Would different methodologies for assessing carbon leakage exposure lead to different risk levels? A case study of the Brazilian industry

Energy-intensive industries play an important role in low-carbon development, being particularly exposed to climate policies. Concern over possible carbon leakage in this sector poses a major challenge for designing effective carbon pricing instruments (CPI). Different methodologies for assessing carbon leakage exposure are currently used by different jurisdictions, each of them based on different approaches and indicators. This paper aims to analyse the extent to which the use of different methodologies leads to different results in terms of exposure to the risk of carbon leakage, using the Brazilian industry sector as a case study. Results indicate that carbon leakage exposure is an expected outcome of eventual CPI implementation in Brazilian industry. However, results vary according to the chosen methodology, so the definition of the criteria is paramount for assessing sectoral exposure to the risk of carbon leakage.

Key policy insights

• Despite increasing discussion about the implementation of carbon pricing on the Brazilian industrial sector, the evaluation of carbon leakage risks is still neglected.

• Assessments of the risk of carbon leakage are directly related to the indicators and criteria used by each methodology. Thus, a given subsector may present different levels of exposure to carbon leakage depending on the methodological choice.

• More than a purely technical discussion, the methodological definition of carbon leakage risk is a political discussion – it can be well-conducted, leading to the success of a CPI, or even sabotaged, by implicitly subsidizing energy-intensive industries.

     

International and national climate policies for aviation: a review

Aviation constitutes about 2.5% of all energy-related CO₂ emissions and in addition there are non-CO₂ effects. In 2016, the ICAO decided to implement a Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) and in 2017 the EU decided on faster emission reductions in its Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which since 2012 includes the aviation sector. The effects of these policies on the expected development of air travel emissions from 2017 to 2030 have been analyzed. For the sample country Sweden, the analysis shows that when emissions reductions in other sectors are attributed to the aviation sector as a result of the EU ETS and CORSIA, carbon emissions are expected to reduce by ?0.8% per year (however if non-CO₂ emissions are included in the analysis, then emissions will increase). This is much less than what is needed to achieve the 2°C target. Our analysis of potential national aviation policy instruments shows that there are legally feasible options that could mitigate emissions in addition to the EU ETS and CORSIA. Distance-based air passenger taxes are common among EU Member States and through increased ticket prices these taxes can reduce demand for air travel and thus reduce emissions. Tax on jet fuel is an option for domestic aviation and for international aviation if bilateral agreements are concluded. A quota obligation for biofuels is a third option.

Key policy insights

• Existing international climate policies for aviation will not deliver any major emission reductions.

• Policymakers who want to significantly push the aviation sector to contribute to meeting the 2°C target need to work towards putting in place tougher international policy instruments in the long term, and simultaneously implement temporary national policy instruments in the near-term.

• Distance-based air passenger taxes, carbon taxes on jet fuel and quota obligations for biofuels are available national policy options; if they are gradually increased, and harmonized with other countries, they can help to significantly reduce emissions.

     

Electricity regulation in the Chinese national emissions trading scheme (ETS): lessons for carbon leakage and linkage with the EU ETS

Carbon leakage is central to the discussion on how to mitigate climate change. The current carbon leakage literature focuses largely on industrial production, and less attention has been given to carbon leakage from the electricity sector (the largest source of carbon emissions in China). Moreover, very few studies have examined in detail electricity regulation in the Chinese national emissions trading system (which leads, for example, to double counting) or addressed its implications for potential linkage between the EU and Chinese emissions trading systems (ETSs). This article seeks to fill this gap by analysing the problem of ‘carbon leakage’ from the electricity sector under the China ETS. Specifically, a Law & Economics approach is applied to scrutinize legal documents on electricity/carbon regulation and examine the economic incentive structures of stakeholders in the inter-/intra-regional electricity markets. Two forms of ‘electricity carbon leakage’ are identified and further supported by legal evidence and practical cases. Moreover, the article assesses the environmental and economic implications for the EU of potential linkage between the world’s two largest ETSs. In response, policy suggestions are proposed to address electricity carbon leakage, differentiating leakage according to its sources.

Key policy insights

• Electricity carbon leakage in China remains a serious issue that has yet to receive sufficient attention.

