Global warming vs. climate change, taxes vs. prices: Does word choice matter?

Does ??climate change?? seem like a less serious problem than ??global warming?? to Americans and Europeans? Does describing the costs of climate change mitigation in terms of ??higher taxes?? instead of ??higher prices?? reduce public support for such efforts? In an experiment embedded in an American national survey, respondents were randomly assigned to rate the seriousness of ??global warming,?? ??climate change,?? or ??global climate change.?? Contrary to predictions made by a leading political strategist, the full sample and political Independents perceived ??climate change?? and ??global warming?? to be equally serious. Among Republicans, ??climate change?? was perceived to be more serious than ??global warming,?? whereas the reverse was true among Democrats. A similar experiment embedded in a survey of residents of 31 European countries showed that ??global warming?? and ??climate change?? were perceived to be equally serious problems. And an experiment embedded in an American survey showed that describing the increased costs of climate change mitigation legislation via ??higher taxes?? instead of via ??higher prices?? did not reduce popular support for such legislation, also contradicting a political strategy memo. Thus, word choice may sometimes affect public perceptions of the climate change seriousness or support for mitigation policies, but a single choice of terminology may not influence all people the same way, making strategic language choices difficult to implement.     

The scale and drivers of carbon footprints in households,cities and regions across India

The carbon footprint (CF) has emerged as an important yardstick to understand the total contribution of countries, sectors and individuals to climate change. In contrast to conventional emissions accounting which captures only territorial or local production activities, the CF includes the emissions imposed by consumption across global supply chains for goods and services. Recent interest has grown in the application of CF assessment for municipalities owing to their large contribution to global carbon emissions and the limited coverage of existing data to monitor their climate pledges. By linking household-level consumer surveys to a global supply chain database, spatially-explicit CF assessment is possible at a district and household scale. To date, such technique has exposed otherwise unforeseen differences in consumer carbon footprints in developed countries. Within this study we calculate and compare the household carbon footprints 623 districts in India, based on micro consumption data from 203,313 households and explain their variation by economic, cultural and demographic factors. We show the eradication of extreme poverty does not conflict with ambitious climate change mitigation in India. However, our analysis suggests CF reduction policies within India need to target high-expenditure households which are responsible for nearly seven times the carbon emissions than low-expenditure households (living on $1.9 consumption a day). These vast disparities between the carbon footprint of citizens in India highlights the need to differentiate individual responsibilities for climate change in national and global climate policy.     

How does framing affect policy support for emissions mitigation? Testing the effects of ocean acidification and other carbon emissions frames

Public support for carbon emissions mitigation is crucial to motivate action to address global issues like climate change and ocean acidification (OA). Yet in the public sphere, carbon emissions mitigation policies are typically discussed in the context of climate change and rarely in the context of OA or other global change outcomes. In this paper, we advance research on OA and climate change perceptions and communication, by (i) examining causal beliefs about ocean acidification, and (ii) measuring support for mitigation policies from individuals presented with one of five different policy frames (climate change, global warming, carbon pollution, air pollution, and ocean acidification). Knowledge about OA causes and consequences is more widespread than we anticipated, though still generally low. Somewhat surprisingly, an “air pollution” mitigation frame elicits the highest degree of policy support overall, while “carbon pollution” performs no better than “climate change” or “global warming.” Framing effects are in part contingent on prior knowledge and attitudes, and mediated by concern. Perhaps due to a lack of OA awareness, the OA frame generates the least support overall, although it seems to close the gap in support associated with political orientation: the OA frame increases support among those (few) conservatives who report having heard of OA before the survey. These findings complement previous work on climate change communication and suggest the need for further research into OA as an effective way to engage conservatives in carbon emissions mitigation policy. Potentially even more promising is the air pollution framing.     

