Should the use of standardized baselines in the CDM be mandatory?

There has been considerable debate on the merits of standardized baselines (SBLs) in the clean development mechanism (CDM), and how such baselines could reduce transaction costs for CDM projects. It has not been considered whether the voluntary versus mandatory use of SBLs by CDM project developers can affect the environmental integrity of the CDM. An example is given in which SBLs are applied to a homogeneous output industry in order to illustrate how the voluntary use of SBLs could lead – even with relatively stringent benchmarks – to over-crediting of emission reduction credits.     

A two-track CDM: improved incentives for sustainable development and offset production

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has been criticized in the literature for encouraging a focus on offset production (OP) at the expense of achieving or encouraging sustainable development (SD). It is argued that one explanation for this is that there is no commonly agreed definition of SD and, moreover, the priority of CDM project developers is often to produce cost-effective OP. Many of the proposals to address these drawbacks are not politically feasible. It is argued that the CDM should be split into a two-track mechanism, with one track for offset production and the other for offset production with an emphasis on sustainable development benefits. This would enable the political deadlock to be broken, allow the inclusion of SD benefits in the price mechanism itself, and allow both SD and OP objectives to be simultaneously achieved.

Policy relevance

The CDM has been criticized for failing to achieve its sustainable development objective, for verification problems regarding the mitigation effects of projects’ emissions, for being complex and bureaucratic, and for the very limited participation by the least developed countries. Given the adoption of a second period of the Kyoto Protocol and the discussion of new market mechanisms in the context of negotiating a new global climate agreement to be adopted in 2015, it is time to explore the ways in which the CDM might be reformed. A two-track version of the CDM is proposed, with one track focused on credit (offset) production and the other track focused on sustainable development. This system could improve the incentive for achieving sustainable development, reduce the uncertainty regarding whether real emissions reductions have been achieved, and be attractive to both developing and industrialized countries.     

Time to market in the CDM: variation over project characteristics and time

Not only is the carbon market inundated with Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) issued by successful projects, it is also littered with failed projects, that is, projects that either fail to be registered under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or projects that have been successfully registered but fail to issue CERs. By relying on a novel application of survival analysis in the context of the CDM, this article shows that half of all projects that start the Global Stakeholder Process fail to issue CERs, while the other half have a median time to market of four years. Furthermore, it is shown that some of the best projects, in terms of being additional, are those that are least likely to make it to market, whereas some of the worst projects, in terms of not being additional, are the ones that are most likely to make it to market. This presents a fundamental challenge for the CDM and future offset schemes that rely on the same design as the CDM. In contrast with previous studies, it is shown that, when project characteristics are controlled for, not all durations measured along the CDM project cycle have increased over time.

Policy relevance

This article develops a novel method for analysing durations measured along the CDM project cycle that avoids the biases of previous studies, and corrects for some misconceptions of what the delays faced by CDM projects are and how these delays have changed over time. Developing an understanding of the delays is important in order not to draw the wrong lessons from the CDM experience. As the leading example of an offset scheme, both in terms of geographical scope and sectoral coverage, and some would say institutional complexity, the CDM serves as a benchmark and reference for all future offset schemes, among others, for the New Market Mechanisms (NMMs) and the Chinese domestic offset programme. While the NMMs are still very much in development, China has announced that it will rely on the methodologies and procedures developed under the CDM for generating offsets for their regional carbon trading schemes.     

Who uses the Clean Development Mechanism? An empirical analysis of projects in Chinese provinces

China is by far the largest host of projects implemented under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). However, earlier studies shed little light on the determinants of the distribution of CDM projects across Chinese provinces. Given China's large size and political-economic diversity, this dearth of research is troubling. We provide an empirical analysis of 2097 CDM projects in 30 Chinese provinces, 2004–2009. We find that high electricity consumption, low per capita income, and a lack of foreign direct investment are all associated with CDM project implementation. The findings are particularly strong for electricity and foreign direct investment. These findings are consistent with the economic theory of CDM project implementation. Project developers focus on minimizing the cost of carbon abatement. Moreover, they suggest that the CDM can, despite its limitations, contribute to reducing economic inequality and uneven development in China.     

