第二承诺期土地利用、土地利用变化与林业规则的各方观点及对策建议

 由土地利用、土地利用变化和林业（LULUCF）活动产生的生态系统的固碳作用,是降低大气中温室气体浓度增加速度的重要途径之一。1997-2001年,经历了长达4 a的艰苦谈判,最终达成了第一承诺期附件一国家利用LULUCF的规则。2008年开始,国际社会开始磋商第二承诺期附件一国家如何利用LULUCF活动的规则。主要缔约方就第二承诺期LULUCF规则提出了各自的观点,发达国家的观点主要包括提高开展碳汇活动的积极性、降低LULUCF规则的复杂性和减少成本、增加《京都议定书》3.4条款下的合格活动等,其目的是在第二承诺期能够利用更多的碳汇完成减排义务;发展中国家主要提出要系统地考虑土地利用造成的温室气体排放和CO2的吸收。最后,针对附件一缔约方在第二承诺期利用LULUCF活动规则,提出了我国应采取的对策建议。     

LULUCF在《京都议定书》履约中的作用

根据主要附件I缔约方2011年向《联合国气候变化框架公约》递交的1990—2009年国家温室气体（GHG）排放清单数据,包括报告的《京都议定书》土地利用、土地利用变化和林业（LULUCF）活动数据,对其LULUCF GHG源/汇趋势、《京都议定书》缔约方LULUCF相关活动在履约中的作用进行系统的对比分析,对缔约方会议确定的森林管理活动汇清除的限额进行评估。分析表明,1990—2009年,附件I缔约方LULUCF总体表现为净GHG汇清除,且总体上呈波浪式增加趋势,20年增加了65.9%,但年际波动较大。1990年LULUCF汇清除相当于GHG排放总量的7.41%, 2009年上升到13.68%。《京都议定书》第一承诺期的最初两年（2008—2009年）,各缔约方每年可从合格的LULUCF活动中获得2.38亿t CO2当量的汇清除,相当于这些缔约方基准年源排放的1.91%,可抵消其减限排额的45%。汇清除主要来自森林管理活动,而其他活动的汇清除所占份额很小。LULUCF活动使《京都议定书》的实施效果大打折扣,为一些缔约方过多地使用森林管理活动的汇清除来完成其减限排指标提供了机会,特别是俄罗斯、日本和意大利等国。这为目前正在谈判的第二承诺期LULUCF规则,特别是如何利用森林管理汇清除的规则敲响警钟。     

第二承诺期LULUCF有关议题谈判进展与对策建议

自2005年作为《京都议定书》缔约方会议的《联合国气候变化框架公约》（以下简称《公约》）缔约方会议第一届会议（CMP.1）决定启动《京都议定书》第二承诺期进程以来,国际社会通过《京都议定书》缔约方特设工作组（AWG-KP）针对第二承诺期的谈判紧锣密鼓地进行。在第二承诺期如何利用LULUCF活动（包括与LULUCF活动有关的清洁发展机制项目）,也是谈判中的主要议题之一。通过调研,概述了AWG-KP的谈判进展,结合第一承诺期LULUCF有关规则的不足,对LULUCF有关的关键问题进行了综合分析,提出了关于第二承诺期LULUCF规则的建议。     

第二承诺期LULUCF有关议题谈判判进展与对策建议

自2005年作为<京都议定书>缔约方会议的<联合国气候变化框架公约>(以下简称(<公约>)缔约方会议第一届会议(CMPI)决定启动<京都议定书>第二承诺期进程以来,国际社会通过<京都议定书>缔约方特设工作组(AwGKP)针对第二承诺期的谈判紧锣密鼓地进行.在第二承诺期如何利用LULUCF活动(包括与LULUCF活动有关的清洁发展机制项目),也是谈判中的主要议题之一.通过调研,概述了AWG-KP的谈判进展,结合第一承诺期LULUCF有关规则的不足,对LULUCF有关的关键问题进行了综合分析,提出了关于第二承诺期LULUCF规则的建议.     