Climate change scepticism and public support for mitigation: Evidence from an Australian choice experiment

Public scepticism surrounding climate change is an obstacle for implementing climate change mitigation measures in many countries. However, very little is known about: (1) the nature and sources of climate change scepticism; and (2) its influence on preferences for climate change mitigation policies. In this paper, we investigate these two issues using evidence and analysis from an Australian public survey and choice experiment. The study has three key findings. First, the intensity of scepticism varies depending on its type; we observed little scepticism over the cause, trend and impact of climate change and widespread scepticism over the effectiveness of mitigation measures and global co-operation. Second, cause and mitigation scepticism play significant roles in determining public support for climate change abatement. Respondents who believed in human-induced climate change were significantly more supportive of mitigation. Likewise, respondents who believed that mitigation would be successful in slowing down climate change were significantly more likely to be supportive. Third, the general public tend to give the benefit of the doubt to supporting mitigation. Those who expressed higher uncertainty about climate outcomes were more supportive of mitigation than others with similar expectations but lower uncertainty.     

The household production function approach to valuing climate: the case of Japan

According to household production function theory households combine marketed goods and nonmarket environmental goods to produce service flows of direct value to the household. This readily explains why, as an input to household production activities, households might have preferences over the climate. Using techniques more frequently employed to account for differences in the demographic composition of households we use household production function theory to estimate climate equivalence scales using household expenditure data drawn from 51 Japanese cities over the period 2000–2009. Our results indicate that warmer temperatures result in a small but statistically highly significant reduction in the cost of living. Combining these estimates with climate change scenarios associated with the IPCC A2, A1B, and B1 emissions scenarios other things being equal points to a slight reduction in Japanese households’ cost of living.     

Public perceptions of rainfall change in India

People’s perceptions of changes in local weather patterns are an important precursor to proactive adaptation to climate change. In this paper, we consider public perceptions of changes in average rainfall in India, analyzing the relationship between perceptions and the instrumental record. Using data from a national sample survey, we find that local instrumental records of precipitation are a strong predictor of perceived declines in rainfall. Perceptions of decreasing rainfall were also associated with perceptions of changes in extreme weather events, such as decreasing frequency of floods and severe storms, increasing frequency of droughts, and decreasing predictability of the monsoon. Higher social vulnerability—including low perceived adaptive capacity and greater food and livelihood dependence on local weather—was also associated with perceptions of decreasing rainfall. While both urban and rural respondents were likely to perceive local changes in precipitation, we show that rural respondents in general were more sensitive to actual changes in precipitation. Individual perceptions of changes in local climate may play an important role in shaping vulnerability to global climate change, adaptive behavior, and support for adaptation and mitigation policies. Awareness of local climate change is therefore particularly important in regions where much of the population is highly exposed and sensitive to the impacts of climate change.     

Exploring the orientations which characterise the likely public acceptance of low emission energy technologies

There is a large body of research and development into the low emission energy technologies that has the potential to assist developed and developing countries transition to more sustainable energy systems. It has long been recognised that public perceptions can have a fundamental effect on the market for technology and this issue raises questions about the role society will play in developing a low emissions energy future. Understanding how the public will respond to the range of low emission energy technologies as part of a climate change mitigation package is therefore critical for researchers, policy makers and industry stakeholders. In the current research, we investigated the Australian public’s likely acceptance of a range of low emission energy technologies by assessing the diverse ‘orientations’ that have emerged in response to low emission energy technologies. In a survey of two Australian states we measured the support for, and knowledge of, a range of low emission energy technologies. Using self-organising maps, a relatively new approach for segmenting response profiles, we identified that at least four distinct ‘orientations’ have emerged toward the issue and are characterising the likely acceptance of these technologies: ‘Disengaged’, ‘Nuclear Oriented’, ‘Renewables Oriented’, and ‘Engaged’. The implications of these multiple public viewpoints are described for climate change mitigation policy and for future research into the social acceptance of alternative energy technologies.     

Do individuals care about fairness in burden sharing for climate change mitigation? Evidence from a lab experiment

