applying `adaptive management' principles to climate change as a partial response to these political obstacles. While such an approach has significant appeal given the uncertainty surrounding the human-climate interface, its experimental, top-down characteristics are not politically feasible at the international level. I recommend certain modifications of existing institutions and practices to improve international information sharing and facilitate efficient learning. These changes would serve to promote a decentralized and passive – and thus politically viable – version of adaptive management, an effective approach to dealing with climate change at the global level.     

The coupling of optimal economic growth and climate dynamics

In this paper, we study optimal economic growth programs coupled with climate change dynamics. The study is based on models derived from MERGE, a well established integrated assessment model (IAM). We discuss first the introduction in MERGE of a set of “tolerable window” constraints which limit both the temperature change and the rate of temperature change. These constraints, obtained from ensemble simulations performed with the Bern 2.5-D climate model, allow us to identity a domain intended to preserve the Atlantic thermohaline circulation. Next, we report on experiments where a two-way coupling is realized between the economic module of MERGE and an intermediate complexity “3-D-” climate model (C-GOLDSTEIN) which computes the changes in climate and mean temperature. The coupling is achieved through the implementation of an advanced “oracle based optimization technique” which permits the integration of information coming from the climate model during the search for the optimal economic growth path. Both cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis modes are explored with this combined “meta-model” which we refer to as GOLDMERGE. Some perspectives on future implementations of these approaches in the context of “collaborative” or “community” integrated assessment modules are derived from the comparison of the different approaches.     

Climate change in northern Patagonia: critical decrease in water resources

The current study presents an assessment of the impact of climate change on water yield, one of the main hydrological ecosystem services, in northern Patagonia. The outputs of regional climate models from the CORDEX Project for South America were used to drive the InVEST water yield model. CORDEX regional climate models project for the far future (2071–2100) an increase in temperature higher than 1.5 °C and a precipitation decrease ranging from − 10 to − 30% for the study area. The projected warmer and dryer climate emerges as a robust signal based on model agreement and on consistent physical drivers of these changes. Moreover, both the projected increase in evapotranspiration and the decrease in precipitation contribute to a strong decrease in water yield of around − 20 to − 40% in the headwaters of northern Patagonian watersheds. Comparison of the results in the two basins reveals that the land cover may be considered a buffer of water yield changes and highlights the key role of protected areas in reducing the vulnerability of water resources to climate change.     

The modification of greenhouse gas warming by the direct effect of sulphate aerosols

 The Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis (CCCma) second generation climate model (GCMII) consists of an atmospheric GCM coupled to mixed layer ocean. It is used to investigate the climate response to a doubling of the CO₂ concentration together with the direct effect of scattering by sulphate aerosols. As expected, the aerosols offset some of the greenhouse gas (GHG) warming; the global annual mean screen temperature change due to doubled CO₂ is 3.4 °C in this model and this is reduced to 2.7 °C when an estimate of the direct effect of anthropogenic sulphate aerosols is included. The pattern of climate response to the comparatively localized aerosol forcing is not itself localized, and it bears a striking resemblance to the response pattern that arises from the globally distributed change in GHG forcing. This “non-local” response to “localized” forcing indicates that the pattern of climate response is determined, to first order, by the overall magnitude of the change in forcing rather than its detailed nature or structure. Feedback processes operating in the system apparently determine this pattern by locally amplifying and suppressing the response to the magnitude of the change in forcing. The influence of the location of the change in forcing is relatively small. These “non-local” and “local” effects of aerosol forcing are characterized and displayed and some of their consequences discussed. Effects on the moisture budget and on the energetics of the global climate are also examined. Received: 10 June 1997 / Accepted: 8 January 1998     

Climate uncertainties and their discontents: increasing the impact of assessments on public understanding of climate risks and choices

US public awareness of the reality and risks of human-caused climate change remains limited, despite strong evidence presented in the IPCC and other major climate assessments. One contributing factor may be that the immense collective effort to produce periodic climate assessments is typically not well matched with public communication and outreach efforts for these reports, leaving a vacuum to be filled by less authoritative sources. Print and online media coverage provides one metric of the US public reach of selected climate assessments between 2000 and 2010. The number of Lexis-Nexis articles for the search terms “climate change” or “global warming” within 14 days of each report’s release varied significantly over time with a peak occurring in 2007. When compared to background “chatter” relating to climate change, each assessment had widely diverse penetration in the US media (~4% for US National Climate Assessment in 2000; ~17% for Arctic Climate Impacts Assessment in 2004; ~19% and ~10% for Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report Working Group I and Working Group II respectively in 2007; ~4% for the US Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) assessment report in 2009; and ~5% for US National Research Council’s America’s Climate Choices reports in 2010). We propose ways to improve the public reach of climate assessments, focusing in particular on approaches to more effectively characterize and communicate the role of uncertainty in human actions as distinct from other sources of uncertainty across the range of possible climate futures.     