• Such leakage arises from the current electricity/carbon regulatory framework in China and jeopardizes mitigation efforts.

• With the US retreat on climate efforts, evidence suggests that EU officials are looking to China and expect an expanded carbon market to reinforce EU global climate leadership.

• Given that the Chinese ETS will be twice the size of the EU ETS, a small amount of carbon leakage in China could have significant repercussions. Electricity carbon leakage should thus be considered in any future EU–China linking negotiations.

     

Pricing carbon consumption: synthesizing an emerging trend

Nearly every carbon price regulates the production of carbon emissions, typically at midstream points of compliance such as power plants, consistent with typical advice from the literature. Since the early 2010s however, policymakers in Australia, California, China, Japan and Korea have implemented carbon prices that regulate the consumption of carbon emissions, where points of compliance are further downstream, such as distributors or final consumers. This article identifies the pivot towards placing the point of compliance for carbon prices further downstream as an emerging international trend, describes the designs of different prices on carbon consumption around the world, and explains the various motivations of the policymakers implementing them. Findings reveal that policymakers tend to layer prices on carbon consumption on top of prices on carbon production in an effort to improve economic outcomes by addressing incomplete pass-through of the carbon price from producer to consumer, thereby facilitating more cost-effective abatement. Policymakers also use prices on carbon consumption to reduce emissions leakage or because large producers of carbon are not within their jurisdiction. The prevalence of prices on carbon consumption will likely increase as evidenced by proposals in China and Europe.

Key policy insights

• The recent surge in the number of jurisdictions implementing prices on carbon consumption represents an emerging international trend.

• Policymakers use prices on carbon consumption in an effort to improve economic outcomes and capture environmental benefits.

• While this article offers insights that detail initial challenges and successes, whether these prices on carbon consumption actually achieve their intended goals is an academically rich topic that requires further research on individual policies.

     

Free allocation rules in the EU emissions trading system: what does the empirical literature show?

This paper analyses the rules for free allocation in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The analysis draws on the empirical evidence emerging from two literature strands. One group of studies sheds light on the following questions: how efficient are free allocation rules in minimizing the risk of carbon leakage? Have they become more efficient over the trading periods? What are the technical limits to making them more efficient? Further: is firm behaviour affected by allowance allocation? Did specific provisions induce strategic behaviour with unintended effects? Studies from the second group estimate sectoral pass-through rates for the costs imposed by the EU ETS. Taking cost pass-through into account is necessary for properly targeting free allocation. The difficulty of accurately quantifying sectoral differences in cost pass-through ability, especially in manufacturing sectors (due to limited data availability and market heterogeneity), is the main hindrance to achieving further efficiency in allowance allocation. The new rules defined in the reform for Phase IV (2021–2030) nevertheless make some progress in this direction.

Key policy insights

• The difficulty of accurately quantifying sectoral differences in cost pass-through ability is the main hindrance to efficient free allocation in minimizing carbon leakage risk.

• In Phase IV (2021–2030), carbon leakage risk will be assessed more accurately thanks to: a) carbon intensity and trade intensity considered together through a combined indicator; b) possible use of more disaggregated data, and c) possible consideration of complementary qualitative assessments of abatement potential, market characteristics and profit margins.

• It is expected that benchmarked allocation introduced in Phase III (2013–2020) has induced additional emission abatement, but there is still a lack of empirical evidence.

     

Governance of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS): accounting,rewarding, and the Paris agreement

Studies show that the ‘well below 2°C’ target from the Paris Agreement will be hard to meet without large negative emissions from mid-century onwards, which means removing CO₂ from the atmosphere and storing the carbon dioxide in biomass, soil, suitable geological formations, deep ocean sediments, or chemically bound to certain minerals. Biomass energy combined with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) is the negative emission technology (NET) given most attention in a number of integrated assessment model studies and in the latest IPCC reports. However, less attention has been given to governance aspects of NETs. This study aims to identify pragmatic ways forward for BECCS, through synthesizing the literature relevant to accounting and rewarding BECCS, and its relation to the Paris Agreement. BECCS is divided into its two elements: biomass and CCS. Calculating net negative emissions requires accounting for sustainability and resource use related to biomass energy production, processing and use, and interactions with the global carbon cycle. Accounting for the CCS element of BECCS foremost relates to the carbon dioxide capture rate and safe underground storage. Rewarding BECCS as a NET depends on the efficiency of biomass production, transport and processing for energy use, global carbon cycle feedbacks, and safe storage of carbon dioxide, which together determine net carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere. Sustainable biomass production is essential, especially with regard to trade-offs with competing land use. Negative emissions have an added value compared to avoided emissions, which should be reflected in the price of negative emission ‘credits’, but must be discounted due to global carbon cycle feedbacks. BECCS development will depend on linkages to carbon trading mechanisms and biomass trading.