One of the reasons for deadlock in global climate policy is countries’ disagreement on how to share the mitigation burden. Normative theory suggests various fairness criteria for structuring burden sharing, most prominently, historical responsibility for emissions, economic capacity, and vulnerability to climate change. Governments have taken up these criteria in their rhetoric at UNFCCC negotiations. I examine whether normative criteria influence individual burden sharing preferences. This bottom-up perspective is important for two reasons. First, it is unknown if governments’ fairness rhetoric matches citizens’ actual preferences. Second, international climate agreements directly affect individuals through domestic policy measures (e.g. energy taxes), and therefore require domestic public support for successful implementation. I conducted two laboratory experiments where participants have to agree on how to share climate change mitigation costs in an ultimatum game. Treatment conditions include differences between proposer and responder in capacity, vulnerability (experiment 1), and historical emissions (experiment 2). Historical emissions are endogenously determined in a prior game. Capacity inequality strongly affects burden sharing, with richer players ending up paying more, and poorer players less. Vulnerability differences reduce the influence of fairness, leading to suggested cost distributions more unfavorable to vulnerable players. However, vulnerable responders still reject many “unfair” offers. Differences in historical responsibility result in cost distributions strongly correlated with players’ relative contributions to climate change. The results suggest that more nuanced consideration of fairness criteria in burden sharing could make ambitious climate agreements more acceptable for reluctant countries and their citizens.     

Social capital and the public acceptability of climate change adaptation policies: a case study in Romney Marsh,UK

There is now a growing literature emphasizing the critical importance of social variables in the formulation of coastal management policies seeking to tackle climate change impacts. This paper focuses on the role of social capital, which is increasingly identified as having a significant role in climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies. We focus on public perceptions of the social costs and benefits arising from two management options (managed retreat/realignment and hold-the-line), the resulting level of policy acceptability, and how this acceptability is mediated by social capital parameters within coastal communities. These issues are examined by means of a quantitative social survey implemented in Romney Marsh (east Sussex/Kent, UK), an area facing significant impacts from climate change. We tested two models through path analysis with latent structures. The first correlates respondents’ perceived costs and benefits with the level of public acceptability of the two policy options. In the second model, we introduce social capital variables, investigating the impacts on perceived social costs and benefits of the policy options, and the overall effect on the level of public acceptability. Our findings demonstrate: (1) perceived social costs and benefits of proposed policy options influence the level of public acceptability of these policies; (2) these social costs and benefits are connected with the level of public acceptability; and (3) specific social capital parameters (i.e. social trust, institutional trust, social networks and social reciprocity) influence perceived policy costs and benefits, and also have a significant impact on the level of public acceptability of proposed policy options.     

“A convenient truth”: air travel passengers’ willingness to pay to offset their CO<Subscript>2</Subscript> emissions

Several economic reviews demonstrate the substantial costs related to climate change and consequently call for early action. These reviews, however, have been limited to measuring ‘objective’ risks and expected material damage related to climate change. The ‘subjective’ perceived risk of climate change and society’s willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid these risks are expected to provide an important additional motivation for direct action. We investigate whether and why air travel passengers—an increasingly important source of greenhouse gas emissions—are supportive of measures that increase the cost of their travel based on the polluter pays principle and compensate the damage caused by their flight. Compared to the results of the few previous studies that have elicited WTP estimates for climate policy more generally, our results appear to be at the lower end of the scale, while a comparison to estimates of the social cost of carbon shows that the average WTP estimate in this study is close to the estimated marginal damage cost. Although significant differences are found between travellers from Europe, North America, Asia and the rest of the world, we show that there exists a substantial demand for climate change mitigation action. The positive risk premium over and above the expected property damage cost assessments should be accounted for more explicitly in economic reviews as it will add to the burden of proof of direct action. Measurements of passenger WTP will help policy makers to design effective financial instruments aimed at discouraging climate-unfriendly travel activities as well as to generate funds for the measures directed at climate change mitigation and adaptation. Based on stated WTP by travellers to offset their greenhouse gas emissions, funds in the order of magnitude of €23 billion could be generated annually to finance climate change mitigation activities.     

The relationship between short-term emissions and long-term concentration targets

The relationship between long-term climate goals and short/medium-term emission targets forms crucial information for the design of international climate policy. Since IPCC??s 4th Assessment Report (AR4), a large number of new scenario studies have been published. This paper reviews this new literature and finds that there is more flexibility in the timing of short-term emission reductions compared to the earlier scenarios assessed by the AR4. For instance, the current literature suggests that a peak of emissions in 2020 and even 2030 would be consistent with limiting temperature change to about 2??C in the long term. The timing when emissions peak depends on whether negative emissions in the long-term can be achieved. The recent scenarios further indicate that global emissions by 2050 should be 40?C80% below 2000 levels. Above all, the paper argues that there is no clear, single ??law?? that would directly determine the required emissions levels in 2020, but that instead policy-makers need to consider trade-offs between the likelihood of achieving long-term targets, the short-term costs, and their expectation with respect to future technologies (and their possible failure). The higher flexibility might be important in finding acceptable agreements on international climate policy.     