后京都时期LULUCF潜在核算规则分析

《京都议定书》附件一缔约方国家通过土地利用、土地利用变化和林业(LULUCF)活动产生的碳汇减轻自身减排压力,为国内工业能源部门碳排放提供空间。但LULUCF包括的核算活动类型和具体方法一直是各方争论的焦点,其中木质林产品、不可抗力等自然干扰、参考水平阈值的设置以及总-净与净-净核算方式的选择这几方面核算漏洞很多,矛盾尤为突出。为防止发达国家过分依赖LULUCF产生的碳汇减轻减排压力,搜集了欧盟27国、加拿大、日本、俄罗斯等发达国家提交的LULUCF数据,分析了核算漏洞对LULUCF核算结果可能产生的影响。结果表明:木质林产品活动的核算方法不确定性较多;剔除自然干扰等不可抗力后,LULUCF活动碳汇至少增加30%;参考水平阈值适于设置在较高碳汇水平;净-净核算方式更适用于后京都时代LULUCF核算规则。     

不同减排领域对附件B缔约方完成《京都议定书》第一承诺期减排目标的贡献

本文搜集了2014年4月最新提交的附件B 35个主要缔约方报告的2008—2012年土地利用、土地利用变化与林业(LULUCF),能源,工业过程,溶剂使用,农业及废弃物6个领域的温室气体(GHG)排放与吸收的数据,估算了第一承诺期各领域的相对减排贡献及各缔约方在各领域做出的减排努力。结果表明,各领域减排量占所有领域总减排量比例由大到小依次为:能源62.6%、工业过程13.9%、农业13.4%、LULUCF 7.4%、废弃物2.6%和溶剂使用0.1%;各缔约方在各领域的减排量相当于其基准年总排放量的平均值由大到小分别为:能源8.7%、农业3.0%、LULUCF 2.5%、工业过程1.3%、废弃物0.5%和溶剂使用0.1%。总体而言,能源领域是GHG减排的主导领域,农业和LULUCF起到辅助减排的作用;多数缔约方选择的LULUCF活动产生的核算结果表现为弱GHG吸收汇,其利用LULUCF活动履约的减排贡献相对较小,仅相当于能源领域减排量的12%,但对于新西兰和冰岛的贡献较大,其LULUCF活动产生的汇清除抵消了两国在其他5个领域GHG排放量的50%以上。     

《京都议定书》第二承诺期谈判艰难迈出第一步

2005年12月在蒙特利尔举行的《京都议定书》第一次缔约方会议决定按议定书第三条第九款的规定启动附件一缔约方(发达国家和经济转轨国家)2012年后温室气体减排指标的谈判,即第二承诺期谈判,并成立了“不限名额特设工作组”(以下简称工作组)。第二承诺期谈     

《京都议定书》第二承诺期森林管理基准线分析

基于各附件I缔约方2011年提交的年度国家温室气体排放清单、《京都议定书》第一承诺期森林管理活动的温室气体源/汇数据,以及森林管理活动的基准线数据,分析了森林管理活动在第一承诺期履约中的贡献,以及按各方提交的基准线,预计森林管理活动在未来承诺期履约中的作用。结果表明,《京都议定书》第一承诺期的最初两年（2008—2009年）,附件I缔约方可从合格的森林管理活动中获得年均2.46亿t CO2当量（CO2-eq）的信用额,相当于相应缔约方基准年（1990年）源排放的2.3%,对减限排目标的贡献率达53%,不合理的规则使一些缔约方在履约中可过度地利用森林管理的汇清除。各附件I缔约方提交的2013—2020年森林管理活动的基准线（约2.52亿t CO2-eq/a的净汇清除）远低于目前和过去的水平,使其可从中获得的用于抵消减排目标的信用额约为第一承诺期的4倍,对未来承诺期履约的贡献率将更大,一些缔约方提交的减排目标中的大部分可通过森林管理活动的信用额来抵消。因此,本文建议在未来的谈判中,要严格控制可用的森林管理活动的信用额,避免森林管理活动被滥用。     