The potential of the CDM to deliver pro-poor benefits

The potential of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects to deliver pro-poor benefits at the community level is examined. Both regular CDM and premium add-on standard projects are evaluated, including the Gold Standard and Climate, Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Standard, through the use of seven poverty indicators. Some key characteristics associated with providing pro-poor benefits are also identified. Finally, the market potential of a revised or new premium add-on standard explicitly designed to deliver pro-poor benefits is assessed through the use of a survey. The results indicate that regular CDM projects are only moderately successful at delivering pro-poor benefits. Although the few projects registered that utilize the CCB Standard all performed well in delivering pro-poor benefits, those that used the Gold Standard performed only slightly better than regular CDM projects. Characteristics associated with providing pro-poor benefits include the use of add-on standards, a high level of stakeholder participation, and the development of projects by not-for-profit and government/intergovernmental organizations. The survey of carbon market participants indicated both an interest and desire for Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits with pro-poor benefits attached and shows that the market potential for such a standard to be quite good.

Policy relevance

This analysis of the CDM goes beyond sustainable development to consider the potential of a project to deliver pro-poor benefits at the local community level. Specific characteristics associated with projects are identified that appear to deliver pro-poor benefits that may benefit future project design. Through this analysis and identifying these characteristics, actions may be taken to incorporate those into CDM project requirements or guidelines to advance the mechanism as a means to contribute to poverty alleviation.     

Standardization of baseline and additionality determination under the CDM

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project developers have long complained about the complexities of project-specific baseline setting and the vagaries of additionality determination. In response to this, the CDM Executive Board took bold steps towards the standardization of CDM methodologies, culminating in the approval of guidelines for the establishment of performance standards in November 2011. The guidelines specify a performance standard stringency level for both baseline and additionality of 80% for several priority sectors and 90% for all other sectors. However, an analysis of 14 large-scale CDM methodologies that use performance standard approaches challenges this top-down approach to the performance standard design. An appropriate performance standard stringency level strongly depends on sector and technology characteristics. A single stringency level for baseline and additionality determination is appropriate only for greenfield projects, but not for retrofit ones. Overly simple, highly aggregated performance standards are unlikely to ensure high environmental integrity, and difficult questions regarding stringency and updating frequency will eventually have to be addressed on a rather disaggregated level. A careful balance between data requirements and the practicability of performance standards is essential because the heavy data requirements of the existing performance standard methodologies have been the key barrier to their actual implementation.

Policy relevance

CDM regulators have been pushed by many stakeholders to standardize baseline setting and eliminate project-specific additionality determination. At first glance, performance standards seem to provide the perfect solution for both tasks. However, a one-size-fits-all political decision – e.g. the average of the top 20% performers as enshrined in the Marrakech Accords – is inappropriate. Substantial disaggregation of performance standards is required both technologically and geographically in order to limit over- and under-crediting and close loopholes for non-additional projects. As a lack of reliable and complete data has been and will be a key bottleneck for the development of performance standards, international support for data collection will be indispensable, but costly, and time-consuming. Empirically driven, techno-economic assessments of performance standard stringency levels must be the central task of the future work on standardized methodologies, and should not be sidelined by perceived needs of policy makers to take bold decisions under time pressures.     

CDM: Is it a ‘win–win’ strategy for rural poverty alleviation in India?

India is perceived to be one of the most attractive Non-Annex I countries for CDM project development. There are more than 350 projects in the CDM pipeline, largely in the areas of renewable energy, energy efficiency in industries and fossil fuel switching. This paper examines the socio-economic component of sustainable development commitments of the CDM projects to see if they can make any impact on rural poverty in India, since the goal of poverty alleviation lies at the core of the country’s development priorities. The study concludes that CDM is not contributing to rural poverty alleviation to any notable extent. Nearly all the projects have a business orientation and are not directed to the development of rural poor. Even the renewable energy projects will have limited role in up-liftment of the masses below poverty line due to their weak resource base. For CDM to emerge as a “win–win” strategy for poverty alleviation projects should be aimed at the rural communities and designed to accelerate agricultural growth in the rainfed regions of the country.     

Adaptation financing in a global agreement: is the adaptation levy appropriate?