Modelling risk adaptation and mitigation behaviour under different climate change scenarios

The main objective of this study is to simulate household choice behavior under varying climate change scenarios using choice experiments. Economic welfare measures are derived for society’s willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce climate change induced flood risks through private insurance and willingness to accept compensation (WTAC) for controlled flooding under varying future risk exposure levels. Material flood damage and loss of life are covered in the insurance policy experiment, while the WTAC experiment also captures the economic value of immaterial flood damage such as feelings of discomfort, fear and social disruption. The results show that WTP and WTAC are substantial, suggesting a more prominent role of external social damage costs in cost-benefit analysis of climate change and flood mitigation policies.     

Risk mitigation and the social cost of carbon

The social cost of carbon – i.e., the marginal present-value cost imposed by greenhouse gas emissions – is determined by a complex interaction between factual assumptions, modeling methods, and value judgments. Among the most crucial factors is society's willingness to tolerate potentially catastrophic environmental risks. To explore this issue, the present analysis employs a stochastic climate–economy model that accounts for uncertainties in baseline economic growth, baseline emissions, greenhouse gas mitigation costs, carbon cycling, climate sensitivity, and climate change damages. In this model, preferences are specified to reflect the high degree of risk aversion revealed by private investment decisions, signaled by the large observed gap between the average rates of return paid by safe and risky financial instruments. In contrast, most climate–economy models assume much lower risk aversion. Given high risk aversion, the analysis finds that investment in climate stabilization yields especially large net benefits by forestalling low-probability threats to long-run human well-being. Accordingly, the social cost of carbon attains the markedly high value of $25,700 per metric ton of carbon dioxide in a baseline scenario in which emissions are unregulated. This value falls to just $4 per ton as the stringency of control measures is successively increased. These results cast doubt on the idea that the social cost of carbon takes on a uniquely defined, objective value that is independent of policy decisions. This does not, however, rule out the use of carbon prices to achieve the benefits of climate stabilization using least-cost mitigation measures.     

Assessing the likelihood of widespread landholder adoption of afforestation and reforestation projects

Tree planting for carbon sequestration is a commonly proposed climate change mitigation strategy, with afforestation projects forming part of voluntary and mandatory carbon offset trading schemes. Afforestation is often promoted as a new economic opportunity for private landholders. While multiple studies have identified physical and economic opportunities for afforestation, few have examined the willingness of private landholders to adopt afforestation, and the factors that influence this willingness. We examine this using data from a survey of Australian landholders. The willingness of landholders to adopt afforestation for carbon sequestration varies substantially depending on how this afforestation is designed and implemented: landholders prefer small plantings on less productive land, which minimise the disturbance afforestation presents to land management, and to landholder values about appropriate uses of agricultural land. Landholders are less willing to consider afforestation if it involves planting the large areas required by many current carbon afforestation schemes. Willingness to adopt afforestation is influenced in particular by landholder's perceptions of its potential to provide a diversified income stream, and its impacts on flexibility of land management. More broadly, it is influenced by their views about the social acceptability of afforestation, particularly whether the landholder believes trees should be planted on agricultural land, and how they believe others in the community view afforestation. Our results suggest that widespread adoption requires designing afforestation so it (i) provides a range of socio-economic benefits that go beyond provision of income; (ii) minimises disruption to land management flexibility; and (iii) is compatible with landholder beliefs about appropriate use of agricultural land.     