土地利用变化和林业清单方法学进展

介绍IPCC土地利用变化和林业（LUCF）国家温室气体清单方法学指南的进展,特别是针对IPCC土地利用、土地利用变化和林业（LULUCF）优良做法指南和IPCC 2006国家温室气体清单指南的重大改进,以及我国未来LUCF清单编制面临的挑战作了简要的介绍。     

附件I缔约方森林管理参考水平的确定方法北大核心CSCD

通过收集各附件I缔约方最新递交的森林管理参考水平报告和专家评审报告,对各缔约方采用的森林管理参考水平确定方法进行了综述,重点分析了确定森林管理参考水平的三个基本要素:森林管理核算面积、核算参数和采伐量。大部分缔约方采用了国别方法或欧盟共同方法,少数缔约方采用历史数据或其外推作为参考水平。由于采用的核算方法和参数基本上都是基于国家温室气体清单和国家森林资源清查数据,因此森林龄级结构和采伐量的预测成为影响森林管理参考水平的重要因素。各缔约方在确定其森林管理参考水平时,尽可能利用其森林特点,结合宏观经济预测,采取尽可能降低参考水平的策略,以在《京都议定书》第二承诺期最大限度地利用森林管理碳吸收汇。     

The role of the land use, land use change and forestry sector in achieving Annex I reduction pledges

Annex I Parties may receive credits or debits from Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) activities, contributing to achieving individual emission reduction targets. In the Durban climate negotiations, Parties agreed new LULUCF accounting rules for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (CP2). By using these new rules, this paper presents key differences among Parties at the minimum (assuming no additional action) and potential (assuming additional actions) contribution of the forest-related LULUCF activities in achieving the pledges for 2020. Overall, the potential contribution of LULUCF is relatively modest (up to about 2 % of 1990 emissions) for the EU, the Annex I Parties likely joining the CP2, and for the Annex I Parties that joined the CP1 as a whole. However, for specific Parties, LULUCF can make a substantial contribution to achieving the pledges. For New Zealand, for instance, the potential contribution of future LULUCF credits may equal 33 % of its 1990 emission level. For Australia, the pledges are expressed relative to 2000 emission levels including LULUCF emissions. Given that LULUCF emissions have strongly declined between 1990 and 2000, and a further decline in foreseen by 2020 (based on Australia’s projections), the minimum contribution of LULUCF to meet the Australian pledges appears to be about 19 % and 7 % relative to its 1990 and 2000 emission level, respectively. A further 3 % potential contribution is estimated from additional actions.     

Impact of the Doha outcome on surplus emission allowances and their effect on developed country emissions

The outcome from the December 2012 climate negotiations in Doha has clarified the rules regarding surplus units for the Kyoto Protocol. We summarize these new rules and estimate the resulting effective emissions during the second commitment period using our unit trade model. Other options to deal with surplus emission allowances are employed as benchmarks to assess the Doha outcome. The effective emissions for developed countries as a group under the Doha outcome could be 10–11 % below 1990 levels or 4–5 % points below business-as-usual levels for the second commitment period if we assume that non-Kyoto Protocol countries domestically achieve their targets. However, if mechanisms exist where non-Kyoto Protocol countries can trade units, their emissions could increase and effective emissions for developed countries could be 7–8 % below 1990 levels. In this low-ambition situation we find the main impact of the Doha surplus rules to be the introduction of the historical cap on emissions allowances. Without the effect of the cap, the Doha outcome allows the Parties to the second commitment period to emit at business-as-usual levels until 2020, while still leaving surplus units at the end of the second commitment period.     

The impact of surplus units from the first Kyoto period on achieving the reduction pledges of the Cancún Agreements

Countries with emission levels below their emission allowances have surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) or other emission credits. Under the Kyoto Protocol, these surplus credits may effectively be carried from the first to a following commitment period. In the climate negotiations, various rules for carry-over and sale of surplus allowances have been put forward. This paper analyses the effect of these options on the reduction pledges for 2020, taking into account the estimated credits from the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation projects, and land-use activities for the first commitment period. For current Kyoto Protocol rules of unlimited carry-over of surplus allowances and limited carry-over of other credits, the environmental effectiveness of reduction pledges could be seriously undermined. For the group of countries that showed a willingness to participate in a second commitment period, it could imply that instead of an aggregated 2020 target resulting from the pledges of 18 to 28?% below 1990 levels by 2020, their emissions could return to business-us-usual emission projections. For the EU, a 30?% target by 2020 could imply higher emissions compared to a 20?% target, if surplus allowances would be used for achieving the 30?% but not for the 20?% target. Restricting the use of Kyoto surplus units to domestic use only, would limit the problem, but still seriously undermine the effectiveness of 2020 reduction targets.     