Key policy insights

• A standardized framework for sustainable biomass should be adopted.

• Countries should agree on a standardized framework for accounting and rewarding BECCS and other negative emission technologies.

• Early government support is indispensable to enable BECCS development, scale-up and business engagement.

• BECCS projects should be designed to maximize learning across various applications and across other NETs.

• BECCS development should be aligned with modalities of the Paris Agreement and market mechanisms.

     

Striving for equivalency across the Alberta,British Columbia,Ontario and Québec carbon pricing systems: the Pan-Canadian carbon pricing benchmark

The Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change is designed to put Canada on track to meet its Paris commitments. A key pillar of the plan is the introduction of a pan-Canadian carbon price by the end of 2018. However, four Canadian provinces, nearly 85% of the Canadian economy and population, have already implemented carbon pricing systems. British Columbia (BC) has a carbon tax. Alberta is transitioning from an output-based allocation system for industrial emitters to a hybrid system combining a carbon levy and refined output-based system. Québec and Ontario have implemented cap-and-trade systems, linked to California. Recognizing these existing systems, rather than impose a single carbon pricing mechanism, the Pan-Canadian Approach to Carbon Pricing gives provinces and territories the flexibility to adopt a carbon tax, a hybrid system, or a cap-and-trade system. To address concerns relating to ‘fairness’ and equivalency of carbon price, a federal carbon pricing benchmark establishes criteria relating to minimum ‘common scope’ and ‘increases in stringency’ that provincial and territorial carbon pricing systems must meet. This article explores the design features of the existing Alberta, BC, Ontario and Québec carbon pricing systems, and considers how the benchmark affects stringency and addresses equivalency of carbon price across these different systems.

Key policy insights

• Canada is taking advantage of its federal structure of government to introduce a minimum pan-Canadian carbon price of $10/tCO₂e in 2018, rising by $10/year to $50/tCO₂e in 2022.

• Rather than imposing a uniform pricing mechanism, the Canadian federal government is recognizing existing subnational carbon pricing mechanisms with very different design features – BC’s carbon tax, Québec and Ontario’s cap-and-trade systems, and Alberta’s hybrid system – to deliver the pan-Canadian carbon price.

• In order to deliver a minimum level of increasing stringency and to address issues of equivalency of carbon price across sub-national jurisdictions, the federal government is in the early stages of implementing a federal carbon-pricing benchmark.

• The lessons learned from the Canadian experience will be relevant to harmonizing carbon pricing systems across both other federal jurisdictions and countries.

     

China’s national carbon emissions trading scheme: lessons from the pilot emission trading schemes,academic literature,and known policy details

Upon completion, China’s national emissions trading scheme (C-ETS) will be the largest carbon market in the world. Recent research has evaluated China’s seven pilot ETSs launched from 2013 on, and academic literature on design aspects of the C-ETS abounds. Yet little is known about the specific details of the upcoming C-ETS. This article combines currently understood details of China’s national carbon market with lessons learned in the pilot schemes as well as from the academic literature. Our review follows the taxonomy of Emissions Trading in Practice: A Handbook on Design and Implementation (Partnership for Market Readiness & International Carbon Action Partnership. (2016). Retrieved from www.worldbank.org): The 10 categories are: scope, cap, distribution of allowances, use of offsets, temporal flexibility, price predictability, compliance and oversight, stakeholder engagement and capacity building, linking, implementation and improvements.

Key policy insights

• Accurate emissions data is paramount for both design and implementation, and its availability dictates the scope of the C-ETS.