Patterns of controversy and consensus in German,Canadian, and US online news on climate change

Individual action and support for policy to tackle climate change have been linked to perceptions of political and scientific controversy and consensus concerning the issue. Recent media effects research indicates that presentation of agreement or conflict between actors’ opinions influences how audiences respond to news about climate change and policy. While some national case studies have investigated portrayals of actors’ positions on important questions regarding climate change in the media, they are largely absent from comparative research. This study addresses this gap by analysing portrayals of actor-issue-positions and the emerging patterns of controversy and consensus in German, Canadian, and US coverage. Studying a sample of occurrences of climate change-related issues (N = 902) in-depth, the results show German media present political consensus about the need to limit emissions and societal controversy about the efficacy of specific mitigation measures. Presenting mainly consensus, Canadian media report more on climate change’s impact, leaving aside the issue of efficacy. In the US, media emphasise political controversy — about the need to limit emissions and occasionally about climate change’s impact on humans. The findings, consistent with other recent publications, can best be explained by journalists selectively indexing of seemingly relevant actor-issue-positions.     

Climate change, powerlessness and the commons dilemma: Assessing New Zealanders’ preparedness to act

Mitigating climate change is recognized as an increasingly urgent task that requires understanding a range of different strategies, including voluntary behavior change. Among the psychological barriers to behavior change are perceptions of powerlessness and the commons dilemma. This paper examines the association between these factors in a sample of New Zealand citizens and clarifies their importance in relation to other barriers to action to mitigate climate change, including uncertainty and perceived risk. Stronger perceptions of powerlessness and the commons dilemma were related to lower levels of action to mitigate climate change and lesser importance being placed upon climate change as an influence on individual actions. The perceived risk of climate change and the perception that humans influence climate change were the strongest predictors of mitigation action.     

Using panel data to estimate the effect of rainfall shocks on smallholders food security and vulnerability in rural Ethiopia

Ethiopia??s agriculture is predominantly rainfed and hence any irregularity in weather conditions has adverse welfare implications. Using panel data, this paper analyzes the effect of rainfall shocks on Ethiopian rural households?? food security and vulnerability over time while controlling for a range of other factors. To this end, we generate a time-variant household food security index which is developed by principal components analysis. Based on this index, households are classified into relative food security groups and their socioeconomic differences are assessed. The exploratory results show that compared to the less secured households, the more secured ones have male and literate household heads, tend to have a greater number of economically active household members, own more livestock, experience better rainfall outcome, and participate in local savings groups. Using the food security index as the dependent variable, we use a fixed effects instrumental variable regression model to identify determinants of households?? food security over time and find that rainfall variability is an important factor. Moreover, household size, participation in local savings groups, and livestock ownership positively affect food security. Results from multinomial logistic regression model complement the fixed effects instrumental variable regression results by showing that the level and variability of rainfall are important determinants of persistent food insecurity and vulnerability. The results highlight the need for efficient risk reduction and mitigation programs to improve risk exposure and coping ability of rural households. Careful promotion of investment in infrastructure to support irrigation and water resources development is one aspect worth considering.     

Assessing spatial associations between perceptions of landscape value and climate change risk for use in climate change planning

This study examines spatially referenced perceived landscape values and climate change risks collected through public participation geographic information systems for potential use in climate change planning. Using survey data from the Southern Fleurieu Peninsula, South Australia, we present a method for identifying perceived landscape values and climate change risks to describe and quantify their spatial associations. Two spatial data models??vector and raster??and two analytical methods??Jaccard coefficients and spatial cross-correlations were used to describe the spatial associations. Results indicate that perceptions of climate change risk are driven, in part, by the values people assign or hold for places on the landscape. Biodiversity and intrinsic landscape values have strong spatial association with biodiversity loss risk while recreation values have strong spatial association with riparian flooding, sea-level rise and wave action risks. Other landscape values show weak to no spatial association with perceived climate change risks. The methodology described in this research provides a mechanism for government agencies to develop place-based adaptation strategies based on these associations.     

The Generational Divide in Support for Environmental Policies: European Evidence

This article examines age variations in support for environmental protection policies that affect climate change using a sample of over 14,000 respondents to a 1999 Eurobarometer survey. There is a steady decline with age in whether respondents are willing to incur higher gasoline prices to protect the environment. This relationship remains after controlling for socioeconomic characteristics. There are age-related differences in information about environmental risks, information sources about the environment, perceived health risks from climate change, and degree of worry about climate change. However, taking these factors into account does not eliminate the age variation in willingness to pay more for gasoline to protect the environment.