The economics of boldness: equity,action, and hope

Equity is usually interpreted in terms of the concept of justice, such that an equitable share of the atmospheric space is understood in terms of past emissions. This emphasizes the collective nature of sharing the burden of mitigation and the duty to act for those who have emitted the most. An alternative is considered: the aggregate costs and benefits to all Parties that could result from both increasing the level of collective ambition and implementing a climate regime that supports bold actions across all Parties. The regional impacts and carbon flow costs across differentiated scenarios are assessed and it is argued that the majority of developing-country Parties would be better off if a high ambition outcome to which all contributed, but some more than others. Moreover, those with middle or low emissions would have proportionally more to gain (or lose) relative to the level of ambition compared to those that have had higher emissions. The climate regime should be built on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities (CBDR&RC), in which all act early even if some do much more; one that accounts for justice but does not forget hope.

Policy relevance

Differing interpretations of equity and the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are discussed, with a focus on how these can enhance or hinder collective action. Whilst the climate change negotiations are usually taken as games in which one party gains and another loses, and interactions are dogged by continuous conflict, it is explored instead how negotiation responses can be framed in terms of cooperation. This would emphasize the gains that could be achieved by common but differentiated collective action, which could result in a collective avoidance of impacts. The possibilities that this shift of perspective could bring are explored by comparing costs under global cooperation (or lack of it). It is found that cooperation reduces the total costs for these regions. Thus, thinking in terms of cooperation focuses the options for negotiation on the means and interpretations of the UNFCCC principles that spur action and avoid climate impacts through collective action.     

The UNFCCC as a negotiation forum: towards common but more differentiated responsibilities

The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRC) captures the idea that it is the common responsibility of states to protect and restore the environment but that the levels and forms of states’ individual responsibilities may be differentiated according to their own national circumstances. This principle has shaped the evolution of the climate regime and has played an important role in promoting compromise and agreement. It is argued that some twenty years after the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the principle of CBDRC remains as relevant as ever. The practice of Parties under the regime and, most recently, the concerted efforts to shape and flesh out the meaning of the principle, underscore the central role that it plays. At the same time, the binary understanding of CBDRC in the Kyoto Protocol is being replaced with a more nuanced, multifaceted understanding. The evolving interpretation of CBDRC is considered, and its continued relevance as the nucleus of a global burden-sharing regime for addressing climate change is demonstrated.

Policy relevance

The development of a common understanding of the principle of CBDRC is essential for the burden sharing and responsibilities under a future climate agreement. The CBDRC principle captures the idea that it is the common responsibility of states to protect and restore the environment, but that the levels and forms of states’ individual responsibilities may be differentiated according to their own national circumstances. This article informs the international climate change negotiations by considering the development of the principle of CBDRC under the UNFCCC over time. It is concluded that, although there has been a significant shift in how the principle is understood, it remains crucial to the integrity and stability of the climate regime.     

马德里气候大会盘点及全球气候治理展望

《联合国气候变化框架公约》（简称《公约》）第25次缔约方会议取得了一定进展,但未能就各方最为关注的《巴黎协定》第六条市场机制实施细则达成一致。会议成果平淡主要有4个原因:第一,过度强调提高各方减排目标力度而未能聚焦《巴黎协定》第六条相关谈判;第二,主席国和部分缔约方急切将各方尚未形成政治共识的提高承诺力度问题引入谈判进程,破坏了谈判氛围;第三,各个议题推进不平衡;第四,发达国家企图逃避责任,促使发展中国家更加团结并形成对立。展望2020年的全球气候多边进程形势,《巴黎协定》第六条相关谈判将继续作为重点,提高力度也将成为讨论主题,但片面强调1.5℃目标可能引发重谈《巴黎协定》风险,同时发达国家背弃《公约》、转嫁责任意图明显。全球气候治理应聚焦落实承诺的力度,并平行推进《公约》及其《巴黎协定》的实施。     

Catching air? Climate change policy in Russia,Ukraine and Kazakhstan

Abstract

Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have each participated actively in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conferences of the Parties, and each is developing domestic rules and institutions to address UN obligations under the treaties. Russia and Ukraine are each Annex I/Annex B countries. Kazakhstan will become Annex I upon ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, but has not yet established itself as Annex B. Each state has evolved a distinct set of policies and priorities in the domestic and the international arena. Drawing largely on interviews in each country, this article presents brief histories of the evolution of climate policy, focusing on each state's behavior in the international arena, the sources of domestic policy leadership, and the forces that led to change in each national approach. Current policies and practices are evaluated with an eye towards learning from the successes and failures in each state.     