• The stakeholder consultative process is critical for effective design, and China is able to build on its extensive experience through the pilot ETSs.

• Current policies and positions on intensity targets and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits constrain the market design of the C-ETS.

• Most critical is the nature of the cap. The currently discussed rate-based cap with ex post adjustment is risky. Instead, an absolute, mass-based emissions cap coupled with the conditional use of permits would allow China to maintain flexibility in the carbon market while ensuring a limit on CO₂ emissions.

     

Mapping and clustering the adoption of carbon pricing policies: what polities price carbon and why?

Carbon pricing, including carbon taxes and emissions trading, has been adopted by different kinds of polities worldwide. Yet, beyond the increasing adoption over time, little is known about what polities – countries as well as sub- and supranational entities – adopt carbon pricing and why. This paper explores patterns of adoption (both implemented policies and those scheduled to be) through cluster analysis, with the purpose of investigating factors that could explain polities’ decisions to adopt carbon pricing. The study contributes empirically by studying carbon taxes and emissions trading together and by ordering the polities adopting carbon pricing into clusters. It also contributes theoretically, by exploring constellations of variables that drive the adoption of carbon pricing within individual clusters. We investigated 66 adopted policies of carbon pricing, which were divided into five clusters: early adopters, North-American subnational entities, Chinese pilot provinces, second-wave developed polities, and second-wave developing polities. The analysis indicates that the reasons for adopting carbon pricing have shifted over time. While international factors (climate commitments or influences from polities within the same region) are increasingly salient, domestic factors (including crises and income levels) were more important for the early adopters.

Key policy insights

• Carbon pricing has become a global mainstream policy instrument.

• Economic and fiscal crises provide windows of opportunity for promoting carbon pricing.

• The international climate regime can support the adoption of carbon pricing through mitigation commitments and international financial and technical assistance.

• Learning between polities from the same region is a useful tool for promoting carbon pricing.

• Carbon intensive economies tend to prefer emissions trading over carbon taxes.

     

Environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement establishes provisions for using international carbon market mechanisms to achieve climate mitigation contributions. Environmental integrity is a key principle for using such mechanisms under the Agreement. This paper systematically identifies and categorizes issues and options to achieve environmental integrity, including how it could be defined, what influences it, and what approaches could mitigate environmental integrity risks. Here, environmental integrity is assumed to be ensured if the engagement in international transfers of carbon market units leads to the same or lower aggregated global emissions. Four factors are identified that influence environmental integrity: the accounting for international transfers; the quality of units generated, i.e. whether the mechanism ensures that the issuance or transfer of units leads to emission reductions in the transferring country; the ambition and scope of the mitigation target of the transferring country; and incentives or disincentives for future mitigation action, such as possible disincentives for transferring countries to define future mitigation targets less ambitiously or more narrowly in order to sell more units. It is recommended that policy-makers combine several approaches to address the significant risks to environmental integrity.

Key policy insights

• Robust accounting is a key prerequisite for ensuring environmental integrity. The diversity of nationally determined contributions is an important challenge, in particular for avoiding double counting and for ensuring that the accounting for international transfers is representative for the mitigation efforts by Parties over time.

• Unit quality can, in theory, be ensured through appropriate design of carbon market mechanisms; in practice, existing mechanisms face considerable challenges in ensuring unit quality. Unit quality could be promoted through guidance under Paris Agreement Article 6, and reporting and review under Article 13.

• The ambition and scope of mitigation targets is key for the incentive for transferring countries to ensure unit quality because countries with ambitious and economy-wide targets would have to compensate for any transfer of units that lack quality. Encouraging countries to adopt ambitious and economy-wide NDC targets would therefore facilitate achieving environmental integrity.

• Restricting transfers in instances of high environmental integrity risk – through eligibility criteria or limits – could complement these approaches.