The climate negotiations recognize that adequate and additional funds are needed to assist adaptation in developing countries. This article analyses whether a future 2% or any higher adaptation levy (AL) can achieve this, whether it causes – as it is a tax on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – a significant excess burden, and how it alters the relation between adaptation financing and mitigation. While former studies have focused on single AL levels, this article determines the transfers from the CDM and the AL for a range of emission reduction targets and AL levels with a partial equilibrium model based on marginal abatement cost estimates for 2020. Revenues from a 2% AL are negligible and remain inadequate for ambitious emission reductions and an AL that maximizes transfers (e.g. US$15 billion for 30% reduction target). Revenues are mostly subtracted from CDM transfers, so little additional funds are raised (e.g. less than $2.4 billion for 30% reduction target). Adaptation financing increases disproportionally with more stringent reduction targets for a rising levy, and the share of Annex I country expenditures devoted to transfers increases slightly. Both effects are only small. The excess burden is larger than 85% of the additional funds.

Policy relevance

Financing adaptation in developing countries has become a cornerstone of a global climate agreement. The mechanism for raising additional funds has not yet been determined. This article assesses the potential of upscaling one option that is already in place under the Kyoto Protocol: the 2% AL on the CDM. It is estimated that even a much higher AL does not generate substantial additional funds, mainly redistributes transfers within non-Annex I countries, does so at social costs in the same order of magnitude as additional funds, and increases the share of Annex I country expenditures devoted to transfers. It is unwise to link mitigation and adaptation as CDM and AL jointly do, since this taxes a beneficial activity. Financial instruments with transfers that decrease with or are independent from climate protection would be preferable.     

Implementing CDM for the Indian dairy sector: prospects and issues

What is the potential for developing small-scale CDM projects in India to reduce enteric methane emissions from cattle and buffaloes? The issue of baseline setting for prospective CDM projects is a complex one in the Indian context. The baselines constructed on the basis of aggregate emission rates at the national level are unlikely to be precise as methane emission rates are influenced by the livestock and feed characteristics, which vary widely across regions in an agro-climatically diverse country like India. This calls for establishing a project specific baseline underpinned with regional methane emission rates. The various aspects of sustainable development that merit consideration in formulating a CDM project in the Indian dairy sector include; increasing the productivity of animals, increasing the net income of producers, decreasing the cost of milk production and the transfer of safe technologies. The projects in the sector would be able to meet the ‘additionality’ conditions of the CDM. However, there are a number of constraints in implementing the enteric methane mitigation strategies through a CDM project at the field level. The article discusses these technical, financial, socio-cultural and institutional barriers along with possible responses to these constraints.     

Selecting and assessing sustainable CDM projects using multi-criteria methods

Even though sustainable development has been broadly debated, the clean development mechanism (CDM) still lacks sophisticated multi-criteria decision methods for identifying, selecting and assessing CDM project activities from this perspective. Bearing in mind the huge number of CDM projects that are beginning to accumulate as the carbon market gains momentum, and the importance for non-Annex I Parties to keep focused on the sustainability objective, this article aims at developing a tool for prioritizing—within a given group, and once a specific list of sustainable development criteria is agreed upon and given—proposed CDM projects from this sustainable development point of view. We reached the following conclusions: (1) it is important to make a conscious choice of an appropriate way to normalize the sustainability performance data of CDM projects; (2) it is important to make a conscious choice of how to aggregate across multiple attributes; (3) in contrast with conventional multi-criteria assessments, which elicit preferences from a stakeholder panel, preference optimization infers from CDM projects' performance data an optimal set of weights that proponents would choose in order to win a competitive selection process. Such preference optimization methods (a) yield sensible results, simulating a range of decision circumstances, (b) avoid conflict and convey impartiality in situations where competing project proponents are likely to clash over objectionable weightings, (c) avoid cognitive overload when the number of CDM projects and/or indicators is overwhelmingly large, and (d) circumvent time-consuming and costly interviews and surveys.

From a policy perspective, the multi-criteria assessment described here can be a powerful tool for prioritizing CDM projects (1) when there is a limited amount of grant funding to certain CDM project candidates, and (2) when the decisionmaking process incorporates the CDM objective of promoting sustainable development, in addition to the objective of helping developed countries to meet part of their reduction obligations as specified in Annex I of the Protocol.     