Intellectual property rights and low carbon technology transfer: Conflicting discourses of diffusion and development

Intellectual property rights (IPRs) and the transfer of low carbon technologies to developing countries have been the focus of sustained disagreement between many developed and developing country Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). We argue that this disagreement stems from two conflicting political discourses of economic development and low carbon technology diffusion which tend to underpin developing and developed countries’ respective motivations for becoming party to the Convention. We illustrate the policy implications of these discourses by examining empirical evidence on IPRs and low carbon technology transfer and highlight how the two discourses are based on an incomplete understanding of the role of technological capacity in either economic development or technology diffusion. This has important implication for the success of post-2012 international climate agreements.     

Catching air? Climate change policy in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan

Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have each participated actively in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conferences of the Parties, and each is developing domestic rules and institutions to address UN obligations under the treaties. Russia and Ukraine are each Annex I/Annex B countries. Kazakhstan will become Annex I upon ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, but has not yet established itself as Annex B. Each state has evolved a distinct set of policies and priorities in the domestic and the international arena. Drawing largely on interviews in each country, this article presents brief histories of the evolution of climate policy, focusing on each state’s behavior in the international arena, the sources of domestic policy leadership, and the forces that led to change in each national approach. Current policies and practices are evaluated with an eye towards learning from the successes and failures in each state.     

Reducing emissions from deforestation—The “combined incentives” mechanism and empirical simulations

Despite accounting for 17–25% of anthropogenic emissions, deforestation was not included in the Kyoto Protocol. The UN Convention on Climate Change is considering its inclusion in future agreements and asked its scientific board to study methodological and scientific issues related to positive incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation. Here we present an empirically derived mechanism that offers a mix of incentives to developing countries to reduce emissions from deforestation, conserve and possibly enhance their ecosystem's carbon stocks. We also use recent data to model its effects on the 20 most forested developing countries. Results show that at low CO₂ prices (～US$ 8/t CO₂) a successful mechanism could reduce more than 90% of global deforestation at an annual cost of US$ 30 billion.     

Delivering the two degree global climate change target using a flexible ratchet framework

Global climate negotiations have been characterized by a divide between developed and developing nations – a split which has served as a persistent barrier to international agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process. Notable progress in bridging this division was achieved at the 21st Conference of the Parties meeting in Paris through the introduction of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). However, the collective ambition of submitted INDCs falls short of a global 2°C target, requiring an effective ratchet mechanism to review and increase national commitments. Inequitable distribution of additional responsibilities risks re-opening historic divisions between parties. This article presents a flexible ratchet framework which shares mitigation commitments on the basis of per capita equity in line with emerging requirements for a 2°C target. The framework has been designed through convergence between developed and developing nations; developed nation targets are based on an agreed standardized percentage reduction wherever emissions are above per capita equity; developing nations are required to peak emissions at or below per capita equity levels by an agreed convergence date. The proposed framework has the flexibility to be integrated with current INDCs and to evolve in line with shifting estimates of climate sensitivity.

Policy relevance

The outcome of the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) negotiations in Paris offered mixed results in terms of level of ambition and submitted national commitments. A global agreement to keep average global temperature rise below two degrees was maintained; however, current pledged Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) are projected to result in an average warming of close to three degrees. The implementation of a global ratchet mechanism to scale-up national commitments will remain key to closing this ambition gap to reach this two degree target. How this upscaling of responsibility is shared between parties will be a defining discussion point within future negotiations. This study presents a standardized, equity-based framework for how this ratchet mechanism can be implemented – a framework designed to be flexible for evolution in line with better understanding of climate sensitivity, and adaptable for integrations with current INDC proposals.     

The global carbon market-mechanism landscape: pre and post 2020 perspectives

With market-mechanisms likely to achieve emission reductions at lower cost than alternative approaches, there is a presumption that they will be embraced by those who are serious about achieving ambitious reductions. Two broad messages exist; there is already considerable activity and some ambition in many parts of the world – a fragmented but embryonic ‘global’ trading landscape is emerging – and there are efforts at UN level to provide a unifying framework for these bottom-up developments. The topography of interest and response varies considerably across groups of countries, and there have been delays in making progress on a unifying framework. This article analyses the current carbon market landscape in terms of market dynamics and market-mechanism developments whilst undertaking an examination of how climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is shaping the future carbon market landscape. This work shows that the combination of existing, emerging, and potential carbon market-mechanisms can be regarded as an emerging pre-2020 fragmented ‘global’ carbon market landscape based on differing bottom-up market based approaches. One outcome of a 2015 Climate Agreement could be a post-2020 global carbon market which would include new domestic and international market initiatives such as the Framework for Various Approaches and New Market Mechanism, together with reformed Kyoto mechanisms.