Comparison of preparatory signal analysis techniques for consideration in the (post-)Kyoto policy process

Our study is a preparatory exercise. We focus on the analysis of uncertainty in greenhouse gas emission inventories. Inventory uncertainty is monitored, but not regulated, under the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Under the Convention, countries publish annual or periodic national inventories of greenhouse gas emissions and removals. Policymakers use these inventories to develop strategies and policies for emission reductions and to track the progress of these policies. However, greenhouse gas inventories contain uncertainty for a variety of reasons, and these uncertainties have important scientific and policy implications. For most countries, the emission changes agreed under the Protocol are of the same order of magnitude as the uncertainty that underlies their combined (carbon dioxide equivalent) emissions estimates. Here we apply and compare six available techniques to analyze the uncertainty in the emission changes that countries agreed to realize by the end of the Protocol’s first commitment period 2008–2012. Any such technique, if implemented, could “make or break” claims of compliance, especially in cases where countries claim fulfillment of their commitments to reduce or limit emissions. The techniques all perform differently and can thus have a different impact on the design and execution of emission control policies. A thorough comparison of the techniques has not yet been made but is needed when expanding the discussion on how to go about dealing with uncertainty under the Kyoto Protocol and its successor.     

The case for Japanese—Russian joint implementation in implementing the Kyoto Protocol

The Doha Amendment allows surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) to be carried over from the first commitment period, but limits their use for offsetting emission growth beyond commitment levels. Amendment 7ter simultaneously ‘shaves’ AAU allocation to a level equivalent to the average 2008–2010 emissions for countries that pledged a growth target under the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This means that economies in transition (EITs) are not allocated headroom for growth, and makes their commitments starkly different from their original pledges. The ‘bubble’ arrangement within the EU adds uncertainty to whether new Member States will avoid the ‘shaving’ of 7ter due to their pooled target. This would put Annex I EITs into an unequal position as a result of the Doha Amendment.     

Compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period

This article provides an ex post analysis of the compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol during the first commitment period (2008–2012) based on the final data for national GHG emissions and exchanges in carbon units that became available at the end of 2015. On the domestic level, among the 36 countries that fully participated in the Kyoto Protocol, only nine countries emitted higher levels of GHGs than committed and therefore had to resort to flexibility mechanisms. On the international level – i.e. after the use of flexibility mechanisms – all Annex B Parties are in compliance. Countries implemented different compliance strategies: purchasing carbon units abroad, stimulating the domestic use of carbon credits by the private sector and incentivizing domestic emission reductions through climate policies.

Overall, the countries party to the Protocol surpassed their aggregate commitment by an average 2.4 GtCO₂e yr^–1. Of the possible explanations for this overachievement, ‘hot-air’ was estimated at 2.2 GtCO₂e yr^–1, while accounting rules for land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) further removed 0.4 GtCO₂e yr^–1 from the net result excluding LULUCF. The hypothetical participation of the US and Canada would have reduced this overachievement by a net 1 GtCO₂e yr^–1. None of these factors – some of which may be deemed illegitimate – would therefore on its own have led to global non-compliance, even without use of the 0.3 GtCO₂e of annual emissions reductions generated by the Clean Development Mechanism. The impact of domestic policies and ‘carbon leakage’ – neither of which is quantitatively assessed here – should not be neglected either.

Policy relevance

Given the ongoing evolution of the international climate regime and the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015, we believe that there is a need to evaluate the results of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. To our knowledge there has been no overarching quantitative ex post assessment of the Kyoto Protocol based on the final emissions data for 2008–2012, which became available in late 2015. This article attempts to fill this gap, focusing on the domestic and international compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period.