     

The roles of network embeddedness,market incentives,and slack resources in the adoption of clean technologies by firms in developing countries

Worldwide carbon dioxide emissions continue to increase driven by fossil fuel consumption and industrial discharges. Progress on carbon emission reduction requires firms to adopt clean technologies which minimize material and energy consumption. Technological change is particularly required in developing countries, where industrial emissions often lead to chronic urban pollution problems. In this study, we explore the antecedents of clean technology strategy by firms in developing countries. We combine the contingent natural resource-based view with the relational view to examine how network embeddedness, market incentives and slack resources influence adoption of clean technology. The empirical support for our hypotheses comes from data obtained from 342 firms that operated in the carbon-offset market during the years 2007 to 2009. We find that a firm’s relational network structure influences adoption of clean technologies, particularly when market incentives are low. Contrary to one of the hypotheses, the results of our paper suggest a negative relationship between a firm’s slack resources and its clean technology strategy. Our study highlights the benefits of networks in fostering adoption of clean technology in developing countries. Furthermore, we find that high market incentives (carbon price) decrease the probability of clean technology adoption, so adding to the view that firms respond to carbon-offset rules to realize high carbon revenues at the lowest cost.

Key policy insights

• High market incentives (carbon price) decrease the probability that firms in developing countries will adopt clean technology.

• This adds to concerns about the capability of the Clean Development Mechanism to deliver sustainable development.

• Even where market incentives are low, firms in developing countries are more likely to adopt clean technologies when they are embedded in a closed network of connected partners.

• To stimulate adoption of clean technology in developing countries, policy makers should focus on initiatives to facilitate partnerships between organizations operating in the carbon market and create opportunities for knowledge sharing and learning.

• By changing the policy focus to networks of organizations, the carbon market can bring about positive change in terms of shifting the firm behaviour.

     

Beyond carbon pricing: policy levers for negative emissions technologies

This paper explores policies for Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs), in an attempt to move beyond the supply-side focus of the majority of NETs research, as well as the current dominance of carbon pricing as the main NETs policy proposal. The paper identifies a number of existing policies from four key areas – energy/transport, agriculture, sub-soil, and oceans – which will have an impact on three NETs: Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), Direct Air Capture (DAC), and terrestrial Enhanced Rock Weathering (ERW). We propose that non-climate co-benefits may be valuable in terms of the policy ‘demand pull’ for NETs; in particular, we find that ERW may provide multiple co-benefits which can be mandated through existing policy structures. However, interaction with numerous policy areas may also create barriers, particularly where there is tension between the priorities of different government departments. On the basis of existing and analogous policies from a range of geographical contexts and scales, this paper proposes four options for NETs policy that could be reasonably implemented in the near-term. We also argue that ERW demonstrates the importance of scale and framing, because the policy environment depends on whether it is framed as a soil amendment at local scales or as a climate stabilization technique at international scale.

Key policy insights

• Co-benefits may assist the ‘demand pull’ for novel technologies by providing multiple policy angles for incentivisation rather than relying on a ‘fix-all’ policy such as a high carbon price.

• DAC with storage might be overly reliant on a high carbon price, because it only provides one core benefit – that of atmospheric carbon reduction.

• ERW may provide multiple co-benefits which can be mandated through existing policy structures, but should focus on using waste rock rather than mining virgin material.

• We propose four near-term options for NETs policy: funding for small-scale BECCS demonstration and an international biomass certification mechanism; small-scale loans for ERW on farms and promotion of locally-sourced rock residues; amendment of fertilizer subsidy schemes to include silicate rock; and a clearer framework for licensing sub-soil access for CO₂ storage.

     

Perceived fairness and public acceptability of carbon pricing: a review of the literature

While carbon pricing is widely seen as a crucial element of climate policy and has been implemented in many countries, it also has met with strong resistance. We provide a comprehensive overview of public perceptions of the fairness of carbon pricing and how these affect policy acceptability. To this end, we review evidence from empirical studies on how individuals judge personal, distributional and procedural aspects of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade. In addition, we examine preferences for particular redistributive and other uses of revenues generated by carbon pricing and their role in instrument acceptability. Our results indicate a high concern over distributional effects, particularly in relation to policy impacts on poor people, in turn reducing policy acceptability. In addition, people show little trust in the capacities of governments to put the revenues of carbon pricing to good use. Somewhat surprisingly, most studies do not indicate clear public preferences for using revenues to ensure fairer policy outcomes, notably by reducing its regressive effects. Instead, many people prefer using revenues for ‘environmental projects’ of various kinds. We end by providing recommendations for improving public acceptability of carbon pricing. One suggestion to increase policy acceptability is combining the redistribution of revenue to vulnerable groups with the funding for environmental projects, such as on renewable energy.