Carbon accounting for sinks in the CDM after CoP-9

Abstract

The role of sinks in the clean development mechanism (CDM) has been a subject of controversy for several reasons; one being that temporary carbon storage in forests appeared to prevent any opportunity to use them as an option to reduce permanent greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In Milan (December 2003), the Conference of the Parties (CoP) decided to address this problem by introducing two types of expiring units: temporary CERs (tCERs) and long-term CERs (lCERs). Countries committed to emission reductions may acquire these units to temporarily offset their emissions and thus to postpone permanent emission reductions. As further decided by the CoP, baseline emissions of GHGs and the enhancement of sinks outside the project boundary will not be accounted for in the calculation of tCERs or lCERs. The contribution of CDM-sink projects to GHG emissions abatement will therefore be greater than what will be credited to them. On the other hand, permanent GHG emissions that may result as a consequence of the implementation of sink project activities are treated as non-permanent. If these emissions are above avoided baseline emissions, CDM-sinks will result in net increases of GHG emissions into the atmosphere. After briefly reassessing the non-permanence problem, this article explains how tCERs and lCERs should be quantified according to Decision 19/CP.9 of CoP-9 and how calculations are implemented in the forthcoming software CO₂ Land. Using a simple numerical example, it illustrates how the GHG accounting rule adopted at CoP-9 may result in net increases of GHG emissions. In the conclusion, a possible solution to this problem is proposed.     

Technology transfer in the CDM: an updated analysis

The prevalence of technology transfer (TT) for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects is analysed, based on information in the project design documents (PDDs) of 3949 projects registered as of 31 March 2012. Responses to a follow-up survey indicate that the PDD statements that concern TT are reasonably accurate and at least 39% of the related projects are expected to involve it. Technology transfer is very heterogeneous across project types and is more common for larger projects. It also usually involves both knowledge and equipment and differs significantly by host country. Technology transfer has declined over time in China, India, and Brazil, the countries that host most of the CDM projects, but it has remained high for other host countries. A host country's existing capacity specific to the technology, the scope for economic deployment of the technology, and complementary policies to build capacity and promote TT, increase the frequency of TT by CDM projects. The technology used by CDM projects originates mostly from Germany, the US, Japan, Denmark, and China, with multiple suppliers of the technology for all project types.     

CDM and national policy: Synergy or conflict? Evidence from the wind power sector in China

This study assesses the effectiveness of a mix of policy instruments including the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Feed-in Tariff (FIT) to induce wind technology diffusion in China. Relying on a panel dataset consisting of information from 1207 CDM wind projects in thirty provinces over the period 2004–2011, the empirical analysis indicates that: first, wind energy deployment responds primarily to those counterfactual emissions which would have occurred in the absence of the wind projects; second, the dynamic efficiency of the FIT subsidy shows a potential incompatibility with the CDM incentive; third, the leverage of the CDM on wind investment is supported by the industry and technology policy package, which explains in large part the decrease in the FIT subsidy. Given these findings, suggestions are made regarding the design of a future carbon offset scheme and its link with mitigation action in developing countries.     

Factors driving international technology transfer: empirical insights from a CDM project survey

This study empirically explores factors driving international technology transfer via Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects by explicitly considering factors that have been identified in the literature on international technology transfer as being relevant for transfer success. These factors include technological characteristics, such as the novelty and complexity of a technology, as well as the use of different transfer channels. Employing data from an original survey of CDM project participants, the econometric analysis also distinguishes between knowledge and equipment transfer. The findings suggest that more complex technologies and the use of export as a transfer channel are both associated with a higher degree of technology transfer. Projects involving two- to five-year-old technologies seem more likely to involve technology transfer than both younger and older technologies. Energy supply and efficiency projects are correlated with a higher degree of technology transfer than non-energy projects. Unlike previous studies, technology transfer was not related to project size, to the length of time a country has hosted CDM projects, or to the host country's absorptive capacity. The findings for knowledge and equipment transfer are similar, but not identical.

Policy relevance

CDM projects are often seen as a vehicle for the transfer of climate technologies from industrialized to developing countries. Technology transfer is an important element of the new and emerging market mechanisms and frameworks under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, such as the Technology Mechanism, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, or Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. Thus, a clearer understanding of the factors driving technology transfer may help policy makers in their design of such mechanisms. For the CDM, this may be achieved by including more stringent technology transfer requirements in countries’ CDM project approval processes. Based on our findings, such policies should focus particularly on energy supply and efficiency technologies. Likewise, it may be beneficial for host countries to condition project approval on the novelty and complexity of technologies and adjust these provisions over time. Since such technological characteristics are not captured systematically by project design documents, using a survey-based evaluation opens up new opportunities for a more holistic and targeted evaluation of technology transfer in CDM projects.     