Lost in translation? United States television news coverage of anthropogenic climate change, 1995–2004

Eminent climate scientists have come to consensus that human influences are significant contributors to modern global climate change. This study examines coverage of anthropogenic climate change in United States (U.S.) network television news – ABC World News Tonight, CBS Evening News and NBC Nightly News – and focuses on the application of the journalistic norm of ‘balance’ in coverage from 1995 through 2004. This study also examines CNN WorldView, CNN Wolf Blitzer Reports and CNN NewsNight as illustrations of cable news coverage. Through quantitative content analysis, results show that 70% of U.S. television news segments have provided ‘balanced’ coverage regarding anthropogenic contributions to climate change vis-à-vis natural radiative forcing, and there has been a significant difference between this television coverage and scientific consensus regarding anthropogenic climate change from 1996 through 2004. Thus, by way of the institutionalized journalistic norm of balanced reporting, United States television news coverage has perpetrated an informational bias by significantly diverging from the consensus view in climate science that humans contribute to climate change. Troubles in translating this consensus in climate science have led to the appearance of amplified uncertainty and debate, also then permeating public and policy discourse.     

Spatially explicit modelling of the impact of climate changes on pasture production in the North Island,New Zealand

To assess the potential impact of climate changes on pasture production in the North Island, New Zealand, eight climate scenarios of increased temperature and increased (or decreased) rainfall were investigated by integrating a polynomial regression model for pasture production with a Geographic Information System (GIS). The results indicated that the climate change scenarios assuming an increase in temperature by 1–2°C and a rainfall change by −20 to +20% would have a very significant impact on pasture production with a predicted pasture production variation from −46.2 to +51.9% compared with the normal climate from 1961–1990. Increased temperature would generally have a positive effect on pasture production in the south and southeast of the North Island, and increased rainfall would have a positive effect in the central, south and southeast of the North Island and a negative effect in the north of the North Island. The interaction of decreased rainfall and increased temperature would have a negative impact for the whole North Island except some central areas with high rainfall. Relevant management practices for coping with potential climate change are discussed.     

Probabilistic Inference for Future Climate Using an Ensemble of Climate Model Evaluations

This paper describes an approach to computing probabilistic assessments of future climate, using a climate model. It clarifies the nature of probability in this context, and illustrates the kinds of judgements that must be made in order for such a prediction to be consistent with the probability calculus. The climate model is seen as a tool for making probabilistic statements about climate itself, necessarily involving an assessment of the model’s imperfections. A climate event, such as a 2^{^}C increase in global mean temperature, is identified with a region of ‘climate-space’, and the ensemble of model evaluations is used within a numerical integration designed to estimate the probability assigned to that region.     

Calculating Historical Contributions To Climate Change – Discussing The ‘Brazilian Proposal’

This paper discusses methodological issues relevant to the calculation of historical responsibility of countries for climate change (‘The Brazilian Proposal’). Using a simple representation of the climate system, the paper compares contributions to climate change using different indicators: current radiative forcing, current GWP-weighted emissions, radiative forcing from increased concentrations, cumulative GWP-weighted emissions, global-average surface-air temperature increase and two new indicators: weighted concentrations (analogue to GWP-weighted emissions) and integrated temperature increase. Only the last two indicators are at the same time ‘backward looking’ (take into account historical emissions), ‘backward discounting’ (early emissions weigh less, depending on the decay in the atmosphere) and ‘forward looking’ (future effects of the emissions are considered) and are comparable for all gases. Cumulative GWP-weighted emissions are simple to calculate but are not ‘backward discounting’. ‘Radiative forcing’ and ‘temperature increase’ are not ‘forward looking’. ‘Temperature increase’ discounts the emissions of the last decade due to the slow response of the climate system. It therefore gives low weight to regions that have recently significantly increased emissions. Results of the five different indicators are quite similar for large groups (but possibly not for individual countries): industrialized countries contributed around 60% to today’s climate change, developing countries around 40% (using the available data for fossil, industrial and forestry CO₂, CH₄ and N₂O). The paper further argues including non-linearities of the climate system or using a simplified linear system is a political choice. The paper also notes that results of contributions to climate change need to be interpreted with care: Countries that developed early benefited economically, but have high historical emission, and countries developing at a later period can profit from developments in other countries and are therefore likely to have a lower contribution to climate change.     

Understanding public complacency about climate change: adults’ mental models of climate change violate conservation of matter

Public attitudes about climate change reveal a contradiction. Surveys show most Americans believe climate change poses serious risks but also that reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions sufficient to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations can be deferred until there is greater evidence that climate change is harmful. US policymakers likewise argue it is prudent to wait and see whether climate change will cause substantial economic harm before undertaking policies to reduce emissions. Such wait-and-see policies erroneously presume climate change can be reversed quickly should harm become evident, underestimating substantial delays in the climate’s response to anthropogenic forcing. We report experiments with highly educated adults – graduate students at MIT – showing widespread misunderstanding of the fundamental stock and flow relationships, including mass balance principles, that lead to long response delays. GHG emissions are now about twice the rate of GHG removal from the atmosphere. GHG concentrations will therefore continue to rise even if emissions fall, stabilizing only when emissions equal removal. In contrast, most subjects believe atmospheric GHG concentrations can be stabilized while emissions into the atmosphere continuously exceed the removal of GHGs from it. These beliefs – analogous to arguing a bathtub filled faster than it drains will never overflow – support wait-and-see policies but violate conservation of matter. Low public support for mitigation policies may arise from misconceptions of climate dynamics rather than high discount rates or uncertainty about the impact of climate change. Implications for education and communication between scientists and nonscientists (the public and policymakers) are discussed.     