Key policy insights

• If people perceive carbon pricing instruments as fair, this increases policy acceptability and support.

• People’s satisfaction with information provided by the government about the policy instrument increases acceptability.

• While people express high concern over uneven distribution of the policy burden, they often prefer using carbon pricing revenues for environmental projects instead of compensation for inequitable outcomes.

• Recent studies find that people’s preferences shift to using revenues for making policy fairer if they better understand the functioning of carbon pricing, notably that relatively high prices of CO₂-intensive goods and services reduce their consumption.

• Combining the redistribution of revenue to support both vulnerable groups and environmental projects, such as on renewable energy, seems to most increase policy acceptability.

     

Maladaptation and development as usual? Investigating climate change mitigation and adaptation projects in Cambodia

ABSTRACT

Based on research into multiple types of climate change mitigation and adaptation (CCMA) projects and policies in Cambodia, this paper documents intersecting social and environmental conflicts that bear striking resemblance to well-documented issues in the history of development projects. Using data from three case studies, we highlight the ways that industrial development and CCMA initiatives are intertwined in both policy and project creation, and how this confluence is creating potentials for maladaptive outcomes. Each case study involves partnerships between international institutions and the national government, each deploys CCMA as either a primary or supporting legitimation, and each failed to adhere to institutional and/or internationally recognized standards of justice. In Cambodia, mismanaged projects are typically blamed on the kleptocratic and patrimonial governance system. We show how such blame obscures the collusion of international partners, who also sidestep their own safeguards, and ignores the potential for maladaptation at the project level and the adverse social and environmental impacts of the policies themselves.

Key policy insights

• Initiatives to mitigate or adapt to climate change look very much like the development projects that caused climate change: Extreme caution must be exercised to ensure policies and projects do not exacerbate the conditions driving climate change.

• Safeguards ‘on paper’ are insufficient to avoid negative impacts and strict accountability mechanisms must be put in place.

• Academic researchers can be part of that accountability mechanism through case study reports, policy briefs, technical facilitation to help ensure community needs are met and safeguards are executed as written.

• Impacts beyond the project scale must be assessed to avoid negative consequences for social and ecological systems at the landscape level.

     

Carbon taxes and greenhouse gas emissions trading systems: what have we learned?

Systematic evidence relating to the performance of carbon pricing – carbon taxes and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading systems (ETSs) – is sparse. In 2015, 17 ETSs were operational in 55 jurisdictions while 18 jurisdictions collected a carbon tax. The papers in this special thematic section review the performance of many of these instruments over the 2005–2015 period. The performance of existing carbon taxes and GHG ETSs can help policy makers make informed choices about whether to introduce these instruments and to improve their design. The purpose of carbon pricing instruments is to reduce GHG emissions cost effectively. Assessing their performance is difficult because emissions are also affected by other policies and exogenous factors such as economic conditions. Carbon taxes in Europe prior to 2008 and in British Columbia reduced emissions from business-as-usual but actual emissions continued to rise. Since 2008 emissions subject to European carbon taxes have declined, but in most countries, other mitigation policies have probably contributed more to the reductions than the carbon taxes. Emissions subject to ETSs, with the exception of four systems without emissions caps, have declined. The ETSs contributed to the emissions reductions, but their share of the overall reduction is not known. Most tax rates are low relative to levels thought to be needed to achieve climate change objectives. Few jurisdictions regularly adjust their tax rates. All ETSs have accumulated surplus allowances and implemented measures to reduce these surpluses. The largest ETSs now specify annual reductions in their emissions cap several years into the future. Emissions trading system allowance prices are generally lower than the tax rates.

Key policy insights

• Theoretical discussions usually portray carbon taxes and GHG ETSs as alternatives. In practice, a jurisdiction often implements both instruments to address emissions by different sources.

• Designs of ETSs have evolved based on experience shared bilaterally and via dedicated institutions.

• Carbon tax designs, in contrast, have hardly evolved and there are no institutions dedicated to sharing experience.

• Every jurisdiction with an ETS and/or carbon tax also has other policies that affect its GHG emissions.