Experts talk the future Reflections on the Bonn Seminar of Governmental Experts, 16–17 May 2005: a view from Europe

Abstract

This article provides a first-cut estimate of the potential impacts of the clean development mechanism (CDM) on electricity generation and carbon emissions in the power sector of non-Annex 1 countries. We construct four illustrative CDM regimes that represent a range of approaches under consideration within the climate community. We examine the impact of these CDM regimes on investments in new generation, under illustrative carbon trading prices of US$ 10 and 100/t C. In the cases that are most conducive to CDM activity, roughly 94% of new generation investments remains identical to the without-CDM situation, with only 6% shifting from higher to lower carbon intensity technologies.We estimate that the CDM would bolster renewable energy generation by as little as 15% at US$ 10/t C, or as much as 300% at US$ 100/t C.

A striking finding comes from our examination of the potential magnitude of the “free-rider” problem, i.e. crediting of activities that will occur even in the absence of the CDM. The CDM is intended to be globally carbon-neutral—a project reduces emissions in the host country but generates credits that increase emissions in the investor country. However, to the extent that unwarranted credits are awarded to non-additional projects, the CDM would increase global carbon emissions above the without-CDM emissions level. Under two of the CDM regimes considered, cumulative free-riders credits total 250–600 MtC through the end of the first budget period in 2012. This represents 10–23% of the likely OECD emissions reduction requirement during the first budget period. Since such a magnitude of free-rider credits from non-additional CDM projects could threaten the environmental integrity of the Kyoto protocol, it is imperative that policy makers devise CDM rules that encourage legitimate projects, while effectively screening out non-additional activities.     

Determinants of technology transfer through the CDM: a within-country analysis for China

Technology transfer (TT) is not mandatory for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, yet proponents of CDM argue that TT in CDM can bring new technologies to developing countries and thus not only reduce emissions but also foster development. We review the quantitative literature on determinants of TT in CDM and estimate determinants for CDM projects in China. China is by far the largest host country of CDM projects and it is therefore crucial to understand the factors that drive TT there. To gain better interpretation, we focus on heterogeneity within a single country and results can thus be linked to specific policies of the country. Our probit estimations confirm previous international cross-country studies, indicating that larger projects and more advanced technologies are more likely to involve TT. In addition, we find evidence that agglomeration effects are more pronounced at the province level rather than larger regions. We also find a positive effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on TT, and academic research and development (R&D) is complementary to TT.

Policy relevance

Technology transfer (TT) is a goal of Chinese CDM legislation, but it is not a prerequisite for project approval. Our estimations show the project specific, technological and region-specific features that encourage more TT among CDM projects. Some variables analysed such as R&D spending and FDI (both are found to have positive effects on TT) can be, to some extent, influenced by the policy-makers. Moreover, we find some evidence for the presence of negative agglomeration effects on the provincial level: the likelihood of TT is decreasing in the number of previous projects operating in the same technology and province. This finding needs to be interpreted with great caution. It may suggest the existence of a learning externality, which could serve as a justification for policy intervention. Any policy intervention requires however careful analysis of potential positive or negative externalities resulting from the agglomeration of CDM projects and a comparison of possible benefits with the costs of TT.     

Cleaner generation,free-riders,and environmental integrity: clean development mechanism and the power sector

This article provides a first-cut estimate of the potential impacts of the clean development mechanism (CDM) on electricity generation and carbon emissions in the power sector of non-Annex 1 countries. We construct four illustrative CDM regimes that represent a range of approaches under consideration within the climate community. We examine the impact of these CDM regimes on investments in new generation, under illustrative carbon trading prices of US$ 10 and 100/t C. In the cases that are most conducive to CDM activity, roughly 94% of new generation investments remains identical to the without-CDM situation, with only 6% shifting from higher to lower carbon intensity technologies. We estimate that the CDM would bolster renewable energy generation by as little as 15% at US$ 10/t C, or as much as 300% at US$ 100/t C.A striking finding comes from our examination of the potential magnitude of the “free-rider” problem, i.e. crediting of activities that will occur even in the absence of the CDM. The CDM is intended to be globally carbon-neutral — a project reduces emissions in the host country but generates credits that increase emissions in the investor country. However, to the extent that unwarranted credits are awarded to non-additional projects, the CDM would increase global carbon emissions above the without-CDM emissions level. Under two of the CDM regimes considered, cumulative free-riders credits total 250–600 Mt C through the end of the first budget period in 2012. This represents 10–23% of the likely OECD emissions reduction requirement during the first budget period. Since such a magnitude of free-rider credits from non-additional CDM projects could threaten the environmental integrity of the Kyoto protocol, it is imperative that policy makers devise CDM rules that encourage legitimate projects, while effectively screening out non-additional activities.     