Climatic change: communication changes over this journal’s first ‘century’

Over the century of ‘Climatic Change’ volumes and the 33 years that they span the climate has changed. Here I consider the challenge of interdisciplinary communication to which the first 99 volumes of this journal are dedicated. Have we succeeded and have climatic change researchers shared findings with a broader audience? If this journal has been successful, should the editorial board and publishers now consider new modes of communicating research to a still wider public, say by hiring a communication cartoonist or with an interactive blog?     

Education,politics and opinions about climate change evidence for interaction effects

U.S. public opinion regarding climate change has become increasingly polarized in recent years, as partisan think tanks and others worked to recast an originally scientific topic into a political wedge issue. Nominally “scientific” arguments against taking anthropogenic climate change seriously have been publicized to reach informed but ideologically receptive audiences. Reflecting the success of such arguments, polls have noted that concern about climate change increased with education among Democrats, but decreased with education among Republicans. These observations lead to the hypothesis that there exist interaction (non-additive) effects between education or knowledge and political orientation, net of other background factors, in predicting public concern about climate change. Two regional telephone surveys, conducted in New Hampshire (n = 541) and Michigan (n = 1, 008) in 2008, included identical climate-change questions that provide opportunities to test this hypothesis. Multivariate analysis of both surveys finds significant interactions. These empirical results fit with theoretical interpretations and several other recent studies. They suggest that the classically identified social bases of concern about the environment in general, and climate in particular, have shifted in recent years. Narrowcast media, including the many Web sites devoted to discrediting climate-change concerns, provide ideal conduits for channeling contrarian arguments to an audience predisposed to believe and electronically spread them further. Active-response Web sites by climate scientists could prove critical to counterbalancing contrarian arguments.     

An assessment of the potential impact of climate change on flood risk in Mumbai

Managing risks from extreme events will be a crucial component of climate change adaptation. In this study, we demonstrate an approach to assess future risks and quantify the benefits of adaptation options at a city-scale, with application to flood risk in Mumbai. In 2005, Mumbai experienced unprecedented flooding, causing direct economic damages estimated at almost two billion USD and 500 fatalities. Our findings suggest that by the 2080s, in a SRES A2 scenario, an ??upper bound?? climate scenario could see the likelihood of a 2005-like event more than double. We estimate that total losses (direct plus indirect) associated with a 1-in-100 year event could triple compared with current situation (to $690?C$1,890 million USD), due to climate change alone. Continued rapid urbanisation could further increase the risk level. The analysis also demonstrates that adaptation could significantly reduce future losses; for example, estimates suggest that by improving the drainage system in Mumbai, losses associated with a 1-in-100 year flood event today could be reduced by as much as 70%.,We show that assessing the indirect costs of extreme events is an important component of an adaptation assessment, both in ensuring the analysis captures the full economic benefits of adaptation and also identifying options that can help to manage indirect risks of disasters. For example, we show that by extending insurance to 100% penetration, the indirect effects of flooding could be almost halved. We conclude that, while this study explores only the upper-bound climate scenario, the risk-assessment core demonstrated in this study could form an important quantitative tool in developing city-scale adaptation strategies. We provide a discussion of sources of uncertainty and risk-based tools could be linked with decision-making approaches to inform adaptation plans that are robust to climate change.     

北极地区极昼气候突变现象及转型成因研究

基于1979—2018年的NCEP-DOE Reanalysis II逐日再分析数据,采用模糊C均值聚类算法(Fuzzy C-Means Algorithm, FCMA)将北极地区极昼期间的气候分为寒干型、半寒干型、半暖湿型及暖湿型4种。在夏季北极海冰快速减少的气候背景下,这4种气候型控制的区域也相应发生了明显变化。其中,寒干型气候面积以-7.241×10~4 km~2·a~(-1)的速率快速减少;半寒干型气候面积以6.489×10~4 km~2·a~(-1)的速率快速增加,且洋面上的气候型变化比陆地更为显著。1999年前后,北极地区主控气候发生突变现象:由寒干型气候为主转化为半寒干型气候为主,尤其在楚科奇海和东西伯利亚海表现突出。成因分析表明海冰面积—净短波辐射—大气增暖增湿—向下长波辐射—气候型转变之间存在密切联系,极昼期海冰面积异常减少对其气候转型突变起到了重要作用。