Policy relevance

With the 2015 Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) expected to see Parties commit to ambitious mitigation commitments, post-2020 could see significant Party (& industry) investment in market-mechanisms and associated emissions units in an effort to achieve some of the abatement cost minimization offered by market approaches. This article is written for those who have an interest in understanding what is happening – and what is not happening – as regards the emergence of market-related approaches to GHG mitigation globally in the run up to the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC which meets in Paris in December 2015, and what could be the shape of things to come post-2020.     

未来联合国气候变化谈判的核心内容及前景展望——“巴厘路线图”解读

 详细介绍了《联合国气候变化框架公约》缔约方会议第13次会议通过的"巴厘路线图"的具体内容。"巴厘路线图"规划了未来两年将要谈判的重要议题,包括发达国家在2012年后减排温室气体义务;发展中国家未来温室气体减排行动;适应气候变化;发达国家未来向发展中国家提供技术转让、资金支持和能力建设等。这些议题谈判的成败,将对未来保护气候的国际努力、对未来全球的气候环境产生决定性影响,从而对谈判前景做了分析     

未来联合国气候变化谈判的核心内容及前景展望——“巴厘路线图”解读

详细介绍了《联合国气候变化框架公约》缔约方会议第13次会议通过的"巴厘路线图"的具体内容。"巴厘路线图"规划了未来两年将要谈判的重要议题,包括发达国家在2012年后减排温室气体义务;发展中国家未来温室气体减排行动;适应气候变化;发达国家未来向发展中国家提供技术转让、资金支持和能力建设等。这些议题谈判的成败,将对未来保护气候的国际努力、对未来全球的气候环境产生决定性影响,从而对谈判前景做了分析     

里约三公约交叉议题谈判进展及应对策略研究

气候变化、生物多样性、土地荒漠化的国际协作在全球范围内越来越受到重视。本文系统梳理了里约三公约交叉议题及其进展情况,并对其进行了综合评价。里约三公约交叉议题可归纳为减缓领域、适应领域、损失和损害以及战略计划和目标四大类,未来会日益强调基于生态系统方式实现协同增效。本文还提出了中国谈判及履约建议：(1)主动引领交叉议题谈判进程;(2)构建和完善国家协同履约机制;(3)结合南南合作、一带一路等开展区域合作。     

《巴黎协定》适应和损失损害内容的解读和对策

《巴黎协定》基本照顾了各缔约方的核心关切,坚持了《联合国气候变化框架公约》（以下简称《公约》）的原则,基本体现了发达国家和发展中国家的区分。在适应部分,《巴黎协定》设立了与全球温升目标相联系的全球适应目标,明确了对发展中国家的适应支持,并确定了具有一定法律约束力的全球适应信息通报和5年周期的全球盘点。在损失损害部分,《巴黎协定》锁定了《公约》下的华沙损失损害国际机制,并基本确定了一个各国通过可持续发展和国际合作共同解决损失损害问题的框架。但是,《巴黎协定》仍然没有解决很多技术性问题和缔约方之间关键性和实质性的分歧。中国作为发展中大国将继续在适应和损失损害问题中面临着出资压力,应通过增强国内适应行动、强化适应和损失损害相关研究和高效利用气候变化南南合作基金3个方面,为谈判争取主动并为推动全球适应气候变化减少损失损害做出贡献。     

Sharing the burden of financing adaptation to climate change

Climate change may cause most harm to countries that have historically contributed the least to greenhouse gas emissions and land-use change. This paper identifies consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethical principles to guide a fair international burden-sharing scheme of climate change adaptation costs. We use these ethical principles to derive political principles – historical responsibility and capacity to pay – that can be applied in assigning a share of the financial burden to individual countries. We then propose a hybrid ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ approach as a promising starting point for international negotiations on the design of burden-sharing schemes. A numerical assessment of seven scenarios shows that the countries of Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change would bear the bulk of the costs of adaptation, but contributions differ substantially subject to the choice of a capacity to pay indicator. The contributions are less sensitive to choices related to responsibility calculations, apart from those associated with land-use-related emissions. Assuming costs of climate adaptation of USD 100 billion per year, the total financial contribution by the Annex I countries would be in the range of USD 65–70 billion per year. Expressed as a per capita basis, this gives a range of USD 43–82 per capita per year.     