     

Achievability of the Paris Agreement targets in the EU: demand-side reduction potentials in a carbon budget perspective

Limiting global warming to ‘well below’ 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5°C is an integral part of the 2015 Paris Agreement. To achieve these aims, cumulative global carbon emissions after 2016 should not exceed 940 – 390?Gt of CO₂ (for the 2°C target) and 167 – ?48?Gt of CO₂ (for the 1.5°C target) by the end of the century. This paper analyses the EU’s cumulative carbon emissions in different models and scenarios (global models, EU-focused models and national carbon mitigation scenarios). Due to the higher reductions in energy use and carbon intensity of the end-use sectors in the national scenarios, we identify an additional mitigation potential of 26–37 Gt cumulative CO₂ emissions up to 2050 compared to what is currently included in global or EU scenarios. These additional reductions could help to both reduce the need for carbon dioxide removals and bring cumulative emissions in global and EU scenarios in line with a fairness-based domestic EU budget for a 2°C target, while still remaining way above the budget for 1.5°C.

Key policy insights

• Models used for policy advice such as global integrated assessment models or EU models fail to consider certain mitigation potential available at the level of sectors.

• Global and EU models assume significant levels of CO₂ emission reductions from carbon capture and storage to reach the 1.5°C target but also to reach the 2°C target.

• Global and EU model scenarios are not compatible with a fair domestic EU share in the global carbon budget either for 2°C or for 1.5°C.

• Integrating additional sectoral mitigation potential from detailed national models can help bring down cumulative emissions in global and EU models to a level comparable to a fairness-based domestic EU share compatible with the 2°C target, but not the 1.5°C aspiration.

     

Targeting carbon dioxide removal in the European Union

In principle, many climate policymakers have accepted that large-scale carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is necessary to meet the Paris Agreement’s mitigation targets, but they have avoided proposing by whom CDR might be delivered. Given its role in international climate policy, the European Union (EU) might be expected to lead the way. But among EU climate policymakers so far there is little talk on CDR, let alone action. Here we assess how best to ‘target’ CDR to motivate EU policymakers exploring which CDR target strategy may work best to start dealing with CDR on a meaningful scale. A comprehensive CDR approach would focus on delivering the CDR volumes required from the EU by 2100, approximately at least 50 Gigatonnes (Gt) CO₂, according to global model simulations aiming to keep warming below 2°C. A limited CDR approach would focus on an intermediate target to deliver the CDR needed to reach ‘net zero emissions’ (i.e. the gross negative emissions needed to offset residual positive emissions that are too expensive or even impossible to mitigate). We argue that a comprehensive CDR approach may be too intimidating for EU policymakers. A limited CDR approach that only addresses the necessary steps to reach the (intermediate) target of ‘net zero emissions’ is arguably more achievable, since it is a better match to the existing policy paradigm and would allow for a pragmatic phase-in of CDR while avoiding outright resistance by environmental NGOs and the broader public.

Key policy insights

• Making CDR an integral part of EU climate policy has the potential to significantly reshape the policy landscape.

• Burden sharing considerations would probably play a major role, with comprehensive CDR prolonging the disparity and tensions between progressives and laggards.

• Introducing limited CDR in the context of ‘net zero’ pathways would retain a visible primary focus on decarbonization but acknowledge the need for a significant enhancement of removals via ‘natural’ and/or ‘engineered’ sinks.

• A decarbonization approach that intends to lead to a low level of ‘residual emissions’ (to be tackled by a pragmatic phase-in of CDR) should be the priority of EU climate policy.

     

Piecemeal or combined? Assessing greenhouse gas mitigation spillovers in US forest and agriculture policy portfolios

ABSTRACT

Forest and agricultural sector response to comprehensive climate policy is well represented in the literature. Less analysis has been devoted to piecemeal solutions. We use the Forest and Agriculture Sector Optimization Model with Greenhouse Gases (FASOMGHG) to project the individual and combined effect of three existing U.S. Department of Agriculture programmes with potential to increase greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation. We find that a combined policy scenario may achieve greater mitigation than individual constituent programmes, suggesting the possibility of complementary spillover effects in some periods. Mitigation varies over time, however, and some periods experience net emissions as markets and management practices respond to initial policy shocks. The regional distribution of GHG mitigation also varies between policy scenario. Differences in the magnitude and imputed cost of mitigation under each scenario, generating negative values for some programmes and time periods, reinforces the need to evaluate portfolio design to cost-effectively achieve near-term GHG mitigation.