Accounting methods for carbon credits: impacts on the minimum area of forestry projects under the Clean Development Mechanism

Abstract

The Ninth Conference of the Parties (COP-9) decided to adopt an accounting system based on expiring carbon credits to address the problem of non-permanent carbon storage in forests established under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This article reviews and discusses carbon accounting methods that were under consideration before COP-9 and presents a model which calculates the minimum area that forest plantation projects should reach to be able to compensate CDM transaction costs with the revenues from carbon credits. The model compares different accounting methods under various sets of parameters on project management, transaction costs, and carbon prices. Model results show that under current carbon price and average transaction costs, projects with an area of less than 500 ha are excluded from the CDM, whatever accounting method is used. Temporary crediting appears to be the most favorable approach to account for non-permanent carbon removal in forests and also for the feasibility of smaller projects. However, lower prices for credits with finite lifetimes may prevent the establishment of CDM forestry projects. Also, plantation projects with low risk of unexpected carbon loss and sufficient capacity for insuring or buffering the risk of carbon re-emission would benefit from equivalence-adjusted average carbon storage accounting rather than from temporary crediting.     

How to attribute market leakage to CDM projects

Abstract

Economic studies suggest that market leakage rates of greenhouse gas abatement can reach the two-digit percentage range. Although the Marrakesh Accords require Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects to account for leakage, most projects neglect market leakage. Insufficient leakage accounting is facilitated by a lack of applicable methods regarding the quantification and attribution of project-related leakage effects. This article proposes a method for attributing CDM-related market leakage effects to individual projects. To this purpose, alternative attribution methods are analysed. We find that project-specific approaches fail to take account of market leakage effects. Consequently, we propose to estimate aggregate market leakage effects and attribute them proportionally to individual projects. We suggest that predetermined commodity-specific leakage factors are applied by project developers to any emission reductions that are associated with a project's leakage-relevant demand or supply changes. This approach is conservative, equitable, incentive-compatible and applicable at manageable costs.     

Can CDM finance energy access in Least Developed Countries? Evidence from Tanzania

Policy documents and academic literature suggest that Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) finance could complement traditional ‘energy access’ (EA) funding in developing countries, including the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Yet these propositions have not been empirically tested. This study helps fill this gap by examining constraints to CDM project passage through five stages of an idealized project development cycle (PDC) in Tanzania, and their implications for the ability of the CDM to contribute to financing energy access in LDCs. Twenty-five semi-structured interviews and documentary material were analysed using an analytical framework developed for systematic investigation of constraints. Institutional constraints such as the under-performance of Tanzania's Designated National Authority were the most often mentioned obstacles for project development. Yet non-institutional constraints such as limited energy sector mitigation potential, indigenous skill shortages, and low carbon market prices also hinder project development. Institutional constraints buttress, rather than supersede, pre-existing non-institutional constraints, and together they prevent energy projects from completing the PDC and accessing CDM finance. The number and severity of constraints suggest that the situation is unlikely to change rapidly, and that the CDM sustains and exacerbates existing global inequalities. Since traditional energy access funding is insufficient to address these inequalities, new funding and policy mechanisms are required.

Policy relevance

The CDM fails to fill the EA financing gap in Tanzania. This is also true for other LDCs where comparable project development challenges prevail. The CDM therefore appears to sustain uneven development patterns overlooking those most in need. Claims about its potential to enhance EA are misplaced, and the situation is unlikely to change rapidly. CDM and carbon market projects more widely will have limited ability to help financing EA in LDCs, even if the institutional setting within which they are implemented were reformed in the future. Yet traditional energy funding will be inadequate on its own. The debate over extending the CDM post-2017, when the second Kyoto Protocol commitment period expires, should be informed by honest appraisal of its merits and defects. Policy makers should revisit lessons provided by this article and wider research to help ensure that new EA mechanisms are not hampered by constraints and can benefit those most in need.