利马气候大会成果分析与展望

利马气候大会达成的《利马气候行动号令》明确了《联合国气候变化框架公约》所有原则,尤其是共同但有区别的责任原则适用于拟于2015年巴黎会议达成的新协议。会议还就“国家自主决定的贡献”等做出了决定。利马大会成果对2015年巴黎气候大会达成气候变化新协议具有重要推动作用。面对2020年后的新挑战,中国需尽快制定应对气候变化法,建立碳排放交易机制,促进对应对气候变化先进技术投资,以及加大参与治理国际气候变化事务力度。     

Introducing population-adjusted historical contributions to global warming

The 1997 Brazilian Proposal suggested that differentiated emissions reduction targets for Annex I parties of the UNFCCC should be based on the impact of their historic greenhouse gas emissions on global temperature rise. In this paper, we develop methodologies for (and undertake) population-adjusted historical responsibility calculations. These adjust national-level historical responsibility calculations for historical population trends. We find a weak correlation between current per capita emissions levels and population-adjusted historical responsibility. Our calculations may contribute to burden sharing schemes in future climate agreements.     

Corporate responses to the CDM: the Indian pulp and paper industry

The key outcomes of the 2006 Nairobi Conference on Climate Change are described, with a particular emphasis on adaptation, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the future of the United Nations climate change regime beyond 2012. Based on an analysis of the key issues being negotiated, the Nairobi Conference can be understood as an important step in the larger process towards a future climate change regime. Its significance is in establishing the confidence and trust between the key players that will be necessary for the successful completion of the current phase of negotiations and agreement on the post-2012 climate change regime.     

The role of non-nation-state actors and side events in the international climate negotiations

United Nations climate change conferences have attracted an increasing number and range of observer participants, often outnumbering national delegates. The interactions between the formal and informal spaces of climate governance at the Conference of the Parties (COP) are explored by investigating why non-nation state actors (NNSAs) attend them and by measuring to what extent official UN Side Events provide relevant information for the formal negotiations. Based on primary empirical research at recent COPs, it is found that 60–75% of Side Events have related directly to items under negotiation in the post-2012 climate negotiations. In this regard, Side Events that facilitate informal exchange between stakeholders not only provide input into the negotiations but also allow issues beyond the realm of the negotiations to be discussed, reflecting the scope of climate change. Although Side Events are an effective forum to exchange ideas and network, their current format and purpose as being events ‘on the side’ does not offer a sufficient framework for coordination between the work of NNSAs and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process.     

联合国气候变化框架公约下发展中国家的能力建设谈判回顾

增强发展中国家能力建设是全球应对气候变化的重要前提条件,而在联合国气候变化框架公约(UNFCCC)的谈判进程中,能力建设部分一直进展缓慢。自缔约方第7次会(COP7)上确定了发展中国家能力建设框架后,能力建设的机制建设一直没有取得实质性进展。在巴黎气候变化大会(COP21)上,缔约方一致通过了《巴黎协定》。《巴黎协定》首次授权通过执行附属机构(SBI)建立巴黎能力建设委员会(PCCB)。该委员会将全面协调对发展中国家能力建设的支持,同时监管2016-2020年的能力建设工作计划,全面系统地促进和增强发展中国家应对气候变化的能力建设活动。另外,《巴黎协定》还同意建立透明度能力建设倡议(CBIT)用以增强2020年前后的机制和技术能力。随后,全球环境基金(GEF)为该倡议成立了CBIT信托基金。至此,公约下能力建设议题已经建立了相对完整的国际机制。未来议题的谈判将走向务实与细节。随着全球应对气候变化迈向一个新阶段,中国在能力建设议题的谈判上也应做相应的调整。     

Differentiating (historic) responsibilities for climate change

Following the conclusion of the official work of the Ad Hoc Group for the Modelling and Assessment of Contributions to Climate Change (MATCH), this article considers the politically more sensitive aspect of the Brazilian proposal, namely the issue of differentiating (historic) responsibility for, and not merely (causal) contribution to climate change. Its aim is (1) to highlight the fact that, while related, the two issues (‘contribution to’ and ‘responsibility for’) are fundamentally different and should not be confused, and (2) to propose a methodology for calculating shares of responsibility as opposed to the shares in causal contribution arrived at through the MATCH results. Two conceptions of responsibility (‘strict’ or ‘limited’) are applied in order to operationalize the notion of ‘respective capabilities’ given in Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC. The key message resulting from the calculations is that causal contribution—while an important indicator of (environmental) relevance to the problem—must not be confused with the moral responsibility for it. The rather large difference between the responsibilities at the two extremes of the scale under both conceptions gives pause for thought as to what sorts of burdens can justly be demanded in any application of the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, whether in the context of the Brazilian proposal or beyond.