Key policy insights

• Increased near-term GHG mitigation in the forest and agriculture sectors in the US may be possible by expanding or refocusing the emphasis of existing programmes.

• Implementing several such forest and agricultural programmes simultaneously may lead to greater GHG mitigation than when implemented separately, indicating the possibility of positive spillover effects.

• Programmes targeted to agricultural management may hold outsized potential to achieve near-term GHG mitigation; Policies aimed at influencing land use conversion appear to be more vulnerable to reversion and subject to larger inter-annual swings.

• The staged implementation of programmes could also be useful, helping to encourage increased mitigation (or the retention of already achieved mitigation) over time as markets re-equilibrate to initial shocks.

• Though the particular scenarios assessed here are unique to the US, our findings may be applicable to other locations outside the US where land management is influenced by individual market actors and there is competition between forest and agricultural land uses.

     

Land restoration in food security programmes: synergies with climate change mitigation

Food-insecure households in many countries depend on international aid to alleviate acute shocks and chronic shortages. Some food security programmes (including Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program–PSNP – which provides a case study for this article) have integrated aid in exchange for labour on public works to reduce long-term dependence by investing in the productive capacity and resilience of communities. Using this approach, Ethiopia has embarked upon an ambitious national programme of land restoration and sustainable land management. Although the intent was to reduce poverty, here we show that an unintended co-benefit is the climate-change mitigation from reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and increased landscape carbon stocks. The article first shows that the total reduction in net GHG emissions from PSNP’s land management at the national scale is estimated at 3.4 million?Mg?CO₂e?y^?1 – approximately 1.5% of the emissions reductions in Ethiopia’s Nationally Determined Contribution for the Paris Agreement. The article then explores some of the opportunities and constraints to scaling up of this impact.

Key policy insights

• Food security programmes (FSPs) can contribute to climate change mitigation by creating a vehicle for investment in land and ecosystem restoration.

• Maximizing mitigation, while enhancing but not compromising food security, requires that climate projections, and mitigation and adaptation responses should be mainstreamed into planning and implementation of FSPs at all levels.

• Cross-cutting oversight is required to integrate land restoration, climate policy, food security and disaster risk management into a coherent policy framework.

• Institutional barriers to optimal implementation should be addressed, such as incentive mechanisms that reward effort rather than results, and lack of centralized monitoring and evaluation of impacts on the physical environment.

• Project implementation can often be improved by adopting best management practices, such as using productive living livestock barriers where possible, and increasing the integration of agroforestry and non-timber forest products into landscape regeneration.

     

On the radiation characteristics of Antarctic Sea Ice

Abstract

Radiative measurements were carried out continuously during a cruise from Australia to Antarctica during austral summer 1995/96. Both shortwave and longwave radiative fluxes were measured. Some of the results are:

• The incoming solar radiation had a mean value of 217 W m^–2; this was a relatively weak value due to the large amount of fractional cloud cover observed. The sun was, for a large part of the trip, above the horizon for 24 hours a day.

• The reflectivity varied widely, not only as a function of sea‐ice concentration, but also as a function of ice type.

• Snow covered pack ice gave the highest albedo values (<70%), while flooded sea ice and thin ice reflected much less (<30%).

• For each sea‐ice type, short term observations showed a good relationship between albedo and ice concentration.

• The albedo increased with decreasing solar elevation.

• The net longwave radiation was negative (mean –27 W m–2); this small absolute value is due to a high amount of fractional cloud cover. There was a weak diurnal variation with a maximum loss (–33 W m^–2) in the early afternoon.

• On the average, the net radiation was positive for 17 hours, and negative for 7 hours a day. However, the duration of a positive balance depended strongly on the surface albedo.

• For the observed albedo values, modelling results showed that the net radiation was always positive when averaged over a day. The magnitude, however, depended strongly on the surface albedo, varying by more than the factor of three.